statute contains exception in California

2016The proper rule of statutory construction is that the statement of limited exceptions excludes others, and therefore the judiciary has no power to add additional exceptions; the enumeration of specific exceptions precludes implying others.’ [Citation.]” (In re James H. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083-1084 ; see also Building Profit Corp. v. Mortgage & Realty Trust (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [“ ‘When a statute contains an exception to a general rule laid down therein, that exception is strictly construed [citation] [and] [o]ther exceptions are necessarily excluded’ ”].) If the language of

2016The proper rule of statutory construction is that the statement of limited exceptions excludes others, and therefore the judiciary has no power to add additional exceptions; the enumeration of specific exceptions precludes implying others.' [Citation.]" (In re James H. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083-1084 ; see also Building Profit Corp. v. Mortgage & Realty Trust (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [" 'When a statute contains an exception to a general rule laid down therein, that exception is strictly construed [citation] [and] [o]ther exceptions are necessarily excluded' "].) If the language of

2007In support, Berry cites Goins v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1009-1010 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 470 ], which held: “When a statute contains an exception to a general rule laid down therein, that exception is strictly construed . . . [and o]ther exceptions are necessarily excluded. . . .

2007In support, Berry cites Goins v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1009-1010 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 470 ], which held: “When a statute contains an exception to a general rule laid down therein, that exception is strictly construed . . . [and o]ther exceptions are necessarily excluded. . . .

2022Co. of Cal. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 386, 392 [“ ‘It would seem . . . intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and . . . avoid, if not.’ ”].) For this reason the statute contains an exception to subdivision (c), provided in subdivision (d) of section 1281.91.

2021Co. of Cal. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 386, 392 [“ ‘It would seem . . . intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and . . . avoid, if not.’ ”].) For this reason the statute contains an exception to subdivision (c), provided in subdivision (d) of section 1281.91.

1994“Although the court did not render express findings on the factors delineated in the rule, and although it may be desirable that a court do so, there is no such mandate in the law. ‘The mere fact that the court did not explicitly refer to rule [373(e)], when the statute contains no such requirement does not support the conclusion that it was ignored.’ (Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. [1983] 34 Cal.3d [554,] 563 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 669 P.2d 9 ].) ‘ “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct.

1994“Although the court did not render express findings on the factors delineated in the rule, and although it may be desirable that a court do so, there is no such mandate in the law. ‘The mere fact that the court did not explicitly refer to rule [373(e)], when the statute contains no such requirement does not support the conclusion that it was ignored.’ (Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. [1983] 34 Cal.3d [554,] 563 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 669 P.2d 9 ].) ‘ “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct.

2023The presence of such a clause establishes a presumption in favor of severance.” (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 270 (Matosantos).) Where, as here, the statute contains no such clause, we consider whether the invalid provision is “ ‘grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.’ ” (Id. at p. 271.) As we explain below, we conclude the criteria for severability are satisfied.

2023The presence of such a clause establishes a presumption in favor of severance.” (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 270 .) Where, as here, the statute contains no such clause, we consider whether the invalid provision is “ ‘grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.’ ” (Id. at p. 271.) We agree with the analysis conducted in In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th 144 and similarly conclude the criteria for severability are satisfied.

2023And so we have said that ‘“[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral . . . forum.”’”].) We reject Lyft’s contention that, even apart from statutory standing, PAGA requires that “the non-individual PAGA claims must be adjudicated together with individual PAGA claims, or not at all.” The language of the statute contains no such requirement. “‘“Where the words of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the fac

2023(See Rancho Pauma Mutual Water Co. v. Yuima Municipal Water Dist., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 117 [defining ambiguity as “ ‘an unclear, indefinite, or equivocal . . . meaning’ ”].)10 “A word or expression is said to be ambiguous when it is ‘open to having several possible meanings or interpretations’ ” and “[a]mbiguities in a written instrument are either patent (arising from the face of the writing) or latent (based on consideration of extrinsic evidence).” (Ibid.) But Tina’s expert resolved that ambiguity, explaining that three days before the parties executed the February 2004 deed, Tina

2012(People v. Smith (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 630, 642 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 ]; see, e.g., Conservatorship of Rand (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 835, 842 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ] [bank account]; People v. Whisenand (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1394 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 501 ] [real property].) While the statutory language does not mandate an express finding of an ability to pay, the statute contains a presumption that those sentenced to prison do not have the ability to pay.

