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12 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc.green2 sentences2015Prejudice to the Nonmovant “[T]he prejudice warranting denial of a [motion to set aside a default judgment] must be substantial.” Kirtland, 524 So.2d at 607 . 2015The Millers argue that they would be prejudiced because, they say, setting aside the default judgment would “provide greater opportunity for fraud.” See Kirt-land, 524 So.2d at 607 (noting that, in some circumstances, “the delay may facilitate fraud and collusion, result in loss of evidence, and hinder discovery”). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Family Dollar Stores of Alabama, Inc.green2 sentences2015See Ex parte Family Dollar Stores of Alabama, Inc., 906 So.2d 892 (Ala.2005). 2015Id. at 897 . | 1 | 1 |
Maxwell v. Dawkinsgreen1 sentence2014Culverhouse, however, goes further and notes that not only has this Court never held that a trial court exceeded its discretion by considering a new argument presented in a post-judgment motion, but also, in Maxwell v. Dawkins, 974 So.2d 282, 286 (Ala.2006), this Court rejected an appellee’s argument to that effect: “It is true that [the appellant] did not raise the issue of his father’s mental capacity to revoke his will until he filed his motion for reconsideration after the trial court had granted [the appellee’s] motion for a summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Northingtongreen1 sentence2005Because the testimony concerning oral negotiations between [the Alfa agent] and [the plaintiff-insured] was admitted into evidence without objection, the trial court did not err in denying Alfa's motion for a directed verdict and its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict." 7 561 So.2d at 1044 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
green
2 sentences2015This undisputed testimony shows that [the Alfa defendants’] conduct was not intentional, and therefore would not support an award of punitive damages against them.” The Alfa defendants further asserted that the amount of punitive damages awarded was excessive and not supported by the record and was in violation of the principles established in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). 2015This undisputed testimony shows that [the Alfa defendants’] conduct was not intentional, and therefore would not support an award of punitive damages against them.” The Alfa defendants further asserted that the amount of punitive damages awarded was excessive and not supported by the record and was in violation of the principles established in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lowe v. Nationwide Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2015Thereafter, Alfa filed a “Motion to Realign Parties,”-which stated, in part: ■. , ,, “Pursuant to the principles set out in the case of Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 521 So.2d 1309 (Ala[1988]), Defendant Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company would move the Court to realign the parties so that Daniel Elijah Davis is a Defendant and to allow the Defendant Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company to opt out of the litigation.” Without explaining the findings on which its decision was based, the trial court denied Alfa’s motion. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ex Parte Edgar
green
1 sentence2011Construing Alfa's motion in this manner, the trial court had no authority to grant it." Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d at 684-85 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Haynes v. Alfa Financial Corp.
green
2 sentences2009Haynes, supra. See also National Union Fire Ins. 2009Haynes, supra . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cotton States Mutual Insurance v. Neese
green
2 sentences2005Based in part on caselaw from other jurisdictions, specifically Weekes v. Atlantic National Insurance Co. , 370 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1966), and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Neese , 254 Ga. 335 , 329 S.E.2d 136 (1985), they argued that *Page 198 the policy exclusion should not apply based on public-policy considerations. 2005Based in part on caselaw from other jurisdictions, specifically Weekes v. Atlantic National Insurance Co. , 370 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1966), and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Neese , 254 Ga. 335 , 329 S.E.2d 136 (1985), they argued that *Page 198 the policy exclusion should not apply based on public-policy considerations. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
cluster 274118
green
2 sentences2005Based in part on caselaw from other jurisdictions, specifically Weekes v. Atlantic National Insurance Co. , 370 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1966), and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Neese , 254 Ga. 335 , 329 S.E.2d 136 (1985), they argued that *Page 198 the policy exclusion should not apply based on public-policy considerations. 2005Based in part on caselaw from other jurisdictions, specifically Weekes v. Atlantic National Insurance Co., 370 F.2d 264 (9th Cir.1966), and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Neese, 254 Ga. 335 , 329 S.E.2d 136 (1985), they argued that *198 the policy exclusion should not apply based on public-policy considerations. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
American Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon
green
1 sentence2003Tort-of-Outrage Claim In American Road Service Co. v. Inmon , 394 So.2d 361 , 365 (Ala. 1980), this Court recognized that "one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from the distress. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby
green
2 sentences1999The court found the protections from excessive punitive-damages awards discussed in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989), and Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), to be sufficient to safeguard a defendant's constitutional due-process rights: "Due to the availability of procedures to safeguard against excessive punitive damage awards, the Plaintiffs in this case do not face the risk of being subjected to an award that exceeds either the limits of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution or the limits of the Constitution of the State of Alabama. 1999The court found the protections from excessive punitive-damages awards discussed in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), and Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), to be sufficient to safeguard a defendant's constitutional due-process rights: "Due to the availability of procedures to safeguard against excessive punitive damage awards, the Plaintiffs in this case do not face the risk of being subjected to an award that exceeds either the limits of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution or the limits of the Constitution of the State of Alabama. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hammond v. City of Gadsden
green
2 sentences1999The court found the protections from excessive punitive-damages awards discussed in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989), and Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), to be sufficient to safeguard a defendant's constitutional due-process rights: "Due to the availability of procedures to safeguard against excessive punitive damage awards, the Plaintiffs in this case do not face the risk of being subjected to an award that exceeds either the limits of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution or the limits of the Constitution of the State of Alabama. 1999The court found the protections from excessive punitive-damages awards discussed in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), and Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), to be sufficient to safeguard a defendant's constitutional due-process rights: "Due to the availability of procedures to safeguard against excessive punitive damage awards, the Plaintiffs in this case do not face the risk of being subjected to an award that exceeds either the limits of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution or the limits of the Constitution of the State of Alabama. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences1997I agree that we must reverse the trial court's grant of Alfa's motion for a new trial, but I do not agree that Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) dictates that result. 1997I agree that we must reverse the trial court's grant of Alfa's motion for a new trial, but I do not agree that Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) dictates that result. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hilliar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1997Hilliar, supra. However, Compass Bank says that it too did not receive the notice of cancellation. 1997Hilliar, supra . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Matter of Williams
green
2 sentences1997Independent research by the Court, however, reveals that the State of Georgia, in the case of [ In re: Williams , 266 Ga. 132 , 464 S.E.2d 816 (1996)], has specifically held public indecency not to be a crime involving moral turpitude . . . . "[While] the same research seems to indicate that the 'Georgia rule' is a minority rule in this country, and even though this Court believes such conduct to be base, vile and immoral to the extent it should be deemed to involve moral turpitude, the Court, at the same time, is bound by Georgia's holding on this point." In considering whether the trial cour 1997Independent research by the Court, however, reveals that the State of Georgia, in the case of [ In re: Williams , 266 Ga. 132 , 464 S.E.2d 816 (1996)], has specifically held public indecency not to be a crime involving moral turpitude . . . . "[While] the same research seems to indicate that the 'Georgia rule' is a minority rule in this country, and even though this Court believes such conduct to be base, vile and immoral to the extent it should be deemed to involve moral turpitude, the Court, at the same time, is bound by Georgia's holding on this point." In considering whether the trial cour | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.