Murphy motion in Georgia

2026While this delay may have at least in part been the result of the multiple substitutions of counsel that took place prior to the trial court’s ruling on Murphy’s amended motion as well as delays resulting from the preparation of the trial transcript, we remind the participants in this case and others involved in the criminal justice system that “it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system, including trial courts and prosecutors as well as defense counsel and defendants, to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided without unne

2026While this delay may have at least in part been the result of the multiple substitutions of counsel that took place prior to the trial court’s ruling on Murphy’s amended motion as well as delays resulting from the preparation of the trial transcript, we remind the participants in this case and others involved in the criminal justice system that “it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system, including trial courts and prosecutors as well as defense counsel and defendants, to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided without unne

2026Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Murphy’s motion. 9 See id. (holding that a motion for a directed verdict was not the appropriate way to challenge an indictment that was allegedly 9 At trial, Murphy’s counsel also moved for a directed verdict as to Count 4 of the indictment because “there is insufficient evidence.” On appeal, however, Murphy challenges only the trial court’s denial of his motion because the indictment fails “to adequately inform Murphy of the nature of the charge against him.” Thus, we decline to address whether the trial court erred by denying Murphy’s motion for

2026Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Murphy’s motion. 9 See id. (holding that a motion for a directed verdict was not the appropriate way to challenge an indictment that was allegedly 9 At trial, Murphy’s counsel also moved for a directed verdict as to Count 4 of the indictment because “there is insufficient evidence.” On appeal, however, Murphy challenges only the trial court’s denial of his motion because the indictment fails “to adequately inform Murphy of the nature of the charge against him.” Thus, we decline to address whether the trial court erred by denying Murphy’s motion for

2014In Considine v. Murphy, 320 Ga. App. 316 ( 739 SE2d 777 ) (2013), this Court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing Considine’s complaint upon finding that Considine had not been afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard on Murphy’s motion to dismiss.1 Upon remand, the trial court once again held that Murphy, acting in his capacity as a court-appointed receiver, was entitled to official 1 Considine had alleged that Murphy breached his contract of engagement and his fiduciary duty to the business for which he served as the receiver, acted with gross negligence, and committed wilful and

2014In Considine v. Murphy, 320 Ga. App. 316 ( 739 SE2d 777 ) (2013), this Court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing Considine’s complaint upon finding that Considine had not been afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard on Murphy’s motion to dismiss. 1 Upon remand, the trial court once again held that Murphy, acting in his capacity as a court-appointed receiver, was entitled to official immunity and granted Murphy’s motion to dismiss.

2024As the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “[t]o the extent that the court’s ruling violated [Murphy’s] statutory rights under OCGA § 15-12-133, the error may be deemed harmless if the State can show that it is highly probable that the error did not affect the result of the trial.”47 But to the extent that 45 Ellington, 292 Ga. at 135-36 (7) (e) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied). 46 Id. at 137 (7) (e). 47 Id. at 138 (7) (f); see Legare, 256 Ga. at 303-04 (1) (addressing a violation of the statutory right to adequate voir dire by determining if it was highly probable that the error

2024As the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “[t]o the extent that the court’s ruling violated [Murphy’s] statutory rights under OCGA § 15-12-133, the error may be deemed harmless if the State can show that it is highly probable that the error did not affect the result of the trial.”47 But to the extent that 45 Ellington, 292 Ga. at 135-36 (7) (e) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied). 46 Id. at 137 (7) (e). 47 Id. at 138 (7) (f); see Legare, 256 Ga. at 303-04 (1) (addressing a violation of the statutory right to adequate voir dire by determining if it was highly probable that the error

2024As the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “[t]o the extent that the court’s ruling violated [Murphy’s] statutory rights under OCGA § 15-12-133, the error may be deemed harmless if the State can show that it is highly probable that the error did not affect the result of the trial.”47 But to the extent that 45 Ellington, 292 Ga. at 135-36 (7) (e) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied). 46 Id. at 137 (7) (e). 47 Id. at 138 (7) (f); see Legare, 256 Ga. at 303-04 (1) (addressing a violation of the statutory right to adequate voir dire by determining if it was highly probable that the error

