first specification error in Louisiana

1994Defendants correctly note that "course" has been defined as during the time of employment and at a place contemplated by the employment citing Robinson v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc., 481 So.2d 592 (La.1986) and Lisonbee v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co., 278 So.2d 5 (La.1973).

1994Turning to the first specification of error, we note that the scope of appellate review in this matter was discussed in Lemoine v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, 607 So.2d 708, 711 (La.App. 4th Cir., 1992), writ denied 609 So.2d 258 (La.1992), wherein the court stated: “The issue of disability is determined by the totality of the evidence, including both lay and medical testimony.

1994Defendants correctly note that "course" has been defined as during the time of employment and at a place contemplated by the employment citing Robinson v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc., 481 So.2d 592 (La.1986) and Lisonbee v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co., 278 So.2d 5 (La.1973).

1992In McCardie, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated the criteria it announced in Brown v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., infra, a plaintiff must meet in order to recover in a slip and fall case, stating: "In Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So.2d 282 (La.1975), this court held that after a plaintiff proves there was a foreign substance on a store's floor (the floor of a self-service convenience store) that caused the plaintiff to fall and sustain an injury, the burden of proof shifts to the owner of the store to exculpate itself from the presumption that it was negligent.

1992In McCardie, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated the criteria it announced in Brown v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., infra, a plaintiff must meet in order to recover in a slip and fall case, stating: "In Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So.2d 282 (La.1975), this court held that after a plaintiff proves there was a foreign substance on a store's floor (the floor of a self-service convenience store) that caused the plaintiff to fall and sustain an injury, the burden of proof shifts to the owner of the store to exculpate itself from the presumption that it was negligent.

1980That case and its progenitor, Montgomery v. Breaux, 297 So.2d 185 (La.1974), dealt with judgments that sustained peremptory exceptions of acquisitive prescription in petitory actions where the exceptions were tried and sustained prior to a trial on the merits.

1980The first specification of error is that the lower court was not empowered to recognize the defendants’ ownership in its judgment because their pleas of prescription were not set forth in a reconventional demand, citing Suire v. Primeaux, 363 So.2d 963 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1978).

1978We are of the opinion that this is a suit for property damages resulting from a proprietor's violation of the obligations imposed by Article 667 of the Civil Code. [2] Hero Lands Company v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So.2d 93 (La.1975); Joubert v. State, through State Park and Recreation Commission, 345 So.2d 220 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977); Carr v. City of Baton Rouge, 314 So.2d 527 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ denied, 318 So.2d 53 (La.1975).

1978We are of the opinion that this is a suit for property damages resulting from a proprietor's violation of the obligations imposed by Article 667 of the Civil Code. [2] Hero Lands Company v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So.2d 93 (La.1975); Joubert v. State, through State Park and Recreation Commission, 345 So.2d 220 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977); Carr v. City of Baton Rouge, 314 So.2d 527 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ denied, 318 So.2d 53 (La.1975).

1978We are of the opinion that this is a suit for property damages resulting from a proprietor's violation of the obligations imposed by Article 667 of the Civil Code. [2] Hero Lands Company v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So.2d 93 (La.1975); Joubert v. State, through State Park and Recreation Commission, 345 So.2d 220 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977); Carr v. City of Baton Rouge, 314 So.2d 527 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ denied, 318 So.2d 53 (La.1975).

1978We are of the opinion that this is a suit for property damages resulting from a proprietor's violation of the obligations imposed by Article 667 of the Civil Code. [2] Hero Lands Company v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So.2d 93 (La.1975); Joubert v. State, through State Park and Recreation Commission, 345 So.2d 220 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977); Carr v. City of Baton Rouge, 314 So.2d 527 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ denied, 318 So.2d 53 (La.1975).

1977In support of this rule, Mr. Musso cites the Edwards v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 175 La. 720 , 144 So. 430 (1932), which contains the language to that effect.

1977In support of this rule, Mr. Musso cites the Edwards v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 175 La. 720 , 144 So. 430 (1932), which contains the language to that effect.

