transcript of the suppression hearing in Georgia

1989“In the absence of a transcript of the suppression hearing, ‘ “we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court.” ’ ” Santone v. State, 187 Ga. App. 789, 790 ( 371 SE2d 428 ).

1989“In the absence of a transcript of the suppression hearing, ‘ “we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court.” ’ ” Santone v. State, 187 Ga. App. 789, 790 ( 371 SE2d 428 ).

2015Absent a transcript of the suppression hearing, we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence presented supported the findings of the court”). 19 Fides, 237 Ga. App. at 607 (1) (punctuation omitted); see also Boston, 226 Ga. App. at 18 (3). 20 Chernowski lists three enumerations of error but consolidates both arguments as to the denial of her motions into one argument section.

2001“Absent a transcript of the suppression hearing, we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence presented supported the findings of the court. [Cits.]” Boston v. State, 226 Ga. App. 17, 18 (3) ( 485 SE2d 578 ) (1997).

1997Brown v. State, 190 Ga. App. 324, 326 (2) ( 378 SE2d 908 ) (1989); Santone v. State, 187 Ga. App. 789, 790 (1) ( 371 SE2d 428 ) (1988).

1997Brown v. State, 190 Ga. App. 324, 326 (2) ( 378 SE2d 908 ) (1989); Santone v. State, 187 Ga. App. 789, 790 (1) ( 371 SE2d 428 ) (1988).

1988In the absence of a transcript of the suppression hearing, “ ‘we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court.’ ” *791 Brannon v. State, 176 Ga. App. 781 (5) ( 337 SE2d 782 ).

1988In the absence of a transcript of the suppression hearing, “ ‘we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court.’ ” *791 Brannon v. State, 176 Ga. App. 781 (5) ( 337 SE2d 782 ).

2015For the sake of clarity, we address these arguments in separate divisions of the opinion. 21 Cf. Floyd v. State, 156 Ga. App. 741, 741 (1) ( 275 SE2d 786 ) (1980) (considering appellant’s arguments as to denial of motion to suppress, despite absence of pretrial motion-hearing transcript, when a renewed motion was made and another complete hearing was held as to the admissibility of the evidence). 22 See State v. Ross, 293 Ga. 834, 835 ( 750 SE2d 305 ) (2013) (“Thus, a court retains broad discretion over interlocutory evidentiary rulings which may be modified at any time until entry of final ju

2015For the sake of clarity, we address these arguments in separate divisions of the opinion. 21 Cf. Floyd v. State, 156 Ga. App. 741, 741 (1) ( 275 SE2d 786 ) (1980) (considering appellant’s arguments as to denial of motion to suppress, despite absence of pretrial motion-hearing transcript, when a renewed motion was made and another complete hearing was held as to the admissibility of the evidence). 22 See State v. Ross, 293 Ga. 834, 835 ( 750 SE2d 305 ) (2013) (“Thus, a court retains broad discretion over interlocutory evidentiary rulings which may be modified at any time until entry of final ju

2015Absent a transcript of the suppression hearing, we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence presented supported the findings of the court”). 19 Fides, 237 Ga. App. at 607 (1) (punctuation omitted); see also Boston, 226 Ga. App. at 18 (3). 20 Chernowski lists three enumerations of error but consolidates both arguments as to the denial of her motions into one argument section.

2015For the sake of clarity, we address these arguments in separate divisions of the opinion. 21 Cf. Floyd v. State, 156 Ga. App. 741, 741 (1) ( 275 SE2d 786 ) (1980) (considering appellant’s arguments as to denial of motion to suppress, despite absence of pretrial motion-hearing transcript, when a renewed motion was made and another complete hearing was held as to the admissibility of the evidence). 22 See State v. Ross, 293 Ga. 834, 835 ( 750 SE2d 305 ) (2013) (“Thus, a court retains broad discretion over interlocutory evidentiary rulings which may be modified at any time until entry of final ju

2015For the sake of clarity, we address these arguments in separate divisions of the opinion. 21 Cf. Floyd v. State, 156 Ga. App. 741, 741 (1) ( 275 SE2d 786 ) (1980) (considering appellant’s arguments as to denial of motion to suppress, despite absence of pretrial motion-hearing transcript, when a renewed motion was made and another complete hearing was held as to the admissibility of the evidence). 22 See State v. Ross, 293 Ga. 834, 835 ( 750 SE2d 305 ) (2013) (“Thus, a court retains broad discretion over interlocutory evidentiary rulings which may be modified at any time until entry of final ju

2001We must assume further that “the court properly exercised its judgment and discretion in denying the motion to suppress.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Aaron v. State, 203 Ga. App. 658, 659 (2) ( 418 SE2d 66 ) (1992); see Hasty v. State, 195 Ga. App. 427 ( 394 SE2d 800 ) (1990).