2012(People v. Smith (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 630, 642 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 ]; see, e.g., Conservatorship of Rand (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 835, 842 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ] [bank account]; People v. Whisenand (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1394 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 501 ] [real property].) While the statutory language does not mandate an express finding of an ability to pay, the statute contains a presumption that those sentenced to prison do not have the ability to pay.

2012(People v. Smith (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 630, 642 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 ]; see, e.g., Conservatorship of Rand (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 835, 842 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ] [bank account]; People v. Whisenand (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1394 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 501 ] [real property].) While the statutory language does not mandate an express finding of an ability to pay, the statute contains a presumption that those sentenced to prison do not have the ability to pay.

2012(People v. Smith (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 630, 642 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 ]; see, e.g., Conservatorship of Rand (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 835, 842 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ] [bank account]; People v. Whisenand (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1394 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 501 ] [real property].) While the statutory language does not mandate an express finding of an ability to pay, the statute contains a presumption that those sentenced to prison do not have the ability to pay.

2012(People v. Smith (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 630, 642 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 ]; see, e.g., Conservatorship of Rand (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 835, 842 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ] [bank account]; People v. Whisenand (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1394 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 501 ] [real property].) While the statutory language does not mandate an express finding of an ability to pay, the statute contains a presumption that those sentenced to prison do not have the ability to pay.

2012(People v. Smith (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 630, 642 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 ]; see, e.g., Conservatorship of Rand (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 835, 842 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ] [bank account]; People v. Whisenand (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1394 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 501 ] [real property].) While the statutory language does not mandate an express finding of an ability to pay, the statute contains a presumption that those sentenced to prison do not have the ability to pay.

2010(See, e.g., Biewend v. Biewend (1941) 17 Cal.2d 108, 115 [ 109 P.2d 701 ]; Grant v. McAuliffe (1953) 41 Cal.2d 859, 865 [ 264 P.2d 944 ]; accord, Miller v. Stauffler Chem.

2010(See, e.g., Biewend v. Biewend (1941) 17 Cal.2d 108, 115 [ 109 P.2d 701 ]; Grant v. McAuliffe (1953) 41 Cal.2d 859, 865 [ 264 P.2d 944 ]; accord, Miller v. Stauffler Chem.

2010(See, e.g., Biewend v. Biewend (1941) 17 Cal.2d 108, 115 [ 109 P.2d 701 ]; Grant v. McAuliffe (1953) 41 Cal.2d 859, 865 [ 264 P.2d 944 ]; accord, Miller v. Stauffler Chem.

2010(See, e.g., Biewend v. Biewend (1941) 17 Cal.2d 108, 115 [ 109 P.2d 701 ]; Grant v. McAuliffe (1953) 41 Cal.2d 859, 865 [ 264 P.2d 944 ]; accord, Miller v. Stauffler Chem.

2003(Goins v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1009 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 470 ] [when a statute contains an exception to a general rule laid down therein, that exception is strictly construed and other exceptions are necessarily excluded].) Moreover, section 701.680 uses the unequivocal words “absolute” and “may not be set aside for any reason.” (Yancey v. Fink, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1351 [“absolute,” as used in § 701.680, is synonymous with “ ‘without a right of redemption’ ”].) Section 701.680 also specifically protects the judgment debtor in the event of an improper sal

1995(Freeman v. Bentley (1992) 205 Ga.App. 409, 412 [ 422 S.E.2d 435, 436 ].) *451 Under section 9201, “Except as otherwise provided by this code a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors.” (Italics added.) This statute contains no requirement of perfection.

1995(Freeman v. Bentley (1992) 205 Ga.App. 409, 412 [ 422 S.E.2d 435, 436 ].) *451 Under section 9201, “Except as otherwise provided by this code a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors.” (Italics added.) This statute contains no requirement of perfection.

1991(Charles S. v. Board of Education (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 83, 95 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 422 ].) In reviewing the language of a statute, it must also be presumed that the Legislature “knew that it was saying and meant what it said.” (Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal 3d 760, 764 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 587 P.2d 227 ].) When a statute contains an exception to a general rule, that exception is strictly construed and other exceptions are excluded.

1991(Charles S. v. Board of Education (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 83, 95 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 422 ].) In reviewing the language of a statute, it must also be presumed that the Legislature “knew that it was saying and meant what it said.” (Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal 3d 760, 764 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 587 P.2d 227 ].) When a statute contains an exception to a general rule, that exception is strictly construed and other exceptions are excluded.

1991(Goins v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1009 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 470 ]; Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 567, 571 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 227 ].) Above all, the fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.

1991(Goins v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1009 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 470 ]; Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 567, 571 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 227 ].) Above all, the fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.