third part analysis in Georgia

2024See Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493, 499 (2) ( 847 SE2d 172 ) (2020) (“[Appellant] does not argue that the State failed to meet its burden on the third part of the test; thus, we address only the first and second parts”).

2024See Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493, 499 (2) ( 847 SE2d 172 ) (2020) (“[Appellant] does not argue that the State failed to meet its burden on the third part of the test; thus, we address only the first and second parts”).

2013The third part of the analysis is whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use.9 Subsequently, this Court held that a trial court’s minimal inquiry in analyzing a challenge to a forfeiture judgment under the Excessive-Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment must be made on the record.10 8 264 Ga. 712 ( 450 SE2d 416 ) (1994). 9 Howell, 283 Ga. at 25 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 (3). 10 See Salmon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 591, 592 (2) ( 549 SE2d 421 ) (2001) (holding that the record of trial

2013The third part of the analysis is whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use.9 Subsequently, this Court held that a trial court’s minimal inquiry in analyzing a challenge to a forfeiture judgment under the Excessive-Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment must be made on the record.10 8 264 Ga. 712 ( 450 SE2d 416 ) (1994). 9 Howell, 283 Ga. at 25 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 (3). 10 See Salmon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 591, 592 (2) ( 549 SE2d 421 ) (2001) (holding that the record of trial

2025Greene v. State, 316 Ga. 584, 597 (3) ( 889 SE2d 864 ) (2023).

2025Greene v. State, 316 Ga. 584, 597 (3) ( 889 SE2d 864 ) (2023).

2025Morrell, 313 Ga. at 259 (2) (b) (quoting Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 544 , 28 As to the last prong of this test—i.e., whether “there is sufficient proof for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the other act,” id.—Wilson does not argue that “the State failed to satisfy its burden under the third part of the test to show that he committed” the 2011 armed robbery.

2021Appellant concedes that the State satisfied the third part of this test, so we will address only the first and second parts. (i) To determine whether other-acts evidence is relevant to a non-character issue, we look to the definition of “relevant evidence” in OCGA § 24-4-401, which says that evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Relevance is thus “a binary question — evidence is either relevant or it is not.” Kirby, 304 Ga. at

2021Because we conclude below that the other-act evidence was admissible to show Appellant’s intent (and because the purposes of intent and absence of mistake or accident are closely related in this case), we need not separately address whether the evidence was admissible for the additional purpose of showing absence of mistake or accident. 17 concedes that the State satisfied the third part of this test, so we will address only the first and second parts. (i) To determine whether other-act evidence is relevant to a non-character issue, we look to the definition of “relevant evidence” in OCGA § 24

2019See Olds v. State , 299 Ga. 65 , 72-75, 786 S.E.2d 633 (2016).

2019See Olds v. State , 299 Ga. 65 , 72-75, 786 S.E.2d 633 (2016).

2016As to the third part of the test, “[wjhether a statement is trustworthy is a matter for the trial court’s discretion, and the exercise of such discretion will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” Gibson v. State, 290 Ga. 6, 8 ( 717 SE2d 447 ) (2011).

2016As to the third part of the test, “[wjhether a statement is trustworthy is a matter for the trial court’s discretion, and the exercise of such discretion will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” Gibson v. State, 290 Ga. 6, 8 ( 717 SE2d 447 ) (2011).

2013The third part of the analysis is whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use.9 Subsequently, this Court held that a trial court’s minimal inquiry in analyzing a challenge to a forfeiture judgment under the Excessive-Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment must be made on the record.10 8 264 Ga. 712 ( 450 SE2d 416 ) (1994). 9 Howell, 283 Ga. at 25 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 (3). 10 See Salmon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 591, 592 (2) ( 549 SE2d 421 ) (2001) (holding that the record of trial

2013The third part of the analysis is whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use.9 Subsequently, this Court held that a trial court’s minimal inquiry in analyzing a challenge to a forfeiture judgment under the Excessive-Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment must be made on the record.10 8 264 Ga. 712 ( 450 SE2d 416 ) (1994). 9 Howell, 283 Ga. at 25 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 (3). 10 See Salmon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 591, 592 (2) ( 549 SE2d 421 ) (2001) (holding that the record of trial

