silver platter doctrine (Washington) · Go Syfert
← Washington issues

silver platter doctrine in Washington

13 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Harry S. Stonehill and Robert P. Brooks v. United Statesgreen
ca9 · 1969 · cited in 3 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2006–2012
2 sentences

2012See, e.g., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968) (evidence obtained in the Philippines in violation of the Fourth Amendment by foreign agents was admissible in federal court when the federal officers did not undertake or unlawfully participate in the unconstitutional search and seizure).

2006See, e.g., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968) (evidence obtained in the Philippines in violation of the Fourth Amendment by foreign agents was admissible in federal court when the federal officers did not undertake or unlawfully participate in the unconstitutional search and seizure).

33
State v. Browngreen
wash · 1997 · cited in 5 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2005–2019
2 sentences

2005Brown, 132 Wn.2d at 585 (applying the silver platter doctrine and framing the issue as “whether evidence lawfully obtained by police authorities in California should be suppressed in a criminal case in Washington State if similar action by Washington authorities would be in violation of Washington law”). ¶27 Here, Fowler does not dispute the court’s findings that (1) M.P.’s two telephone calls to Fowler complied with Oregon’s one-party consent law.

2005Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 585 , 940 P.2d 546 (applying the silver platter doctrine and framing the issue as "whether evidence lawfully obtained by police authorities in California should be suppressed in a criminal case in Washington State if similar action by Washington authorities would be in violation of Washington law."). ¶ 27 Here, Fowler does not dispute the court's findings that (1) M.P.'s two telephone calls to Fowler complied with Oregon's one-party consent law.

25
Lustig v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1949 · cited in 3 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1985–2006
2 sentences

2006The term “silver platter” doctrine was coined in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 , 69 S. Ct. 1372 , 93 L.

2006The term “silver platter” doctrine was coined in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 , 69 S. Ct. 1372 , 93 L.

23
State v. Fowlergreen
washctapp · 2005 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005App. 676, 685 , 111 P.3d 1264 (2005). f43 As the trial court correctly ruled, the biological sample was lawfully obtained in Florida. 21 ¶44 Mezquia argues that the silver platter doctrine does not allow the admission of the evidence because there was an inappropriate level of cooperation and assistance between Florida and Washington officials as participants in a national database.

2005State v. Fowler, 127 Wash.App. 676, 680 , 111 P.3d 1264, 1265 (2005). *386 ¶ 43 As the trial court correctly ruled, the biological sample was lawfully obtained in Florida. [21] ¶ 44 Mezquia argues that the silver platter doctrine does not allow the admission of the evidence because there was an inappropriate level of cooperation and assistance between Florida and Washington officials as participants in a national database.

12
State v. Bradleygreen
wash · 1986 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005See State v. Bradley, 105 Wash.2d 898 , 719 P.2d 546 (1986); State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wash.App. 370 , 20 P.3d 430 (2001). ¶ 42 Rather, the admissibility of the DNA sample obtained in another jurisdiction is governed by the silver platter doctrine under which evidence that is apparently lawfully and independently obtained in another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington, even if such evidence if obtained in Washington would violate Washington law.

2005See State v. Bradley, 105 Wash.2d 898 , 719 P.2d 546 (1986); State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wash.App. 370 , 20 P.3d 430 (2001). ¶ 42 Rather, the admissibility of the DNA sample obtained in another jurisdiction is governed by the silver platter doctrine under which evidence that is apparently lawfully and independently obtained in another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington, even if such evidence if obtained in Washington would violate Washington law.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (24)

CaseCitedYears
Elkins v. United States green
scotus · 1960
2 sentences

2006In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), the Supreme Court abolished the so-called silver platter doctrine, whereby it was previously permissible for federal courts to receive into evidence items which were obtained in a state search by means which, if engaged in by federal officers, would constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

2006In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), the Supreme Court abolished the so-called silver platter doctrine, whereby it was previously permissible for federal courts to receive into evidence items which were obtained in a state search by means which, if engaged in by federal officers, would constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

41997–2019
State v. Gwinner green
washctapp · 1990
2 sentences

2019See, e.g., Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529 ; Gwinner, 59 Wn.

2005State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 587-88 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997); State v. Gwinner, 59 Wn.

