14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Penny S.green1 sentence2025(See In re Joshua S. (2007) 2 41 Cal.4th 261, 272 [“ ‘notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced’ ”].) However, the time for appealing the initial order granting probation following Murphy’s plea to the robbery charge has passed and thus, that order is not included in the present appeal. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Superior Court of Yolo Countygreen1 sentence2025(People v. Superior Court (Rodas) (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1316, 1325 [“Under section 1237 of the Penal Code, a defendant may challenge the merits of his conviction on an appeal from the order granting probation. [Citation.] If the time to appeal the probation order lapses without an appeal having been taken, however, the defendant may not thereafter challenge the underlying conviction when appealing a subsequent order revoking probation and imposing a suspended sentence”].) Although requested, a certificate of probable cause is not necessary for review of the finding that Murphy violated her pro | 1 | 1 |
People v. Landaugreen1 sentence2023(See People v. Landau (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1, 37 [when the “delay was at [the defendant’s] request or with his consent, the weight accorded the delay is reduced”].) The court first granted a continuance over Murphy’s objection on May 14. | 1 | 1 |
Gregory D. v. Linda D.green1 sentence2014(See Conservatorship of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 69 [standing to appeal does not turn on whether party had standing in trial court].) 7 As a final matter, we consider Murphy’s motion for judicial notice of a Hungarian will purportedly executed by the decedent. | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Floridagreen2 sentences1976(Murphy v. Florida (1975) 421 U.S. 794, 799 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 589, 594 , 95 S.Ct. 2031 ].) The first part of the Murphy test may be stated as follows: where there is an apparent and flagrant departure from fundamental due process and decorum and an intrusion of external influences, prejudice will be presumed. 1976(Murphy v. Florida (1975) 421 U.S. 794, 799 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 589, 594 , 95 S.Ct. 2031 ].) The first part of the Murphy test may be stated as follows: where there is an apparent and flagrant departure from fundamental due process and decorum and an intrusion of external influences, prejudice will be presumed. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bargergreen2 sentences1976The only digressions from this atmosphere were produced by the conduct of appellants. [82] (49) The second part of the Murphy test, referred to as a "totality of the circumstances" standard (Goldsmith, Due Process Denial Not *187 Presumed When Knowledge of Past Misdeeds Is Possessed by the Jury: "Totality of Circumstances" Test Will Be Used to Determine Fairness of Trial (1975) 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 285) is derived from Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. 717 and requires (1) an examination of the voir dire in search of juror hostility; (2) consideration of the general atmosphere of the community or co 1976The only digressions from this atmosphere were produced by the conduct of appellants. [82] (49) The second part of the Murphy test, referred to as a "totality of the circumstances" standard (Goldsmith, Due Process Denial Not *187 Presumed When Knowledge of Past Misdeeds Is Possessed by the Jury: "Totality of Circumstances" Test Will Be Used to Determine Fairness of Trial (1975) 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 285) is derived from Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. 717 and requires (1) an examination of the voir dire in search of juror hostility; (2) consideration of the general atmosphere of the community or co | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sewellgreen2 sentences1974(People v. Sewell, 3 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 895 ].) Disclosure was not required here because Murphy’s claim failed to rise above mere speculation: we know only that the informant purchased heroin from Murphy within a week before the search; nothing in the record remotely suggests the informant knew anything about Martinez, about Murphy’s motorcycle, or about Murphy’s asserted sale of the motorcycle to Martinez. 5. 1974(People v. Sewell, 3 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 895 ].) Disclosure was not required here because Murphy’s claim failed to rise above mere speculation: we know only that the informant purchased heroin from Murphy within a week before the search; nothing in the record remotely suggests the informant knew anything about Martinez, about Murphy’s motorcycle, or about Murphy’s asserted sale of the motorcycle to Martinez. 5. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences1974(See People v. Garcia, 67 Cal.2d 830, 840 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 434 P.2d 366 ].) He argues the informant might have been a material witness on the issue of guilt because he might have been able to substantiate Murphy’s defense theory that the heroin belonged to one Martinez, to whom Murphy claimed he had previously sold the motorcycle. 1974(See People v. Garcia, 67 Cal.2d 830, 840 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 434 P.2d 366 ].) He argues the informant might have been a material witness on the issue of guilt because he might have been able to substantiate Murphy’s defense theory that the heroin belonged to one Martinez, to whom Murphy claimed he had previously sold the motorcycle. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Minnesota v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2015(Id. at p. 427.) Analogizing Murphy’s situation to that of a subpoenaed witness who testifies on pain of contempt, the court observed that “[t]he answers of such a witness to questions put to him are not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless the witness is required to answer over his valid claim of the privilege.” (Ibid.) “If he asserts the privilege, he ‘may not be required to answer a question if there is some rational basis for believing that it will incriminate him, at least without at that time being assured that neither it nor its fruits may be used against him’ in a 2015(Id. at p. 427.) Analogizing Murphy’s situation to that of a subpoenaed witness who testifies on pain of contempt, the court observed that “[t]he answers of such a witness to questions put to him are not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless the witness is required to answer over his valid claim of the privilege.” (Ibid.) “If he asserts the privilege, he ‘may not be required to answer a question if there is some rational basis for believing that it will incriminate him, at least without at that time being assured that neither it nor its fruits may be used against him’ in a | 3 | 2014–2015 |
Wright v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2024The case on which she principally relies is Wright v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 318 (Wright). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Applera Corp. v. MP BIOMEDICALS, LLC
green
1 sentence2022(See Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. (1988) 486 U.S. 800 , 808–809, [“[Title 28 United States Code section ]1338(a) jurisdiction ... extend[s] only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.”].) Such a claim would raise a specific patent law question on infringement, namely whether products sold by Finelin | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Heritage Pacific Financial v. Monroy CA1/2
green
1 sentence2022Despite Murphy’s claim block billing is wholly improper, “[t]rial courts 22. retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010 .) Here, the trial court’s award suggests it had no difficulty determining the tasks identified were compensable and while our independent review shows some block billing, the tasks identified are sufficiently clear that we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.