2001We must assume further that “the court properly exercised its judgment and discretion in denying the motion to suppress.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Aaron v. State, 203 Ga. App. 658, 659 (2) ( 418 SE2d 66 ) (1992); see Hasty v. State, 195 Ga. App. 427 ( 394 SE2d 800 ) (1990).

2001We must assume further that “the court properly exercised its judgment and discretion in denying the motion to suppress.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Aaron v. State, 203 Ga. App. 658, 659 (2) ( 418 SE2d 66 ) (1992); see Hasty v. State, 195 Ga. App. 427 ( 394 SE2d 800 ) (1990).

2001We must assume further that “the court properly exercised its judgment and discretion in denying the motion to suppress.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Aaron v. State, 203 Ga. App. 658, 659 (2) ( 418 SE2d 66 ) (1992); see Hasty v. State, 195 Ga. App. 427 ( 394 SE2d 800 ) (1990).

1998Inasmuch as factual and credibility determinations made by the trial court at a suppression hearing must be upheld by the appellate court unless shown to be clearly erroneous, and the absence of the transcript from the record makes that showing impossible, we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 213 Ga. App. 11, 13 (2) ( 444 SE2d 89 ) (1994).

1998Inasmuch as factual and credibility determinations made by the trial court at a suppression hearing must be upheld by the appellate court unless shown to be clearly erroneous, and the absence of the transcript from the record makes that showing impossible, we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 213 Ga. App. 11, 13 (2) ( 444 SE2d 89 ) (1994).

1996The transcript of the suppression hearing shows independently that, at the time he originally gave his consent, Crisanti “was not subjected to any duress or coercion, and that he freely, voluntarily and intelligently consented to the search of his [carry-on bag]. . . . [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) Calixte v. State, 197 Ga. App. 723, 725-726 (2) ( 399 SE2d 490 ) (1990).

1996The transcript of the suppression hearing shows independently that, at the time he originally gave his consent, Crisanti “was not subjected to any duress or coercion, and that he freely, voluntarily and intelligently consented to the search of his [carry-on bag]. . . . [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) Calixte v. State, 197 Ga. App. 723, 725-726 (2) ( 399 SE2d 490 ) (1990).

1991A review of the transcript of the suppression hearing demonstrates that the trial court was authorized to find that “the officers’ conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Maryland v. Garrison, supra at 88.

1989Moreover, “ ‘ “[t]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for concluding’ that probable cause existed.” ’ ” Rush v. State, 188 Ga. App. 520, 522 ( 373 SE2d 377 ), citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 234 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527).

1989Moreover, “ ‘ “[t]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for concluding’ that probable cause existed.” ’ ” Rush v. State, 188 Ga. App. 520, 522 ( 373 SE2d 377 ), citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 234 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527).

1989Moreover, “ ‘ “[t]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for concluding’ that probable cause existed.” ’ ” Rush v. State, 188 Ga. App. 520, 522 ( 373 SE2d 377 ), citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 234 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527).

1980However, I do not believe the lack of a transcript of the suppression hearing mandates affirmance. "[A]n appellant ... who appeals his felony conviction, and states in his notice of appeal that a transcript is to be transmitted as part of the appellate record, has a continuing duty under [Code Ann. §] 6-806, to request, at the time that he files his notice of appeal, the court reporter to transcribe the reported testimony." State v. Hart, 246 Ga. 212, 213 ( 271 SE2d 133 ) (1980).

1980However, I do not believe the lack of a transcript of the suppression hearing mandates affirmance. "[A]n appellant ... who appeals his felony conviction, and states in his notice of appeal that a transcript is to be transmitted as part of the appellate record, has a continuing duty under [Code Ann. §] 6-806, to request, at the time that he files his notice of appeal, the court reporter to transcribe the reported testimony." State v. Hart, 246 Ga. 212, 213 ( 271 SE2d 133 ) (1980).