Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harry S. Stonehill and Robert P. Brooks v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968) (evidence obtained in the Philippines in violation of the Fourth Amendment by foreign agents was admissible in federal court when the federal officers did not undertake or unlawfully participate in the unconstitutional search and seizure). 2006See, e.g., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968) (evidence obtained in the Philippines in violation of the Fourth Amendment by foreign agents was admissible in federal court when the federal officers did not undertake or unlawfully participate in the unconstitutional search and seizure). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2005Brown, 132 Wn.2d at 585 (applying the silver platter doctrine and framing the issue as “whether evidence lawfully obtained by police authorities in California should be suppressed in a criminal case in Washington State if similar action by Washington authorities would be in violation of Washington law”). ¶27 Here, Fowler does not dispute the court’s findings that (1) M.P.’s two telephone calls to Fowler complied with Oregon’s one-party consent law. 2005Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 585 , 940 P.2d 546 (applying the silver platter doctrine and framing the issue as "whether evidence lawfully obtained by police authorities in California should be suppressed in a criminal case in Washington State if similar action by Washington authorities would be in violation of Washington law."). ¶ 27 Here, Fowler does not dispute the court's findings that (1) M.P.'s two telephone calls to Fowler complied with Oregon's one-party consent law. | 2 | 5 |
Lustig v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006The term “silver platter” doctrine was coined in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 , 69 S. Ct. 1372 , 93 L. 2006The term “silver platter” doctrine was coined in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 , 69 S. Ct. 1372 , 93 L. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Fowlergreen2 sentences2005App. 676, 685 , 111 P.3d 1264 (2005). f43 As the trial court correctly ruled, the biological sample was lawfully obtained in Florida. 21 ¶44 Mezquia argues that the silver platter doctrine does not allow the admission of the evidence because there was an inappropriate level of cooperation and assistance between Florida and Washington officials as participants in a national database. 2005State v. Fowler, 127 Wash.App. 676, 680 , 111 P.3d 1264, 1265 (2005). *386 ¶ 43 As the trial court correctly ruled, the biological sample was lawfully obtained in Florida. [21] ¶ 44 Mezquia argues that the silver platter doctrine does not allow the admission of the evidence because there was an inappropriate level of cooperation and assistance between Florida and Washington officials as participants in a national database. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bradleygreen2 sentences2005See State v. Bradley, 105 Wash.2d 898 , 719 P.2d 546 (1986); State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wash.App. 370 , 20 P.3d 430 (2001). ¶ 42 Rather, the admissibility of the DNA sample obtained in another jurisdiction is governed by the silver platter doctrine under which evidence that is apparently lawfully and independently obtained in another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington, even if such evidence if obtained in Washington would violate Washington law. 2005See State v. Bradley, 105 Wash.2d 898 , 719 P.2d 546 (1986); State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wash.App. 370 , 20 P.3d 430 (2001). ¶ 42 Rather, the admissibility of the DNA sample obtained in another jurisdiction is governed by the silver platter doctrine under which evidence that is apparently lawfully and independently obtained in another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington, even if such evidence if obtained in Washington would violate Washington law. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Elkins v. United States
green
2 sentences2006In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), the Supreme Court abolished the so-called silver platter doctrine, whereby it was previously permissible for federal courts to receive into evidence items which were obtained in a state search by means which, if engaged in by federal officers, would constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 2006In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), the Supreme Court abolished the so-called silver platter doctrine, whereby it was previously permissible for federal courts to receive into evidence items which were obtained in a state search by means which, if engaged in by federal officers, would constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. | 4 | 1997–2019 |
State v. Gwinner
green
2 sentences2019See, e.g., Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529 ; Gwinner, 59 Wn. 2005State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 587-88 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997); State v. Gwinner, 59 Wn. | 4 | 1997–2019 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2005State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 587-88 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997). 2005Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 585 , 940 P.2d 546 (applying the silver platter doctrine and framing the issue as "whether evidence lawfully obtained by police authorities in California should be suppressed in a criminal case in Washington State if similar action by Washington authorities would be in violation of Washington law."). ¶ 27 Here, Fowler does not dispute the court's findings that (1) M.P.'s two telephone calls to Fowler complied with Oregon's one-party consent law. | 4 | 2005–2005 |
Wolf v. Colorado
red
2 sentences2006The Elkins Court noted that the foundation upon which the admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal court originally rested — that unreasonable state searches did not violate the federal constitution — had disappeared in 1949 with the holding of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S. Ct. 1359 , 93 L. 2006The Elkins Court noted that the foundation upon which the admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal court originally rested — that unreasonable state searches did not violate the federal constitution — had disappeared in 1949 with the holding of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S. Ct. 1359 , 93 L. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Mendez
red
2 sentences2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999). 2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2005We conclude the DNA test results were admissible under the silver platter doctrine and the trial court properly denied Mezquia’s motion to suppress the evidence EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE ¶48 Mezquia argues that under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L. 2005We conclude the DNA test results were admissible under the silver platter doctrine and the trial court properly denied Mezquia’s motion to suppress the evidence EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE ¶48 Mezquia argues that under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Mendez
red
2 sentences2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999). 2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Duncan
green
2 sentences2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999). 2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Gimarelli
green