41997–2019
State v. Brown green
wash · 1997
2 sentences

2005State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 587-88 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997).

2005Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 585 , 940 P.2d 546 (applying the silver platter doctrine and framing the issue as "whether evidence lawfully obtained by police authorities in California should be suppressed in a criminal case in Washington State if similar action by Washington authorities would be in violation of Washington law."). ¶ 27 Here, Fowler does not dispute the court's findings that (1) M.P.'s two telephone calls to Fowler complied with Oregon's one-party consent law.

42005–2005
Wolf v. Colorado red
scotus · 1949
2 sentences

2006The Elkins Court noted that the foundation upon which the admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal court originally rested — that unreasonable state searches did not violate the federal constitution — had disappeared in 1949 with the holding of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S. Ct. 1359 , 93 L.

2006The Elkins Court noted that the foundation upon which the admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal court originally rested — that unreasonable state searches did not violate the federal constitution — had disappeared in 1949 with the holding of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S. Ct. 1359 , 93 L.

22006–2006
State v. Mendez red
wash · 1999
2 sentences

2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999).

2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999).

22005–2005
Blakely v. Washington green
scotus · 2004
2 sentences

2005We conclude the DNA test results were admissible under the silver platter doctrine and the trial court properly denied Mezquia’s motion to suppress the evidence EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE ¶48 Mezquia argues that under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L.

2005We conclude the DNA test results were admissible under the silver platter doctrine and the trial court properly denied Mezquia’s motion to suppress the evidence EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE ¶48 Mezquia argues that under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L.

22005–2005
State v. Mendez red
wash · 1999
2 sentences

2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999).

2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999).

22005–2005
State v. Duncan green
wash · 2002
2 sentences

2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999).

2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999).

22005–2005
State v. Gimarelli green
washctapp · 2001
2 sentences

2005App. 370 , 20 P.3d 430 (2001). ¶42 Rather, the admissibility of the DNA sample obtained in another jurisdiction is governed by the silver platter doctrine under which evidence that is apparently lawfully and independently obtained in another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington, even if such evidence if obtained in Washington would violate Washington law.

2005See State v. Bradley, 105 Wash.2d 898 , 719 P.2d 546 (1986); State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wash.App. 370 , 20 P.3d 430 (2001). ¶ 42 Rather, the admissibility of the DNA sample obtained in another jurisdiction is governed by the silver platter doctrine under which evidence that is apparently lawfully and independently obtained in another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington, even if such evidence if obtained in Washington would violate Washington law.

22005–2005
State v. Duncan green
wash · 2002
2 sentences

2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999).

2005State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 171 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 214 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999).

22005–2005
State v. Eisfeldt green
wash · 2008
1 sentence

2020App. at 910 . 17 State v. Eisefeldt, 163 Wn.2d 628, 636 , 185 P.3d 580 (2008). 7 81837-6-I/8 conducts his search.” 18 The private search doctrine does not apply in Washington. 19 But, the silver platter doctrine provides that “evidence lawfully obtained under the laws of another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington courts even if the evidence was obtained in a manner that would violate Washington law.” 20 Here, Dropbox, a private entity, conducted a search of Knight’s Dropbox files.

12020–2020
State v. Eisfeldt green
wash · 2008
1 sentence

2020App. at 910 . 17 State v. Eisefeldt, 163 Wn.2d 628, 636 , 185 P.3d 580 (2008). 7 81837-6-I/8 conducts his search.” 18 The private search doctrine does not apply in Washington. 19 But, the silver platter doctrine provides that “evidence lawfully obtained under the laws of another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington courts even if the evidence was obtained in a manner that would violate Washington law.” 20 Here, Dropbox, a private entity, conducted a search of Knight’s Dropbox files.

12020–2020
State v. Mezquia green
washctapp · 2005
1 sentence

2019State v. Mezquia, 129 Wn.