2013The third part of the analysis is whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use.9 Subsequently, this Court held that a trial court’s minimal inquiry in analyzing a challenge to a forfeiture judgment under the Excessive-Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment must be made on the record.10 8 264 Ga. 712 ( 450 SE2d 416 ) (1994). 9 Howell, 283 Ga. at 25 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 (3). 10 See Salmon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 591, 592 (2) ( 549 SE2d 421 ) (2001) (holding that the record of trial

2013The third part of the analysis is whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use.9 Subsequently, this Court held that a trial court’s minimal inquiry in analyzing a challenge to a forfeiture judgment under the Excessive-Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment must be made on the record.10 8 264 Ga. 712 ( 450 SE2d 416 ) (1994). 9 Howell, 283 Ga. at 25 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 (3). 10 See Salmon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 591, 592 (2) ( 549 SE2d 421 ) (2001) (holding that the record of trial

2013The third part of the analysis is whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use.9 Subsequently, this Court held that a trial court’s minimal inquiry in analyzing a challenge to a forfeiture judgment under the Excessive-Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment must be made on the record.10 8 264 Ga. 712 ( 450 SE2d 416 ) (1994). 9 Howell, 283 Ga. at 25 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 (3). 10 See Salmon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 591, 592 (2) ( 549 SE2d 421 ) (2001) (holding that the record of trial

2013The third part of the analysis is whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use.9 Subsequently, this Court held that a trial court’s minimal inquiry in analyzing a challenge to a forfeiture judgment under the Excessive-Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment must be made on the record.10 8 264 Ga. 712 ( 450 SE2d 416 ) (1994). 9 Howell, 283 Ga. at 25 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 (3). 10 See Salmon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 591, 592 (2) ( 549 SE2d 421 ) (2001) (holding that the record of trial

2013The third part of the analysis is whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use.9 Subsequently, this Court held that a trial court’s minimal inquiry in analyzing a challenge to a forfeiture judgment under the Excessive-Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment must be made on the record.10 8 264 Ga. 712 ( 450 SE2d 416 ) (1994). 9 Howell, 283 Ga. at 25 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 (3). 10 See Salmon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 591, 592 (2) ( 549 SE2d 421 ) (2001) (holding that the record of trial

2013Indeed, given the increased level of detailed analysis required by Howell, it is even more important that a trial court make its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record so as to provide an opportunity for meaningful appellate review of its decision.18 16 283 Ga. at 26 (1) (punctuation omitted). 17 See id. (“we adopt the analysis in von Hofe v. United States, and consider it to supersede the three-factor test in Thorp.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 Cf. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 838 (3) (B) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012) (holding that the trial court was required to make specific findings

2013Indeed, given the increased level of detailed analysis required by Howell, it is even more important that a trial court make its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record so as to provide an opportunity for meaningful appellate review of its decision.18 16 283 Ga. at 26 (1) (punctuation omitted). 17 See id. (“we adopt the analysis in von Hofe v. United States, and consider it to supersede the three-factor test in Thorp.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 Cf. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 838 (3) (B) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012) (holding that the trial court was required to make specific findings

2013Indeed, given the increased level of detailed analysis required by Howell, it is even more important that a trial court make its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record so as to provide an opportunity for meaningful appellate review of its decision.18 16 283 Ga. at 26 (1) (punctuation omitted). 17 See id. (“we adopt the analysis in von Hofe v. United States, and consider it to supersede the three-factor test in Thorp.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 Cf. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 838 (3) (B) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012) (holding that the trial court was required to make specific findings

2013Indeed, given the increased level of detailed analysis required by Howell, it is even more important that a trial court make its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record so as to provide an opportunity for meaningful appellate review of its decision.18 16 283 Ga. at 26 (1) (punctuation omitted). 17 See id. (“we adopt the analysis in von Hofe v. United States, and consider it to supersede the three-factor test in Thorp.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 Cf. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 838 (3) (B) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012) (holding that the trial court was required to make specific findings