Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1945–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Saulgreen2 sentences1981Noting thatthe jury had been instructed that opinion testimony was not conclusive, controlling or binding on the jury and could be entirely disregarded ( 189 Ga. at 6-7 ), the court found the opinions admissible because the knowledge of the experts upon the issue involved was not known to the average person, saying ( 189 Ga. at 9 ): “True it is that the jurors are the ultimate triors; and as stated above, and comprehended in our well-defined rules, where it is possible for them to take the same elements and constituent factors which guide the expert to his conclusions and from them alone make 1981Noting thatthe jury had been instructed that opinion testimony was not conclusive, controlling or binding on the jury and could be entirely disregarded ( 189 Ga. at 6-7 ), the court found the opinions admissible because the knowledge of the experts upon the issue involved was not known to the average person, saying ( 189 Ga. at 9 ): “True it is that the jurors are the ultimate triors; and as stated above, and comprehended in our well-defined rules, where it is possible for them to take the same elements and constituent factors which guide the expert to his conclusions and from them alone make | 2 | 3 |
Mosby v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Expert testimony is admissible if the expert’s opinion is beyond the ken of the average layperson, but it is not admissible “where jurors can take the same elements and constituent factors which guide the expert to his conclusions and from them alone make an equally intelligent judgment of their own[.]” Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 453 (2) ( 796 SE2d 277 ) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted).2 Dr. Evans’s testimony was beyond the ken of the average layperson, who would not be able to make an equally intelligent judgment about the bite marks, including the force necessary for an adult to 2020Expert testimony is admissible if the expert’s opinion is beyond the ken of the average layperson, but it is not admissible “where jurors can take the same elements and constituent factors which guide the expert to his conclusions and from them alone make an equally intelligent judgment of their own[.]” Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 453 (2) ( 796 SE2d 277 ) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted).2 Dr. Evans’s testimony was beyond the ken of the average layperson, who would not be able to make an equally intelligent judgment about the bite marks, including the force necessary for an adult to | 1 | 2 |
Collum v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Collum v. State, 281 Ga. 719, 723 (3) ( 642 SE2d 640 ) (2007) (the force necessary to break a young child’s rib is an issue beyond the ken of the average layperson). 2020See Collum v. State, 281 Ga. 719, 723 (3) ( 642 SE2d 640 ) (2007) (the force necessary to break a young child’s rib is an issue beyond the ken of the average layperson). | 1 | 1 |
Cone v. Davisgreen2 sentences1995“Where ... it is possible for . . . the jury to take the same elements and constituent factors which guide the expert to his conclusions and from them alone make an equally intelligent judgment of their own, independently of the opinion of others, then ... it [is] their province, their right and duty, to form their own conclusions as to the ultimate fact of negligence, uninfluenced by the opinion of the [expert] witness.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cone v. Davis, 66 Ga. App. 229, 236 ( 17 SE2d 849 ) (1941). 1995“Where ... it is possible for . . . the jury to take the same elements and constituent factors which guide the expert to his conclusions and from them alone make an equally intelligent judgment of their own, independently of the opinion of others, then ... it [is] their province, their right and duty, to form their own conclusions as to the ultimate fact of negligence, uninfluenced by the opinion of the [expert] witness.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cone v. Davis, 66 Ga. App. 229, 236 ( 17 SE2d 849 ) (1941). | 1 | 1 |
Sinns v. Stategreen2 sentences1986But the Supreme Court has also held that “[e]xpert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman.” Smith v. State, 247 *693 Ga. 612, 619 ( 277 SE2d 678 ); accord Sinns v. State, 248 Ga. 385, 388 ( 283 SE2d 479 ). 1986But the Supreme Court has also held that “[e]xpert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman.” Smith v. State, 247 *693 Ga. 612, 619 ( 277 SE2d 678 ); accord Sinns v. State, 248 Ga. 385, 388 ( 283 SE2d 479 ). | 1 | 1 |
Mayor of Milledgeville v. Woodgreen2 sentences1969Mayor &c. of Milledgeville v. Wood, *387 114 Ga. 370, 372 ( 40 SE 239 ); Barnes v. Thomas, 72 Ga. App. 827, 835 ( 35 SE2d 364 ). 1969Mayor &c. of Milledgeville v. Wood, *387 114 Ga. 370, 372 ( 40 SE 239 ); Barnes v. Thomas, 72 Ga. App. 827, 835 ( 35 SE2d 364 ). | 1 | 1 |
Barnes v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1969Mayor &c. of Milledgeville v. Wood, *387 114 Ga. 370, 372 ( 40 SE 239 ); Barnes v. Thomas, 72 Ga. App. 827, 835 ( 35 SE2d 364 ). 1969Mayor &c. of Milledgeville v. Wood, *387 114 Ga. 370, 372 ( 40 SE 239 ); Barnes v. Thomas, 72 Ga. App. 827, 835 ( 35 SE2d 364 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fordham v. State
green
2 sentences2008However, where jurors can “take the same elements and constituent factors which guide the expert to his conclusions and from them alone make an equally intelligent judgment of their own, independently of the opinion of others, then undoubtedly this should be done. . . . [Cit.]” Id. at 59 . 1992However, it remains clear that: “where it is possible for [the jurors] to take the same elements and constituent factors which guide the expert to his conclusions and from them alone make an equally intelligent judgment of their own, independently of the opinion of others, then undoubtedly this should be done.” Fordham v. State, 254 Ga. 59 ( 325 SE2d 755 ) (1985), quoting from Metropolitan Life Ins. | 3 | 1986–2008 |
Bly v. State
green
2 sentences2017(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. 2017(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Weems v. State
green
1 sentence2020(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450 (2) ( 796 SE2d 277 ) (2017).6 See also Weems v. State, 268 Ga. 142 (3) 5 The expert’s summary provided in pertinent part: I will provide testimony . . . on matters pertaining to the use of force, fight-flight-freeze responses, and human physiology during high stress and life threatening situations. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1986But the Supreme Court has also held that “[e]xpert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman.” Smith v. State, 247 *693 Ga. 612, 619 ( 277 SE2d 678 ); accord Sinns v. State, 248 Ga. 385, 388 ( 283 SE2d 479 ). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Taylor v. State
green
2 sentences1945Taylor v. State, 135 Ga. 622 (6) ( 70 S. E. 237 ). 1945Taylor v. State, 135 Ga. 622 (6) ( 70 S. E. 237 ). | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.