Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
87 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Berk v. Matthewsgreen2 sentences2016No. 13AP-507, 2014-Ohio-315, ¶ 9 , citing Berk v. Mathews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169 (1990). {¶ 17} To prevail under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must show that (1) the movant has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted, (2) the movant is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5), and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time. 2016Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169 (1990). {¶14} To prevail under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must show that: (1) the movant has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted, (2) the movant is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5), and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time. | 4 | 4 |
GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2026As previously addressed, an abuse of discretion means the trial court’s “exercise of that discretion is outside the legally permissible range of choices.” Hackett, 2020-Ohio-6699, at ¶ 19 . {¶ 27} A motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R.60(B) requires demonstration that “(I) the movant has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (II) the movant is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (III) the motion is made within a reasonable time.” Watkins at ¶ 24 , citing GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Industries, 47 Ohio St.2d 146 2026“Where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.” GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶18} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reconsidered its non-final order granting Smith’s motion for a default judgment. | 3 | 70 |
In re A.K.green1 sentence2026Additionally, the motion must involve issues that could not be raised in a direct appeal, or “issues which occur outside of the record and which justify relief from judgment.” Watkins at ¶ 23 , citing In re A.K., 2011-Ohio-4536, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), quoting Volodkevich v. Volodkevich, 36 Ohio St.3d 152, 155 (1988). {¶ 28} In her sixth assignment of error, Marksch argues that the State used a Civ.R. 60(B) motion as a substitute for appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co.green2 sentences2022Summit No. 26719, 2013-Ohio-2794, ¶ 13 , quoting Colley at Ross App. No. 21CA3753 12 249. “[C]ourts must remain mindful of the fact that ‘ “[m]atters involving large sums should not be determined by default judgments if it can reasonabl[y] be avoided.” ’ ” [brackets sic.] Id., quoting Colley at 249, fn.5 , quoting Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir.1951). {¶30} Finally, “ ‘[w]here timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that case 2022Summit No. 26719, 2013-Ohio-2794, ¶ 13 , quoting Colley at Ross App. No. 21CA3753 12 249. “[C]ourts must remain mindful of the fact that ‘ “[m]atters involving large sums should not be determined by default judgments if it can reasonabl[y] be avoided.” ’ ” [brackets sic.] Id., quoting Colley at 249, fn.5 , quoting Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir.1951). {¶30} Finally, “ ‘[w]here timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that case | 1 | 1 |
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Deskinsgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Progressive Cas., citing GMAC v. Deskins (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 132, 134 , 16 OBR 140, 474 N.E.2d 1207 . (“Where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.”) Default judgments are a necessary tool, however, because sometimes defendants simply will not address the merits of the lawsuit when they are sued. 2008See, e.g., Progressive Cas., citing GMAC v. Deskins (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 132, 134 , 16 OBR 140, 474 N.E.2d 1207 . (“Where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.”) Default judgments are a necessary tool, however, because sometimes defendants simply will not address the merits of the lawsuit when they are sued. | 1 | 1 |
Medina Supply Co. v. Corradogreen2 sentences2006See Medina Supply Co. v. Corrado (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 847 , 850-851 , 689 N.E.2d 600 ; Davidson v. Hayes (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 28 , 590 N.E.2d 18 ; Society Natl. 2006See Medina Supply Co. v. Corrado (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 847 , 850-851 , 689 N.E.2d 600 ; Davidson v. Hayes (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 28 , 590 N.E.2d 18 ; Society Natl. | 1 | 1 |
| Erick Rios Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Incgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick
green
