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12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Stategreen2 sentences2019The co-conspirator hearsay exception permits admission of the hearsay statement of a co-conspirator, made in the course of the conspiracy, so long as a prima facie case of conspiracy has been established apart from the hearsay statement itself.8 There was no error in allowing Harris to testify regarding Barnes’s statement.9 It was made to Harris during the concealment phase of the conspiracy to beat, kidnap, 7 See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258-260 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018). 8 (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898, 902 (2) ( 757 SE2d 102 ) (2014). 9 See id. at 2019The co-conspirator hearsay exception permits admission of the hearsay statement of a co-conspirator, made in the course of the conspiracy, so long as a prima facie case of conspiracy has been established apart from the hearsay statement itself.8 There was no error in allowing Harris to testify regarding Barnes’s statement.9 It was made to Harris during the concealment phase of the conspiracy to beat, kidnap, 7 See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258-260 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018). 8 (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898, 902 (2) ( 757 SE2d 102 ) (2014). 9 See id. at | 3 | 4 |
State v. Wilkinsgreen2 sentences2020The State argued below that the statement fell within the co-conspirator hearsay exception under OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E) (“Rule 801 (d) (2) (E)”), but now concedes that the trial court erred in admitting the statement under that exception based on our decision in State v. Wilkins, 302 Ga. 156 ( 805 SE2d 868 ) (2017), which was decided after Allen and McCray’s trial. 2020The State argued below that the statement fell within the co-conspirator hearsay exception under OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E) (“Rule 801 (d) (2) (E)”), but now concedes that the trial court erred in admitting the statement under that exception based on our decision in State v. Wilkins, 302 Ga. 156 ( 805 SE2d 868 ) (2017), which was decided after Allen and McCray’s trial. | 1 | 2 |
Franklin v. Stategreen2 sentences2020“The co-conspirator hearsay exception permits admission of the hearsay statement of a co-conspirator, made in the course of the conspiracy, so long as a prima facie case of conspiracy has been established apart 8 from the hearsay statement itself.” Franklin v. State, 298 Ga. 636, 639 (2) ( 784 SE2d 359 ) (2016) (punctuation omitted). 2020“The co-conspirator hearsay exception permits admission of the hearsay statement of a co-conspirator, made in the course of the conspiracy, so long as a prima facie case of conspiracy has been established apart 8 from the hearsay statement itself.” Franklin v. State, 298 Ga. 636, 639 (2) ( 784 SE2d 359 ) (2016) (punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Owens v. Stategreen1 sentence2019The co-conspirator hearsay exception permits admission of the hearsay statement of a co-conspirator, made in the course of the conspiracy, so long as a prima facie case of conspiracy has been established apart from the hearsay statement itself.8 There was no error in allowing Harris to testify regarding Barnes’s statement.9 It was made to Harris during the concealment phase of the conspiracy to beat, kidnap, 7 See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258-260 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018). 8 (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898, 902 (2) ( 757 SE2d 102 ) (2014). 9 See id. at | 1 | 1 |
Pitts v. Stategreen2 sentences2018A statement is testimonial if its “primary purpose . . . was to establish evidence that could be used in a future prosecution.” Pitts v. State, 280 Ga. 288, 289 ( 627 SE2d 17 ) 10 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the co-conspirator hearsay exception is now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E). 11 (2006). 2018A statement is testimonial if its “primary purpose . . . was to establish evidence that could be used in a future prosecution.” Pitts v. State, 280 Ga. 288, 289 ( 627 SE2d 17 ) 10 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the co-conspirator hearsay exception is now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E). 11 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
McKinney v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See McKinney v. State, 281 Ga. 92, 96 (4) ( 635 SE2d 153 ) (2006) (“[Statements admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception permitting the use of statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy are not ‘testimonial.’ Accordingly, the holding in Crawford is not applicable to the admission of the statements of the co-conspirators made during the pendency of the conspiracy.”) (citations omitted); Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842 (2) ( 770 SE2d 855 ) (2015); Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99 (4) ( 745 SE2d 583 ) (2013). 2016See McKinney v. State, 281 Ga. 92, 96 (4) ( 635 SE2d 153 ) (2006) (“[Statements admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception permitting the use of statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy are not ‘testimonial.’ Accordingly, the holding in Crawford is not applicable to the admission of the statements of the co-conspirators made during the pendency of the conspiracy.”) (citations omitted); Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842 (2) ( 770 SE2d 855 ) (2015); Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99 (4) ( 745 SE2d 583 ) (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Ardis v. Stategreen2 sentences2015As to the Confrontation Clause issue, “[a] defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by the witnesses against him is violated under Bruton ‘when co-defendants are tried jointly and the testimonial statement of a co-defendant who does not testify at trial is used to implicate the other co-defendant in the crime.’ ” Ardis v. State, 290 Ga. 58, 60 (2) (a) ( 718 SE2d 526 ) (2011). 2015As to the Confrontation Clause issue, “[a] defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by the witnesses against him is violated under Bruton ‘when co-defendants are tried jointly and the testimonial statement of a co-defendant who does not testify at trial is used to implicate the other co-defendant in the crime.’ ” Ardis v. State, 290 Ga. 58, 60 (2) (a) ( 718 SE2d 526 ) (2011). | 1 | 1 |
Perera v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See id. at 15 (post-arrest statements made by co-conspirators to third parties were properly admitted under the co-conspirator hearsay exception); accord Perera v. State, 295 Ga. 880 (5) ( 763 SE2d 687 ) (2014). 2015See id. at 15 (post-arrest statements made by co-conspirators to third parties were properly admitted under the co-conspirator hearsay exception); accord Perera v. State, 295 Ga. 880 (5) ( 763 SE2d 687 ) (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273 (3) (c) ( 731 SE2d 51 ) (2012). 2014See Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273 (3) (c) ( 731 SE2d 51 ) (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Silvers v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See also Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 48 (3) ( 597 SE2d 373 ) (2004) (“ ‘[t]he once-unavailable defendant who now seeks to exculpate his co-defendant lacks credibility ”). 4 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the co-conspirator hearsay exception is now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E). 2014See also Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 48 (3) ( 597 SE2d 373 ) (2004) (“ ‘[t]he once-unavailable defendant who now seeks to exculpate his co-defendant lacks credibility ”). 4 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the co-conspirator hearsay exception is now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App 2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App | 1 | 1 |