1977Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471 , 137 So.2d 298 , and Malone, Ruminations [thereon], 30 La.L.R. 363 (1970); Laird v. Travelers Ins.

1977Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471 , 137 So.2d 298 , and Malone, Ruminations [thereon], 30 La.L.R. 363 (1970); Laird v. Travelers Ins.

1976Counsel urges that the applicable law is that found in the recent case of Holland v. Buckley, La., 305 So.2d 113 (La.1974).

1968Defendant also claims that plaintiff can not demand indemnification for that part of the amount which was paid out in the compromise settlement, citing the case of Winford v. Bulloch, 210 La. 301 , 26 So.2d 822 (1946).

1968Defendant also claims that plaintiff can not demand indemnification for that part of the amount which was paid out in the compromise settlement, citing the case of Winford v. Bulloch, 210 La. 301 , 26 So.2d 822 (1946).

1967The Trial Court erred in awarding $3,500.00 to a woman whose only injury of any consequence was a back sprain from which she was relatively pain free during the great majority of the time she was under the care of a physician." With regard to the first specification of error, namely the question of the introduction of testimony by the physician who treated plaintiffs and in admitting the testimony and giving it any weight, the appellant relies on two cases, namely, Kennedy v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 142 La. 879 , 77 So. 777 (1918), and Bailey v. Fisher, 11 La.App. 187 , 123 So. 166 (Orlea

1967The Trial Court erred in awarding $3,500.00 to a woman whose only injury of any consequence was a back sprain from which she was relatively pain free during the great majority of the time she was under the care of a physician." With regard to the first specification of error, namely the question of the introduction of testimony by the physician who treated plaintiffs and in admitting the testimony and giving it any weight, the appellant relies on two cases, namely, Kennedy v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 142 La. 879 , 77 So. 777 (1918), and Bailey v. Fisher, 11 La.App. 187 , 123 So. 166 (Orlea

1967The Trial Court erred in awarding $3,500.00 to a woman whose only injury of any consequence was a back sprain from which she was relatively pain free during the great majority of the time she was under the care of a physician." With regard to the first specification of error, namely the question of the introduction of testimony by the physician who treated plaintiffs and in admitting the testimony and giving it any weight, the appellant relies on two cases, namely, Kennedy v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 142 La. 879 , 77 So. 777 (1918), and Bailey v. Fisher, 11 La.App. 187 , 123 So. 166 (Orlea

1967The Trial Court erred in awarding $3,500.00 to a woman whose only injury of any consequence was a back sprain from which she was relatively pain free during the great majority of the time she was under the care of a physician." With regard to the first specification of error, namely the question of the introduction of testimony by the physician who treated plaintiffs and in admitting the testimony and giving it any weight, the appellant relies on two cases, namely, Kennedy v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 142 La. 879 , 77 So. 777 (1918), and Bailey v. Fisher, 11 La.App. 187 , 123 So. 166 (Orlea

1966The Supreme Court in the case of Coston v. Coston (1941) 196 La. 1095 , 200 So. 474 , made the following statement: "A `prima facie case' for divorce on the ground of adultery may be made out by showing facts or circumstances that lead fairly and necessarily to the conclusion that adultery has been committed as alleged in the petition, since in the nature of things the alleged offense can seldom be established by direct or positive evidence." In that case, they also made the following statement: "Adultery may be established by indirect or circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct evidence.

1966The Supreme Court in the case of Coston v. Coston (1941) 196 La. 1095 , 200 So. 474 , made the following statement: "A `prima facie case' for divorce on the ground of adultery may be made out by showing facts or circumstances that lead fairly and necessarily to the conclusion that adultery has been committed as alleged in the petition, since in the nature of things the alleged offense can seldom be established by direct or positive evidence." In that case, they also made the following statement: "Adultery may be established by indirect or circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct evidence.

1963As a condition precedent to the application of the principle of law stated in Travelers Fire Insurance Company v. Meadows, La.App., 13 So.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1943) the party invoking the rule must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the vehicle in question was in fact on the wrong side of the road at the moment of collision.