statute contains requirement in Florida

2017See Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999) ("We are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the [l]egislature.").

2014See T.P. v. State, 117 So.3d 864, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting McWhorter v. State, 971 So.2d 154, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)) (“... [U]nder section 776.013, a person who is attacked is allowed to stand his or her ground and ‘meet force -with force.’ It appears that the new law places no duty on the person to avoid or retreat from danger, so long as that person is not engaged in an unlawful activity and is located in a place where he or she has a right to be. § 776.013(3), Fla. Stat. (2005) (Internal citation omitted).”).

2014See T.P. v. State, 117 So.3d 864, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting McWhorter v. State, 971 So.2d 154, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)) (“... [U]nder section 776.013, a person who is attacked is allowed to stand his or her ground and ‘meet force -with force.’ It appears that the new law places no duty on the person to avoid or retreat from danger, so long as that person is not engaged in an unlawful activity and is located in a place where he or she has a right to be. § 776.013(3), Fla. Stat. (2005) (Internal citation omitted).”).

2009Citing Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1972), the D Amaño court distinguished negligence from an intentional tort as follows: Where a reasonable man would believe that a particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be held in the eyes of the law as though he had intended it....

2009However, the statute contains an exception “to any action based upon an intentional tort.” § 768.81(4)(b), Fla. Stat. Our supreme court “has defined an intentional tort as one in which the actor exhibits a deliberate intent to injure or engages in conduct which is substantially certain to result in injury or death.” D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 438 (Fla.2002).

2008Reynolds v. State, 842 So.2d 46, 51 (Fla.2002) (“That the statute contains a requirement of a general intent to commit an act that is obviously reasonably related to the harm sought to be avoided, rather than a more specific intent, is a choice for the Legislature.”); see also, Wright, 920 So.2d at 28-24 (the legislature has broad authority to determine intent requirements in defining crimes and courts must defer to the legislative determination on such matters as long as there is a rational basis for the legislative action). 5 In other words, placing oneself in actual physical control of a mo

2008Id.

2008Reynolds v. State, 842 So.2d 46, 51 (Fla.2002) (“That the statute contains a requirement of a general intent to commit an act that is obviously reasonably related to the harm sought to be avoided, rather than a more specific intent, is a choice for the Legislature.”); see also, Wright, 920 So.2d at 28-24 (the legislature has broad authority to determine intent requirements in defining crimes and courts must defer to the legislative determination on such matters as long as there is a rational basis for the legislative action). 5 In other words, placing oneself in actual physical control of a mo

1996Hewitt Contracting Co. v. Joyner Electric, Inc., 616 So.2d 190, 190-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Morris-Edge Masonry, Inc. v. Tonn & Blank, Inc., 461 So.2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). [5] Both courts hold, however, that the "issue can be decided only after both parties receive appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard." Hewitt Contracting Co. v. Joyner Electric, Inc., 616 So.2d at 191 ; Morris-Edge Masonry, Inc. v. Tonn & Blank, Inc., 461 So.2d at 1037 .

1996Hewitt Contracting Co. v. Joyner Electric, Inc., 616 So.2d 190, 190-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Morris-Edge Masonry, Inc. v. Tonn & Blank, Inc., 461 So.2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). [5] Both courts hold, however, that the "issue can be decided only after both parties receive appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard." Hewitt Contracting Co. v. Joyner Electric, Inc., 616 So.2d at 191 ; Morris-Edge Masonry, Inc. v. Tonn & Blank, Inc., 461 So.2d at 1037 .

1996Hewitt Contracting Co. v. Joyner Electric, Inc., 616 So.2d 190, 190-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Morris-Edge Masonry, Inc. v. Tonn & Blank, Inc., 461 So.2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). [5] Both courts hold, however, that the "issue can be decided only after both parties receive appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard." Hewitt Contracting Co. v. Joyner Electric, Inc., 616 So.2d at 191 ; Morris-Edge Masonry, Inc. v. Tonn & Blank, Inc., 461 So.2d at 1037 .

1996Hewitt Contracting Co. v. Joyner Electric, Inc., 616 So.2d 190, 190-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Morris-Edge Masonry, Inc. v. Tonn & Blank, Inc., 461 So.2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). [5] Both courts hold, however, that the "issue can be decided only after both parties receive appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard." Hewitt Contracting Co. v. Joyner Electric, Inc., 616 So.2d at 191 ; Morris-Edge Masonry, Inc. v. Tonn & Blank, Inc., 461 So.2d at 1037 .

1984See Bell v. State, 437 So.2d 1057 (Fla. 1983).