Duckworth v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App 2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App | 1 | 1 |
West v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App 2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App | 1 | 1 |
White v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App 2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App 2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App | 1 | 1 |
Givens v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App 2008See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (6) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997). 6 Although these statements were also double hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement rule satisfied any objection to these witnesses’ testimony as to their own out-of-court statements to Tyner; Jackson’s incriminating statements to White were admissible under the same theory as the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent; and the verbal act rule satisfied any hearsay objection to admission of Kelley’s testimony concerning Jackson’s criminal solicitation of him. 7 See generally Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Owens v. State
green
1 sentence2019The co-conspirator hearsay exception permits admission of the hearsay statement of a co-conspirator, made in the course of the conspiracy, so long as a prima facie case of conspiracy has been established apart from the hearsay statement itself.8 There was no error in allowing Harris to testify regarding Barnes’s statement.9 It was made to Harris during the concealment phase of the conspiracy to beat, kidnap, 7 See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258-260 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018). 8 (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898, 902 (2) ( 757 SE2d 102 ) (2014). 9 See id. at | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Billings v. State
green
2 sentences2016See McKinney v. State, 281 Ga. 92, 96 (4) ( 635 SE2d 153 ) (2006) (“[Statements admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception permitting the use of statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy are not ‘testimonial.’ Accordingly, the holding in Crawford is not applicable to the admission of the statements of the co-conspirators made during the pendency of the conspiracy.”) (citations omitted); Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842 (2) ( 770 SE2d 855 ) (2015); Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99 (4) ( 745 SE2d 583 ) (2013). 2016See McKinney v. State, 281 Ga. 92, 96 (4) ( 635 SE2d 153 ) (2006) (“[Statements admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception permitting the use of statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy are not ‘testimonial.’ Accordingly, the holding in Crawford is not applicable to the admission of the statements of the co-conspirators made during the pendency of the conspiracy.”) (citations omitted); Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842 (2) ( 770 SE2d 855 ) (2015); Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99 (4) ( 745 SE2d 583 ) (2013). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Castillo v. State
green
2 sentences2016The appeal was docketed to the September 2015 term of this Court and was thereafter submitted for decision on the briefs. 2 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the co-conspirator hearsay exception is now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E). 3 These charges were different, and carried significantly greater sentences, from those on which Green was jailed at the time he contacted Detective Smith regarding McClendon’s confession. 4 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the admissibility of prior consistent statements is governed by OCGA §§ 24-8-801 (d) (1) and 24-6-613 (c). 5 Compare Castillo 2016The appeal was docketed to the September 2015 term of this Court and was thereafter submitted for decision on the briefs. 2 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the co-conspirator hearsay exception is now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E). 3 These charges were different, and carried significantly greater sentences, from those on which Green was jailed at the time he contacted Detective Smith regarding McClendon’s confession. 4 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the admissibility of prior consistent statements is governed by OCGA §§ 24-8-801 (d) (1) and 24-6-613 (c). 5 Compare Castillo | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2016The appeal was docketed to the September 2015 term of this Court and was thereafter submitted for decision on the briefs. 2 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the co-conspirator hearsay exception is now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E). 3 These charges were different, and carried significantly greater sentences, from those on which Green was jailed at the time he contacted Detective Smith regarding McClendon’s confession. 4 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the admissibility of prior consistent statements is governed by OCGA §§ 24-8-801 (d) (1) and 24-6-613 (c). 5 Compare Castillo 2016The appeal was docketed to the September 2015 term of this Court and was thereafter submitted for decision on the briefs. 2 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the co-conspirator hearsay exception is now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E). 3 These charges were different, and carried significantly greater sentences, from those on which Green was jailed at the time he contacted Detective Smith regarding McClendon’s confession. 4 Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the admissibility of prior consistent statements is governed by OCGA §§ 24-8-801 (d) (1) and 24-6-613 (c). 5 Compare Castillo | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Favors v. State
green
2 sentences2016See McKinney v. State, 281 Ga. 92, 96 (4) ( 635 SE2d 153 ) (2006) (“[Statements admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception permitting the use of statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy are not ‘testimonial.’ Accordingly, the holding in Crawford is not applicable to the admission of the statements of the co-conspirators made during the pendency of the conspiracy.”) (citations omitted); Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842 (2) ( 770 SE2d 855 ) (2015); Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99 (4) ( 745 SE2d 583 ) (2013). 2016See McKinney v. State, 281 Ga. 92, 96 (4) ( 635 SE2d 153 ) (2006) (“[Statements admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception permitting the use of statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy are not ‘testimonial.’ Accordingly, the holding in Crawford is not applicable to the admission of the statements of the co-conspirators made during the pendency of the conspiracy.”) (citations omitted); Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842 (2) ( 770 SE2d 855 ) (2015); Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99 (4) ( 745 SE2d 583 ) (2013). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.