2 sentences2005App. 370 , 20 P.3d 430 (2001). ¶42 Rather, the admissibility of the DNA sample obtained in another jurisdiction is governed by the silver platter doctrine under which evidence that is apparently lawfully and independently obtained in another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington, even if such evidence if obtained in Washington would violate Washington law. 2005See State v. Bradley, 105 Wash.2d 898 , 719 P.2d 546 (1986); State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wash.App. 370 , 20 P.3d 430 (2001). ¶ 42 Rather, the admissibility of the DNA sample obtained in another jurisdiction is governed by the silver platter doctrine under which evidence that is apparently lawfully and independently obtained in another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington, even if such evidence if obtained in Washington would violate Washington law. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Duncan
green
2 sentences2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999). 2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Eisfeldt
green
1 sentence2020App. at 910 . 17 State v. Eisefeldt, 163 Wn.2d 628, 636 , 185 P.3d 580 (2008). 7 81837-6-I/8 conducts his search.” 18 The private search doctrine does not apply in Washington. 19 But, the silver platter doctrine provides that “evidence lawfully obtained under the laws of another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington courts even if the evidence was obtained in a manner that would violate Washington law.” 20 Here, Dropbox, a private entity, conducted a search of Knight’s Dropbox files. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Eisfeldt
green
1 sentence2020App. at 910 . 17 State v. Eisefeldt, 163 Wn.2d 628, 636 , 185 P.3d 580 (2008). 7 81837-6-I/8 conducts his search.” 18 The private search doctrine does not apply in Washington. 19 But, the silver platter doctrine provides that “evidence lawfully obtained under the laws of another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington courts even if the evidence was obtained in a manner that would violate Washington law.” 20 Here, Dropbox, a private entity, conducted a search of Knight’s Dropbox files. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Mezquia
green
1 sentence2019State v. Mezquia, 129 Wn. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Perrone
green
2 sentences2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption 2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Reep
neutral
1 sentence2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Luther
green
1 sentence2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Luther
green
1 sentence2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Reep
green
1 sentence2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2005In Blakely , the Supreme Court held that "`[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). ¶ 49 The jury did not determine whether the State proved the factual basis for Mezquia's exceptional sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. 2005In Blakely , the Supreme Court held that "`[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). ¶ 49 The jury did not determine whether the State proved the factual basis for Mezquia's exceptional sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2005State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 587-88 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997). [2] Because significant portions of M.P.'s first call to Fowler contained static and were not discernible, Detective Wilson requested that M.P. call a second time. [3] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [4] Although briefly implied in the trial court's ruling, the parties do not discuss constitutional privacy rights. 2005State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 587-88 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997). [2] Because significant portions of M.P.'s first call to Fowler contained static and were not discernible, Detective Wilson requested that M.P. call a second time. [3] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [4] Although briefly implied in the trial court's ruling, the parties do not discuss constitutional privacy rights. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Gimarelli
green
1 sentence2005See State v. Bradley, 105 Wash.2d 898 , 719 P.2d 546 (1986); State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wash.App. 370 , 20 P.3d 430 (2001). ¶ 42 Rather, the admissibility of the DNA sample obtained in another jurisdiction is governed by the silver platter doctrine under which evidence that is apparently lawfully and independently obtained in another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington, even if such evidence if obtained in Washington would violate Washington law. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Fowler
green
1 sentence2005State v. Fowler, 127 Wash.App. 676, 680 , 111 P.3d 1264, 1265 (2005). *386 ¶ 43 As the trial court correctly ruled, the biological sample was lawfully obtained in Florida. [21] ¶ 44 Mezquia argues that the silver platter doctrine does not allow the admission of the evidence because there was an inappropriate level of cooperation and assistance between Florida and Washington officials as participants in a national database. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Mollica
green
2 sentences1997Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). [147] Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327 ). [148] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327-29 ). [149] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329-30 ). [150] Id. at 125, 796 P.2d 728 . [151] Id. (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329 ). [152] Id. [153] Johnson, 75 Wash.App. at 700 , 879 P.2d 984 (quoting Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 ). [154] Ex. 89, tape 2, side 1. [155] The trial court found an agency relationship was created when the State asked the Palm Spr 1997Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). [147] Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327 ). [148] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327-29 ). [149] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329-30 ). [150] Id. at 125, 796 P.2d 728 . [151] Id. (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329 ). [152] Id. [153] Johnson, 75 Wash.App. at 700 , 879 P.2d 984 (quoting Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 ). [154] Ex. 89, tape 2, side 1. [155] The trial court found an agency relationship was created when the State asked the Palm Spr | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1997Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). [147] Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327 ). [148] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327-29 ). [149] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329-30 ). [150] Id. at 125, 796 P.2d 728 . [151] Id. (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329 ). [152] Id. [153] Johnson, 75 Wash.App. at 700 , 879 P.2d 984 (quoting Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 ). [154] Ex. 89, tape 2, side 1. [155] The trial court found an agency relationship was created when the State asked the Palm Spr 1997Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). [147] Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327 ). [148] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327-29 ). [149] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329-30 ). [150] Id. at 125, 796 P.2d 728 . [151] Id. (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329 ). [152] Id. [153] Johnson, 75 Wash.App. at 700 , 879 P.2d 984 (quoting Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 ). [154] Ex. 89, tape 2, side 1. [155] The trial court found an agency relationship was created when the State asked the Palm Spr | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.