2024And later, in its order denying Murphy’s motion for new trial, the trial court reaffirmed its earlier decision, ruling the postcard did not contain any threats, and therefore, it was properly excluded from evidence as hearsay. 12 We review a trial court’s rulings admitting or excluding evidence for “an abuse of discretion.13 And we will reverse a conviction for “a trial court’s evidentiary error only if it was harmful.”14 Importantly, the test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is “whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdicts, and in conducting

2024And later, in its order denying Murphy’s motion for new trial, the trial court reaffirmed its earlier decision, ruling the postcard did not contain any threats, and therefore, it was properly excluded from evidence as hearsay. 12 We review a trial court’s rulings admitting or excluding evidence for “an abuse of discretion.13 And we will reverse a conviction for “a trial court’s evidentiary error only if it was harmful.”14 Importantly, the test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is “whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdicts, and in conducting

2024And later, in its order denying Murphy’s motion for new trial, the trial court reaffirmed its earlier decision, ruling the postcard did not contain any threats, and therefore, it was properly excluded from evidence as hearsay. 12 We review a trial court’s rulings admitting or excluding evidence for “an abuse of discretion.13 And we will reverse a conviction for “a trial court’s evidentiary error only if it was harmful.”14 Importantly, the test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is “whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdicts, and in conducting

2024And later, in its order denying Murphy’s motion for new trial, the trial court reaffirmed its earlier decision, ruling the postcard did not contain any threats, and therefore, it was properly excluded from evidence as hearsay. 12 We review a trial court’s rulings admitting or excluding evidence for “an abuse of discretion.13 And we will reverse a conviction for “a trial court’s evidentiary error only if it was harmful.”14 Importantly, the test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is “whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdicts, and in conducting

2024And later, in its order denying Murphy’s motion for new trial, the trial court reaffirmed its earlier decision, ruling the postcard did not contain any threats, and therefore, it was properly excluded from evidence as hearsay. 12 We review a trial court’s rulings admitting or excluding evidence for “an abuse of discretion.13 And we will reverse a conviction for “a trial court’s evidentiary error only if it was harmful.”14 Importantly, the test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is “whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdicts, and in conducting

2024And later, in its order denying Murphy’s motion for new trial, the trial court reaffirmed its earlier decision, ruling the postcard did not contain any threats, and therefore, it was properly excluded from evidence as hearsay. 12 We review a trial court’s rulings admitting or excluding evidence for “an abuse of discretion.13 And we will reverse a conviction for “a trial court’s evidentiary error only if it was harmful.”14 Importantly, the test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is “whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdicts, and in conducting

2012See Reason v. State, 283 Ga. App. 608, 609-610 (1) (a) ( 642 SE2d 236 ) (2007). 3.

2012See Reason v. State, 283 Ga. App. 608, 609-610 (1) (a) ( 642 SE2d 236 ) (2007). 3.

2006Under these circumstances, there is “no reasonable probability that an additional charge on mere suspicion or speculation would have produced a different outcome at trial.” New v. State, 270 Ga. App. 341, 345 (2) (a) ( 606 SE2d 865 ) (2004).

2006Under these circumstances, there is “no reasonable probability that an additional charge on mere suspicion or speculation would have produced a different outcome at trial.” New v. State, 270 Ga. App. 341, 345 (2) (a) ( 606 SE2d 865 ) (2004).

2005See generally Walton v. State, 269 Ga. App. 812, 813 (1) ( 605 SE2d 622 ) (2004).

2005See generally Walton v. State, 269 Ga. App. 812, 813 (1) ( 605 SE2d 622 ) (2004).

1998“While these factors give rise to reasonable and articulable suspicion [for a brief detention of defendant], they do not give rise to probable cause for arrest or search.” DiSanti *369 v. State, 190 Ga. App. 331, 334 (1), 335, supra. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant Murphy’s motion to suppress.