party seeking to establish waiver in California

1997The applicable standard of review is summarized in Christensen v. Dewor Developments (1983) 33 Cal.3d 778, 781-782 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 8 , 661 P.2d 1088 ] (which affirmed a trial court’s finding of waiver): Although the burden of proof is heavy on the party seeking to establish waiver, which should not lightly be inferred in light of public policy favoring arbitration, a determination by a trial court that the right to compel arbitration has been waived ordinarily involves a question of fact, which is binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence.

1997The applicable standard of review is summarized in Christensen v. Dewor Developments (1983) 33 Cal.3d 778, 781-782 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 8 , 661 P.2d 1088 ] (which affirmed a trial court’s finding of waiver): Although the burden of proof is heavy on the party seeking to establish waiver, which should not lightly be inferred in light of public policy favoring arbitration, a determination by a trial court that the right to compel arbitration has been waived ordinarily involves a question of fact, which is binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence.

2023The appellate court may not reverse the trial court’s finding of waiver unless the record as a matter of law compels finding nonwaiver.” (Davis, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 211 .) Moreover, “[i]f more than one reasonable inference may be drawn from undisputed facts, the substantial evidence rule requires indulging the inferences favorable to the trial court’s judgment.” (Davis, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 211 .) “ ‘When, however, the facts are undisputed and only one inference may reasonably be drawn, the issue is one of law and the reviewing court is not bound by the trial court’s ruling.’ ”

2023The appellate court may not reverse the trial court’s finding of waiver unless the record as a matter of law compels finding nonwaiver.” (Davis, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 211 .) Moreover, “[i]f more than one reasonable inference may be drawn from undisputed facts, the substantial evidence rule requires indulging the inferences favorable to the trial court’s judgment.” (Davis, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 211 .) “ ‘When, however, the facts are undisputed and only one inference may reasonably be drawn, the issue is one of law and the reviewing court is not bound by the trial court’s ruling.’ ”

1986Courts will closely scrutinize any claims of waiver [citations], and ‘“indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Moreover, the burden of proof is ‘heavy’ and rests on the party seeking to establish waiver [citations] which ‘is not to be lightly inferred.’ [Citations.]” (Keating v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 584, 604-605 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 645 P.2d 1192 ].) Although there is no single test for establishing waiver, factors to consider include whether the party seeking arbitration has (1) previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to in

1986Courts will closely scrutinize any claims of waiver [citations], and ‘“indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Moreover, the burden of proof is ‘heavy’ and rests on the party seeking to establish waiver [citations] which ‘is not to be lightly inferred.’ [Citations.]” (Keating v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 584, 604-605 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 645 P.2d 1192 ].) Although there is no single test for establishing waiver, factors to consider include whether the party seeking arbitration has (1) previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to in

2010Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195 .) Like the “clear and convincing” standard of proof, these higher burdens guide the trial court’s determination, but do not alter the standard of review on appeal. “ ‘It was the trial court’s duty to determine whether’ the petitioners met their ‘burden of proof; it is our duty to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that it did.’ ” (In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1382 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1566, 1576 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 24 ].) “Although t

2010Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195 .) Like the “clear and convincing” standard of proof, these higher burdens guide the trial court’s determination, but do not alter the standard of review on appeal. “ ‘It was the trial court’s duty to determine whether’ the petitioners met their ‘burden of proof; it is our duty to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that it did.’ ” (In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1382 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1566, 1576 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 24 ].) “Although t

2010Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195 .) Like the “clear and convincing” standard of proof, these higher burdens guide the trial court’s determination, but do not alter the standard of review on appeal. “ ‘It was the trial court’s duty to determine whether’ the petitioners met their ‘burden of proof; it is our duty to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that it did.’ ” (In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1382 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1566, 1576 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 24 ].) “Although t

2010Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195 .) Like the “clear and convincing” standard of proof, these higher burdens guide the trial court’s determination, but do not alter the standard of review on appeal. “ ‘It was the trial court’s duty to determine whether’ the petitioners met their ‘burden of proof; it is our duty to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that it did.’ ” (In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1382 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1566, 1576 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 24 ].) “Although t

1983Courts will closely scrutinize any claims of waiver [citations] and ‘ “indulge every intendment to give effect to [arbitration] proceedings.” [Citations.]’ Moreover, the burden of proof is ‘heavy’ and rests on the party seeking to establish waiver [citations] which ‘is not to be lightly inferred.’ [Citations.]” (Keating v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 604-605.) We explained that while there is no “single test” for establishing waiver, “the relevant factors include whether the party seeking arbitration (1) has ‘previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to invoke arbitration,

1983Courts will closely scrutinize any claims of waiver [citations] and ‘ “indulge every intendment to give effect to [arbitration] proceedings.” [Citations.]’ Moreover, the burden of proof is ‘heavy’ and rests on the party seeking to establish waiver [citations] which ‘is not to be lightly inferred.’ [Citations.]” (Keating v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 604-605.) We explained that while there is no “single test” for establishing waiver, “the relevant factors include whether the party seeking arbitration (1) has ‘previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to invoke arbitration,

1982Co. v. Townsend (1976) 58 Cal. App.3d 1, 9 [129 Cal. Rptr. *605 489].)" ( Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist., supra, 23 Cal.3d 180, 189 .) Moreover, the burden of proof is "heavy" and rests on the party seeking to establish waiver ( Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. General Elec.

1982Co. v. Townsend (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 1, 9 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 489 ].)” (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist., supra, 23 Cal.3d 180, 189 .) Moreover, the burden of proof is “heavy” and rests on the party seeking to establish waiver (Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. General Elec.