duty to give warning in Illinois

1998Hout v. State (1966), 25 Ill.

1991This Court has long held that “although the State is not an insurer of the safety of persons in the lawful use of the highways, it is nevertheless under the duty to give warning by the erection of proper and adequate signs at a reasonable distance, of a dangerous condition of which the State had notice, either actual or constructive.” (Hout v. State (1966), 25 Ill.

2003Under these circumstances, we are guided by our decision in People v. Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d 483 (1967), where we clearly rejected the notion that a trial court has a duty to give the instruction sua sponte.

2003Under these circumstances, we are guided by our decision in People v. Taylor , 36 Ill. 2d 483 (1967), where we clearly rejected the notion that a trial court has a duty to give the instruction sua sponte .

1990Starcher v. State (1983), 36 Ill.

1978In the absence of such a request, however, the instruction which the court did give provided an adequate guide for the jury." 35 Ill.

1978In the absence of such a request, however, the instruction which the court did give provided an adequate guide for the jury.” 35 Ill.

1978On the contrary, we noted in City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen (1946), 394 Ill. 248, 252 , “The sidewalk is simply a part of the street which the municipal authorities have set apart for the use of pedestrians.” We disagree with the holding of the appellate court that the defendants had a duty to give warning to motorists of the condition of the highway.

1977(Roberts v. Town of Cicero (1938), 369 Ill. 639, 642 ; cf. Brooks v. Dean Berenz Asphalt Co. (1967), 83 Ill.

1977(Roberts v. Town of Cicero (1938), 369 Ill. 639, 642 ; cf. Brooks v. Dean Berenz Asphalt Co. (1967), 83 Ill.

1976In the absence of such a request, however, the instruction which the court did give provided an adequate guide for the jury.” The same holding was recently reached by this court in People v. Bedford (2d Dist. 1976), 38 Ill.

1974The relationship between a board’s general power to dismiss under section 10— 22.4 and the duty to give warning where the causes are remediable was discussed by the court in Keyes v. Board of Education (1959), 20 Ill.App.2d 504, 508 , 156 N.E.2d 763, 765-66 , wherein the court said: “As a safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious exercise of such power, the Act requires that if the causes assigned for dismissal of a teacher are remediable, the Board before serving notice of charges must give such teacher a written warning, stating the specific causes which, if not remedied, may result in

1974The relationship between a board’s general power to dismiss under section 10— 22.4 and the duty to give warning where the causes are remediable was discussed by the court in Keyes v. Board of Education (1959), 20 Ill.App.2d 504, 508 , 156 N.E.2d 763, 765-66 , wherein the court said: “As a safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious exercise of such power, the Act requires that if the causes assigned for dismissal of a teacher are remediable, the Board before serving notice of charges must give such teacher a written warning, stating the specific causes which, if not remedied, may result in

1910In Wells v. O’Hare, 209 Ill. 627 , it was said: “A declaration, to recover for negligence, must allege the negligence or omission relied upon to give the right to recover.” The count also alleged that defendant by certain servants caused holes in the rock filled with explosives to be negligently exploded; that defendant, by the negligent manner of his employes who had charge of the explosives, wire or electric batteries, exploded the same in the holes in close proximity to plaintiff.