coerced confession claim in Illinois

2017Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶¶ 4, 21 (reversing the dismissal of the defendant’s postconviction petition and remanding for a hearing on the defendant’s coerced confession claim where the initial confession was obtained during a 45-minute interview with Detective Lenihan); McGee, 2012 IL App (1st) 111084, ¶¶ 1-4 . ¶ 168 In contrast, at trial, there were no eyewitnesses at trial, no physical evidence linking defendant to the murder, and no evidence of an arrest of defendant at the crime scene.

2016Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶¶ 4, 21 (this court reversed the dismissal of the defendant’s postconviction petition and remanded for a hearing on the defendant’s coerced confession claim where the initial confession was obtained during a 45-minute interview with Detective Lenihan); McGee, 2012 IL App (1st) 111084, ¶¶ 1-4 . ¶ 103 In contrast, at trial, there were no eyewitnesses at trial, no physical evidence linking defendant to the murder, and no evidence of an arrest of 39 No. 1-12-3371 defendant at the crime scene.

2017Almodovar, 2013 IL App (1st) 101476, ¶ 79 (granting the defendant leave to file a successive petition and finding that the new evidence would probably change the result on retrial, where “[n]o physical evidence link[ed] the defendant to the shooting,” where the two eyewitnesses had “only a brief opportunity to see the perpetrators,” and where the defendant attached a newspaper article concerning past misconduct by the same detective). ¶ 169 The only evidence at trial linking defendant to the offense was his own videotaped confession, which defendant has consistently claimed was coerced.

2016Almodovar, 2013 IL App (1st) 101476, ¶ 79 (this court granted the defendant leave to file a successive petition and found that the new evidence would probably change the result on retrial, where “[n]o physical evidence link[ed] the defendant to the shooting,” where the two eyewitnesses had “only a brief opportunity to see the perpetrators,” and where the defendant attached a newspaper article concerning past misconduct by the same detective). ¶ 104 The only evidence at trial linking defendant to the offense was his own videotaped confession, which defendant has consistently claimed was coerced

2026People v. Jones, 2025 IL App (5th) 230511-U, ¶ 41 . ¶ 83 This case bears no resemblance to People v. Blalock, 2022 IL 126682 , where newly surfaced pattern and practice evidence, which was uniquely difficult to obtain and controlled by the State, established cause for a coerced confession claim.

2026However, for the reasons that follow, we find that Blalock actually refutes defendant’s argument that in his motion he presented previously unavailable evidence sufficient to establish cause, and defendant’s remaining authorities lend no support. ¶ 24 In Blalock, “the rule adopted by the appellate court [was] that the factual basis of a claim of a coerced confession is always known to a defendant, that subsequent evidence of police misconduct is irrelevant to establishing cause, and a coerced confession claim can therefore never be raised in a successive postconviction petition.” Blalock, 2022

2025See People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 479 (1996). ¶ 37 Thus, at the second stage of postconviction proceedings, a petitioner with a coerced confession claim must sufficiently allege that the pattern and practice evidence is new, material, and not cumulative.

2025See People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 479 (1996). ¶ 37 Thus, at the second stage of postconviction proceedings, a petitioner with a coerced confession claim must sufficiently allege that the pattern and practice evidence is new, material, and not cumulative.

2024See Nicholas, 2013 IL App (1st) 103202, ¶ 42 (holding that the defendant established cause to file a successive petition raising a coerced-confession claim when he had newly discovered evidence that added a “significant detail” and “lend[ed] considerable corroborative weight to defendant's claim”).

2024See People v. Jones, 2016 IL App (1st) 123371 , ¶ 116 (“A defendant's lack of evidence that an officer has committed misconduct in circumstances similar to those of the defendant can serve as cause for failing to fully raise that claim in prior proceedings.”).

2023See French, 2022 IL App (1st) 220122, ¶ 33 (because defendant’s claim was “buildable” prior to Miller and Thompson, he had “ample time to summon the evidentiary support to raise his proportionate penalties claim”). ¶ 26 Finally, relying on People v. Blalock, 2022 IL 126682 , defendant argues that the circuit court erred “in reasoning that because mitigation evidence was adduced at the original sentencing hearing, Dr. Garbarino’s report was not in fact ‘new.’ ” In Blalock, the court held that defendant established cause for bringing a coerced confession claim where he presented new evidence of

2022See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171773 , ¶ 81; People v. Weathers, 2015 IL App (1st) 133264, ¶ 14 ; People v. Mitchell, 2012 IL App (1st) 100907, ¶¶ 60, 63 ; see also People v. Wrice, 406 Ill.

2022App. 3d 43, 52 (2010) (cause established when the defendant raised for the first time the argument that the report of the special state’s attorney corroborated his claim of torture), aff’d, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 49 (noting that the State conceded the showing of cause). ¶ 46 The appellate court below, in rejecting the reasoning found in cases such as Brandon, both ignored the realities of raising a coerced confession claim and adopted a rule that leads to absurd results.

2022See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171773 , ¶ 81; People v. Weathers, 2015 IL App (1st) 133264, ¶ 14 ; People v. Mitchell, 2012 IL App (1st) 100907, ¶¶ 60, 63 ; see also People v. Wrice, 406 Ill.

2022See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171773 , ¶ 81; People v. Weathers, 2015 IL App (1st) 133264, ¶ 14 ; People v. Mitchell, 2012 IL App (1st) 100907, ¶¶ 60, 63 ; see also People v. Wrice, 406 Ill.