12019–2019
State v. Perrone green
wash · 1992
2 sentences

2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption

2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption

12018–2018
State v. Reep neutral
wash · 2007
1 sentence

2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption

12018–2018
State v. Luther green
wash · 2006
1 sentence

2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption

12018–2018
State v. Luther green
wash · 2006
1 sentence

2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption

12018–2018
State v. Reep green
wash · 2007
1 sentence

2018But he does not provide any argument for why Washington should abandon the rule. -7- No. 74662-6-1/ 8 Particularity Next, Martinez contends that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad.13 The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption

12018–2018
Apprendi v. New Jersey green
scotus · 2000
2 sentences

2005In Blakely , the Supreme Court held that "`[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). ¶ 49 The jury did not determine whether the State proved the factual basis for Mezquia's exceptional sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.

2005In Blakely , the Supreme Court held that "`[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). ¶ 49 The jury did not determine whether the State proved the factual basis for Mezquia's exceptional sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.

12005–2005
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

2005State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 587-88 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997). [2] Because significant portions of M.P.'s first call to Fowler contained static and were not discernible, Detective Wilson requested that M.P. call a second time. [3] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [4] Although briefly implied in the trial court's ruling, the parties do not discuss constitutional privacy rights.

2005State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 587-88 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997). [2] Because significant portions of M.P.'s first call to Fowler contained static and were not discernible, Detective Wilson requested that M.P. call a second time. [3] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [4] Although briefly implied in the trial court's ruling, the parties do not discuss constitutional privacy rights.

12005–2005
State v. Gimarelli green
washctapp · 2001
1 sentence

2005See State v. Bradley, 105 Wash.2d 898 , 719 P.2d 546 (1986); State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wash.App. 370 , 20 P.3d 430 (2001). ¶ 42 Rather, the admissibility of the DNA sample obtained in another jurisdiction is governed by the silver platter doctrine under which evidence that is apparently lawfully and independently obtained in another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington, even if such evidence if obtained in Washington would violate Washington law.

12005–2005
State v. Fowler green
washctapp · 2005
1 sentence

2005State v. Fowler, 127 Wash.App. 676, 680 , 111 P.3d 1264, 1265 (2005). *386 ¶ 43 As the trial court correctly ruled, the biological sample was lawfully obtained in Florida. [21] ¶ 44 Mezquia argues that the silver platter doctrine does not allow the admission of the evidence because there was an inappropriate level of cooperation and assistance between Florida and Washington officials as participants in a national database.

12005–2005
State v. Mollica green
nj · 1989
2 sentences

1997Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). [147] Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327 ). [148] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327-29 ). [149] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329-30 ). [150] Id. at 125, 796 P.2d 728 . [151] Id. (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329 ). [152] Id. [153] Johnson, 75 Wash.App. at 700 , 879 P.2d 984 (quoting Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 ). [154] Ex. 89, tape 2, side 1. [155] The trial court found an agency relationship was created when the State asked the Palm Spr

1997Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). [147] Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327 ). [148] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327-29 ). [149] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329-30 ). [150] Id. at 125, 796 P.2d 728 . [151] Id. (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329 ). [152] Id. [153] Johnson, 75 Wash.App. at 700 , 879 P.2d 984 (quoting Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 ). [154] Ex. 89, tape 2, side 1. [155] The trial court found an agency relationship was created when the State asked the Palm Spr

11997–1997
State v. Johnson green
washctapp · 1994
2 sentences

1997Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). [147] Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327 ). [148] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327-29 ). [149] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329-30 ). [150] Id. at 125, 796 P.2d 728 . [151] Id. (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329 ). [152] Id. [153] Johnson, 75 Wash.App. at 700 , 879 P.2d 984 (quoting Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 ). [154] Ex. 89, tape 2, side 1. [155] The trial court found an agency relationship was created when the State asked the Palm Spr

1997Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). [147] Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327 ). [148] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327-29 ). [149] Id. (citing Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329-30 ). [150] Id. at 125, 796 P.2d 728 . [151] Id. (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329 ). [152] Id. [153] Johnson, 75 Wash.App. at 700 , 879 P.2d 984 (quoting Gwinner, 59 Wash.App. at 125 , 796 P.2d 728 ). [154] Ex. 89, tape 2, side 1. [155] The trial court found an agency relationship was created when the State asked the Palm Spr

11997–1997

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030 (7) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.050 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.090 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.030 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.040 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.060 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

WA 13 (1985–2020) OR 5 (1968–2019) PA 4 (1973–2023) MT 3 (1982–1990) TX 2 (1992–2015) NY 2 (1962–1993) NJ 2 (1989–2021) IA 2 (2017–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check