10 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014In Wong Sun, the United States Supreme Court described exploitation as “whether, granting estab- lishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploita- tion of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently dis- tinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” 371 US at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2014In Wong Sun , the United States Supreme Court described exploitation as “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” 371 US at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Stephens v. Bohlmangreen2 sentences1993It held that the statute does not begin to run when the "plaintiff is unaware of the cause of his injury * * * [but] begins to run when a reasonable person would perceive the role which the defendant has played in inducing that condition." 304 Or. at 161 , 742 P.2d 1176 ; see also Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or. 344 , 838 P.2d 600 (1992). 1993It held that the statute does not begin to run when the "plaintiff is unaware of the cause of his injury * * * [but] begins to run when a reasonable person would perceive the role which the defendant has played in inducing that condition." 304 Or. at 161 , 742 P.2d 1176 ; see also Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or. 344 , 838 P.2d 600 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Lipscomb v. Blackwellgreen1 sentence1982See, International Harvester, Inc., 138 NLRB 923 (1962), enf’d sub nom Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F2d 784 (7th Cir), cert den 377 US 1003 (1964); Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).’ 32 Or App at 546 .” 50 Or App at 200 . e then stated in Willamina Ed. Assoc.: “The third part of the test was framed in terms of the award’s compatability with the basic policies of the collective bargaining statute. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pinnell
green
2 sentences2015“Unfair prejudice,” in the context of OEC 403, means “‘an undue tendency to suggest [a] decision [] on an improper basis, commonly, although not always, an emotional one.’” State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98 , 106 n 12, 806 P2d 110 (1991) (quoting Legislative Commentary to OEC 403, reported in Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 125 (2d ed 1989) (brackets in Pinnell)). 2015“Unfair prejudice,” in the context of OEC 403, means “‘an undue tendency to suggest [a] decision [] on an improper basis, commonly, although not always, an emotional one.’” State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98 , 106 n 12, 806 P2d 110 (1991) (quoting Legislative Commentary to OEC 403, reported in Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 125 (2d ed 1989) (brackets in Pinnell)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Southard
green
2 sentences2014The court then turned to the third part of the analysis, “whether, under OEC 403, the probative value of the diagnosis ‘is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’” Id. 2014The court determined that the diagnosis was of “marginal” probative value because it “did not tell the jury anything that it was not equally capable of determining ***.” Id. at 140 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cox Ex Rel. Cox v. State
green
2 sentences2008Cox v. State of Oregon , 191 Or App 1 , 4 , 80 P3d 514 (2003). 5 C. 2008Cox v. State of Oregon , 191 Or App 1 , 4 , 80 P3d 514 (2003). 5 C. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation District
green
2 sentences1993Despite defendants' arguments to the contrary, that holding is consistent with the holding in Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation Dist., 304 Or. 151 , 742 P.2d 1176 (1987), where the court phrased the third part of the test in terms of causation instead of negligence. 1993Despite defendants' arguments to the contrary, that holding is consistent with the holding in Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation Dist., 304 Or. 151 , 742 P.2d 1176 (1987), where the court phrased the third part of the test in terms of causation instead of negligence. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Willamina Education Ass'n v. Willamina School District 30J
neutral
1 sentence1982See, International Harvester, Inc., 138 NLRB 923 (1962), enf’d sub nom Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F2d 784 (7th Cir), cert den 377 US 1003 (1964); Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).’ 32 Or App at 546 .” 50 Or App at 200 . e then stated in Willamina Ed. Assoc.: “The third part of the test was framed in terms of the award’s compatability with the basic policies of the collective bargaining statute. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Siegel v. Gresham Grade Teachers Ass'n
neutral
1 sentence1982See, International Harvester, Inc., 138 NLRB 923 (1962), enf’d sub nom Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F2d 784 (7th Cir), cert den 377 US 1003 (1964); Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).’ 32 Or App at 546 .” 50 Or App at 200 . e then stated in Willamina Ed. Assoc.: “The third part of the test was framed in terms of the award’s compatability with the basic policies of the collective bargaining statute. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.