precursor rule in Iowa

2015Id. at 244–45; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 748 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 2008) (per curiam) (finding attorney violated precursor to rule 32:1.3 by failing to perform the legal work he had contracted to do).

2015Id. at 244-45 ; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 748 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 2008) (per curiam) (finding attorney violated precursor to rule 32:1.3 by failing to perform the legal work he had contracted to do).

2019For example, Smith deposited earned fees from court-appointed work— which she had earned by the time the state paid them and which were therefore personal funds—into the trust account.”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sunleaf, 588 N.W.2d 126 , 126–27 (Iowa 1999) (concluding an attorney violated the precursor to rule 32:1.15(b) when he “used his trust account for the deposit of earned fees”); Humphreys, 524 N.W.2d at 398 (“We have held that commingling of clients’ funds is an absolute offense, one that does not lend itself to the defense that the lawyer’s employees were res

2016See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Profl Ethics & Conduct v. Sunleaf, 588 N.W.2d 126, 126-27 (Iowa 1999) (concluding an attorney violated the precursor to rule 32:1.15(b) when he “used his trust account for the deposit of earned fees”).

2022Winger Contracting Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 926 N.W.2d 526, 543 (Iowa 2019) (reiterating a motion under the precursor to rule 1.904(2) is not a vehicle for a wholly new argument and cannot be a replacement of the requirement to preserve error).

2019For example, Smith deposited earned fees from court-appointed work— which she had earned by the time the state paid them and which were therefore personal funds—into the trust account.”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sunleaf, 588 N.W.2d 126 , 126–27 (Iowa 1999) (concluding an attorney violated the precursor to rule 32:1.15(b) when he “used his trust account for the deposit of earned fees”); Humphreys, 524 N.W.2d at 398 (“We have held that commingling of clients’ funds is an absolute offense, one that does not lend itself to the defense that the lawyer’s employees were res

2016Similarly, we concluded an attorney violated the precursor to rule 32:1.15(b) when he “deposited the proceeds from a personal loan into the trust account, and then periodically used the account to pay a variety of business and personal obligations.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hall, 728 N.W.2d 383, 385, 387 (Iowa 2007); see also Comm. on Profl Ethics & Conduct v. O’Callaghan, 436 N.W.2d 51, 52 (Iowa 1989) (noting it was “not disputed” a lawyer violated rules prohibiting commingling when he “began using his office trust account for personal deposits and expenditures”).

2016Similarly, we concluded an attorney violated the precursor to rule 32:1.15(b) when he “deposited the proceeds from a personal loan into the trust account, and then periodically used the account to pay a variety of business and personal obligations.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hall, 728 N.W.2d 383, 385, 387 (Iowa 2007); see also Comm. on Profl Ethics & Conduct v. O’Callaghan, 436 N.W.2d 51, 52 (Iowa 1989) (noting it was “not disputed” a lawyer violated rules prohibiting commingling when he “began using his office trust account for personal deposits and expenditures”).

2012See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 774 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2009) (noting that a third OWI conviction violated DR 1-102(A)(6), the precursor to rule 32:8.4(b)), overruled on other grounds by Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 768-69 ; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Marcucci 543 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Iowa 1996).

2012See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 774 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2009) (noting that a third OWI conviction violated DR 1-102(A)(6), the precursor to rule 32:8.4(b)), overruled on other grounds by Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 768-69 ; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Marcucci 543 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Iowa 1996).

1988Iowa Code section 784.2 (1977), the precursor to rule 18(5)(g) which became effective in 1978, contained language substantially similar to that in rule 18(5)(g) for our purposes. 1 Interpreting section 784.2, we expressly held that “absence [of defendant and defense counsel] gives rise to a presumption of prejudice necessitating reversal unless the record affirmatively shows the instruction had no influence on the jury’s verdict prejudicial to the defendant.” Id. at 221-222 ; see also State v. Griffin, 323 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1982).

1988Subsequently, in State v. McKee, 312 N.W.2d 907, 915 (Iowa 1981), we assessed a trial court response to a jury request for additional instructions.

1982See State v. Houston, 261 Iowa 1369, 1373 , 158 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1968) (§ 769.4, The Code 1966 — the precursor to rule 5(3) — “does not require the State ... to call every witness listed in the minutes of testimony which is part of the county attorney’s true information”); State v. Parker, 261 Iowa 88, 100-102 , 151 N.W.2d 505, 513 (1967); Cf. State v. Marchellino, 304 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1981) (under Iowa R.Crim.P. 12(3) a defendant’s duty to disclose witnesses arises when they are “expected” to be called by the defense).

1982See State v. Houston, 261 Iowa 1369, 1373 , 158 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1968) (§ 769.4, The Code 1966 — the precursor to rule 5(3) — “does not require the State ... to call every witness listed in the minutes of testimony which is part of the county attorney’s true information”); State v. Parker, 261 Iowa 88, 100-102 , 151 N.W.2d 505, 513 (1967); Cf. State v. Marchellino, 304 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1981) (under Iowa R.Crim.P. 12(3) a defendant’s duty to disclose witnesses arises when they are “expected” to be called by the defense).

1982See State v. Houston, 261 Iowa 1369, 1373 , 158 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1968) (§ 769.4, The Code 1966 — the precursor to rule 5(3) — “does not require the State ... to call every witness listed in the minutes of testimony which is part of the county attorney’s true information”); State v. Parker, 261 Iowa 88, 100-102 , 151 N.W.2d 505, 513 (1967); Cf. State v. Marchellino, 304 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1981) (under Iowa R.Crim.P. 12(3) a defendant’s duty to disclose witnesses arises when they are “expected” to be called by the defense).

1982See State v. Houston, 261 Iowa 1369, 1373 , 158 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1968) (§ 769.4, The Code 1966 — the precursor to rule 5(3) — “does not require the State ... to call every witness listed in the minutes of testimony which is part of the county attorney’s true information”); State v. Parker, 261 Iowa 88, 100-102 , 151 N.W.2d 505, 513 (1967); Cf. State v. Marchellino, 304 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1981) (under Iowa R.Crim.P. 12(3) a defendant’s duty to disclose witnesses arises when they are “expected” to be called by the defense).

1982See State v. Houston, 261 Iowa 1369, 1373 , 158 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1968) (§ 769.4, The Code 1966 — the precursor to rule 5(3) — “does not require the State ... to call every witness listed in the minutes of testimony which is part of the county attorney’s true information”); State v. Parker, 261 Iowa 88, 100-102 , 151 N.W.2d 505, 513 (1967); Cf. State v. Marchellino, 304 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1981) (under Iowa R.Crim.P. 12(3) a defendant’s duty to disclose witnesses arises when they are “expected” to be called by the defense).

1981In State v. Dawson, 245 Iowa 747, 749 , 63 N.W.2d 917, 918 (1954), we said that a similar provision, a precursor to rule 22(3)(d), was directory only and that noncompliance did not result in prejudice to the defendant.

1981In State v. Dawson, 245 Iowa 747, 749 , 63 N.W.2d 917, 918 (1954), we said that a similar provision, a precursor to rule 22(3)(d), was directory only and that noncompliance did not result in prejudice to the defendant.