green
1 sentence2022(See Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. (1988) 486 U.S. 800 , 808–809, [“[Title 28 United States Code section ]1338(a) jurisdiction ... extend[s] only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.”].) Such a claim would raise a specific patent law question on infringement, namely whether products sold by Finelin | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Truong v. Nguyen
green
1 sentence2013The court in Truong v. Nguyen (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 865 addressed the plaintiff’s claim of negligent entrustment in a situation where the defense of primary assumption of risk applied and thus the driver of the boat had no legal duty to the participant in the activity. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Royal Globe Insurance v. Superior Court
red
2 sentences1986Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 592 P.2d 329 ] points toward a relaxation of the Murphy rule. 1986Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 592 P.2d 329 ] points toward a relaxation of the Murphy rule. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Irvin v. Dowd
green
2 sentences1976The only digressions from this atmosphere were produced by the conduct of appellants. 82 The second part of the Murphy test, referred to as a “totality of the circumstances” standard (Goldsmith, Due Process Denial Not Presumed When Knowledge of Past Misdeeds Is Possessed by the Jury: “Totality of Circumstances” Test Will Be Used to Determine Fairness of Trial (1975) 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 285) is derived from Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. 717 and requires (1) an examination of the voir dire in search of juror hostility; (2) consideration of the general atmosphere of the community or courtroom at t 1976The only digressions from this atmosphere were produced by the conduct of appellants. 82 The second part of the Murphy test, referred to as a “totality of the circumstances” standard (Goldsmith, Due Process Denial Not Presumed When Knowledge of Past Misdeeds Is Possessed by the Jury: “Totality of Circumstances” Test Will Be Used to Determine Fairness of Trial (1975) 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 285) is derived from Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. 717 and requires (1) an examination of the voir dire in search of juror hostility; (2) consideration of the general atmosphere of the community or courtroom at t | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Quinlan
green
2 sentences1976The only digressions from this atmosphere were produced by the conduct of appellants. [82] (49) The second part of the Murphy test, referred to as a "totality of the circumstances" standard (Goldsmith, Due Process Denial Not *187 Presumed When Knowledge of Past Misdeeds Is Possessed by the Jury: "Totality of Circumstances" Test Will Be Used to Determine Fairness of Trial (1975) 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 285) is derived from Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. 717 and requires (1) an examination of the voir dire in search of juror hostility; (2) consideration of the general atmosphere of the community or co 1976The only digressions from this atmosphere were produced by the conduct of appellants. [82] (49) The second part of the Murphy test, referred to as a "totality of the circumstances" standard (Goldsmith, Due Process Denial Not *187 Presumed When Knowledge of Past Misdeeds Is Possessed by the Jury: "Totality of Circumstances" Test Will Be Used to Determine Fairness of Trial (1975) 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 285) is derived from Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. 717 and requires (1) an examination of the voir dire in search of juror hostility; (2) consideration of the general atmosphere of the community or co | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Salas
green
2 sentences1976The only digressions from this atmosphere were produced by the conduct of appellants. [82] (49) The second part of the Murphy test, referred to as a "totality of the circumstances" standard (Goldsmith, Due Process Denial Not *187 Presumed When Knowledge of Past Misdeeds Is Possessed by the Jury: "Totality of Circumstances" Test Will Be Used to Determine Fairness of Trial (1975) 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 285) is derived from Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. 717 and requires (1) an examination of the voir dire in search of juror hostility; (2) consideration of the general atmosphere of the community or co 1976The only digressions from this atmosphere were produced by the conduct of appellants. [82] (49) The second part of the Murphy test, referred to as a "totality of the circumstances" standard (Goldsmith, Due Process Denial Not *187 Presumed When Knowledge of Past Misdeeds Is Possessed by the Jury: "Totality of Circumstances" Test Will Be Used to Determine Fairness of Trial (1975) 13 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 285) is derived from Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. 717 and requires (1) an examination of the voir dire in search of juror hostility; (2) consideration of the general atmosphere of the community or co | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Theodor v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1974Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.3d 77 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 226 , 501 P.2d 234 ], points out that by the enactment of section 1538.5 the Legislature created “a comprehensive scheme for challenging the introduction into evidence, and for the return, of items unlawfully seized." ( 8 Cal.3d at p. 91 .) Whether Murphy’s motion came technically before or during the preliminary hearing, the provisions of section 1538.5 were controlling. 1974Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.3d 77 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 226 , 501 P.2d 234 ], points out that by the enactment of section 1538.5 the Legislature created “a comprehensive scheme for challenging the introduction into evidence, and for the return, of items unlawfully seized." ( 8 Cal.3d at p. 91 .) Whether Murphy’s motion came technically before or during the preliminary hearing, the provisions of section 1538.5 were controlling. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Stiff v. Fogerson
green
2 sentences1957This court cannot see that the case of Stiff v. Fogerson, 58 N.M. 193 [ 269 P.2d 743 ], cited by Mr. Wilson, is controlling under the facts in this case. 1957This court cannot see that the case of Stiff v. Fogerson, 58 N.M. 193 [ 269 P.2d 743 ], cited by Mr. Wilson, is controlling under the facts in this case. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.