2 sentences1993To this extent, the quantum of evidence necessary depends upon all surrounding facts and circumstances.” Childs v. Kelley (Jan. 23, 1991), Hamilton App. No. C-890468, unreported, 1991 WL 6360 . “ Where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.’ ” Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 9, 13 , 7 O.O.3d 5, 7 , 371 N.E.2d 214, 217 , quoting GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Industries, supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus. 1993To this extent, the quantum of evidence necessary depends upon all surrounding facts and circumstances.” Childs v. Kelley (Jan. 23, 1991), Hamilton App. No. C-890468, unreported, 1991 WL 6360 . “ Where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.’ ” Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 9, 13 , 7 O.O.3d 5, 7 , 371 N.E.2d 214, 217 , quoting GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Industries, supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus. | 8 | 1982–2020 |
Colley v. Bazell
green
2 sentences2008While Civ.R. 60(B) is a remedial rule and, therefore, to be construed liberally, the trial court must bear in mind that the rule attempts to "strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and justice should be done." Colley v. Bazell (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 243 , 248 , citing 11 Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure 140, Section 2851, as quoted in Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 9 , 12 . *Page 5 {¶ 13} The decision to grant or deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is entrusted "to the sound discretion of the trial court." In re Whitm 2005"Where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits." G.T.E., syllabus paragraph three. {¶ 15} As the Court noted in Colley v. Bazelli (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 243 What is excusable neglect and what is inexcusable neglect can hardly be determined in a vacuum. * * * The recent cases applying Rule 60(b) have uniformly held that it must be given a liberal construction. | 6 | 1999–2008 |
Strack v. Pelton
green
2 sentences2023“These [three] requirements are independent and in the conjunctive; thus the test is not fulfilled if any one of the requirements is not met.” Id., citing Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174 , 637 N.E.2d 914 (1994). {¶32} “Where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.” GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 47 Ohio St. 2d 146 , 351 N.E.2d 113 , paragraph three of the syllabus (1976). 1. 2023“These [three] requirements are independent and in the conjunctive; thus the test is not fulfilled if any one of the requirements is not met.” Id., citing Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174 , 637 N.E.2d 914 (1994). {¶32} “Where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.” GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 47 Ohio St. 2d 146 , 351 N.E.2d 113 , paragraph three of the syllabus (1976). 1. | 3 | 2008–2023 |
Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams
green
2 sentences2019Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams , 36 Ohio St.3d 17 , 20, 520 N.E.2d 564 (1988). {¶8} In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate judgment, the motion must contain operative facts demonstrating three things: (1) the motion is timely, (2) the movant is entitled to relief under at least one of the grounds set forth in the rule, and (3) the movant has a meritorious claim or defense should the motion be granted. 2019Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams , 36 Ohio St.3d 17 , 20, 520 N.E.2d 564 (1988). {¶8} In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate judgment, the motion must contain operative facts demonstrating three things: (1) the motion is timely, (2) the movant is entitled to relief under at least one of the grounds set forth in the rule, and (3) the movant has a meritorious claim or defense should the motion be granted. | 3 | 2005–2019 |
Horkins v. Quality Chevrolet, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018“Indeed, the law does not favor judgments by default, and it is ‘a general tenet of Ohio jurisprudence * * * that cases should be decided on their merits whenever possible.’ ” Wilson at ¶ 15 , quoting Hopkins v. Quality Chevrolet, Inc., 79 Ohio App.3d 578, 583 , 607 N.E.2d 914 (4th Dist.1992). 2018“Indeed, the law does not favor judgments by default, and it is ‘a general tenet of Ohio jurisprudence * * * that cases should be decided on their merits whenever possible.’ ” Wilson at ¶ 15 , quoting Hopkins v. Quality Chevrolet, Inc., 79 Ohio App.3d 578, 583 , 607 N.E.2d 914 (4th Dist.1992). | 2 | 2007–2018 |
Moore v. Emmanuel Family Training Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017“Under Civ.R. 60(B), a movant’s burden is only to allege a meritorious claim, not to prevail on the merits of the claims.” (Citation omitted.) Moore v. Emmanuel Family Training Ctr., Inc., 18 Ohio St.3d 64, 67 , 479 N.E.2d 879 (1985). “ ‘A meritorious defense is one which, if proved, would entitle a party to the relief requested.’ ” Cincinnati Ins. 2017“Under Civ.R. 60(B), a movant’s burden is only to allege a meritorious claim, not to prevail on the merits of the claims.” (Citation omitted.) Moore v. Emmanuel Family Training Ctr., Inc., 18 Ohio St.3d 64, 67 , 479 N.E.2d 879 (1985). “ ‘A meritorious defense is one which, if proved, would entitle a party to the relief requested.’ ” Cincinnati Ins. | 2 | 2003–2017 |
Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency v. Guthrie
green
2 sentences2008R. 60(B) requires the court to carefully consider the two conflicting principles of finality and perfection.'" Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency v. Guthrie (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 437 , 441 , quoting Strack v. Pelton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 172 , 175 . 2008R. 60(B) requires the court to carefully consider the two conflicting principles of finality and perfection.'" Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency v. Guthrie (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 437 , 441 , quoting Strack v. Pelton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 172 , 175 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Hackett (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2026As previously addressed, an abuse of discretion means the trial court’s “exercise of that discretion is outside the legally permissible range of choices.” Hackett, 2020-Ohio-6699, at ¶ 19 . {¶ 27} A motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R.60(B) requires demonstration that “(I) the movant has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (II) the movant is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (III) the motion is made within a reasonable time.” Watkins at ¶ 24 , citing GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Industries, 47 Ohio St.2d 146 | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Eitel's Towing Serv., Inc. v. D H Trucking, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022Moreover, “where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.” Id., citing GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976). [PGW] presented evidence that established it has a meritorious defense – specifically, that it is not even a proper party in interest to this case and was improperly sued. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Keaton v. Purchase Plus Buyers Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022ANALYSIS A. Vanest, D.G.M., Keaton {¶31} Appellants cite three cases that they claim require us to reverse the trial court’s judgment: Vanest, 124 Ohio App. 3d 525, 528-38 , 706 N.E.2d 825 (1997) (Being preoccupied with another lawsuit is not excusable neglect for missing a legal deadline), D.G.M., 111 Ohio App. 3d 134, 136-41 , 675 N.E.2d 1263 (1996) (Being preoccupied with the work concerning a political campaign and had no time to devote to this suit was not excusable neglect), Keaton, 145 Ohio App. 3d 796, 798-806 , 2001-Ohio-2569 , 764 N.E.2d 1043 (Proof of service of complaint required r 2022ANALYSIS A. Vanest, D.G.M., Keaton {¶31} Appellants cite three cases that they claim require us to reverse the trial court’s judgment: Vanest, 124 Ohio App. 3d 525, 528-38 , 706 N.E.2d 825 (1997) (Being preoccupied with another lawsuit is not excusable neglect for missing a legal deadline), D.G.M., 111 Ohio App. 3d 134, 136-41 , 675 N.E.2d 1263 (1996) (Being preoccupied with the work concerning a political campaign and had no time to devote to this suit was not excusable neglect), Keaton, 145 Ohio App. 3d 796, 798-806 , 2001-Ohio-2569 , 764 N.E.2d 1043 (Proof of service of complaint required r | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Vanest v. Pillsbury Co.
green
2 sentences2022ANALYSIS A. Vanest, D.G.M., Keaton {¶31} Appellants cite three cases that they claim require us to reverse the trial court’s judgment: Vanest, 124 Ohio App. 3d 525, 528-38 , 706 N.E.2d 825 (1997) (Being preoccupied with another lawsuit is not excusable neglect for missing a legal deadline), D.G.M., 111 Ohio App. 3d 134, 136-41 , 675 N.E.2d 1263 (1996) (Being preoccupied with the work concerning a political campaign and had no time to devote to this suit was not excusable neglect), Keaton, 145 Ohio App. 3d 796, 798-806 , 2001-Ohio-2569 , 764 N.E.2d 1043 (Proof of service of complaint required r 2022ANALYSIS A. Vanest, D.G.M., Keaton {¶31} Appellants cite three cases that they claim require us to reverse the trial court’s judgment: Vanest, 124 Ohio App. 3d 525, 528-38 , 706 N.E.2d 825 (1997) (Being preoccupied with another lawsuit is not excusable neglect for missing a legal deadline), D.G.M., 111 Ohio App. 3d 134, 136-41 , 675 N.E.2d 1263 (1996) (Being preoccupied with the work concerning a political campaign and had no time to devote to this suit was not excusable neglect), Keaton, 145 Ohio App. 3d 796, 798-806 , 2001-Ohio-2569 , 764 N.E.2d 1043 (Proof of service of complaint required r | 1 | 2022–2022 |
D.G.M., Inc. v. Cremeans Concrete & Supply Co.
green
2 sentences2022ANALYSIS A. Vanest, D.G.M., Keaton {¶31} Appellants cite three cases that they claim require us to reverse the trial court’s judgment: Vanest, 124 Ohio App. 3d 525, 528-38 , 706 N.E.2d 825 (1997) (Being preoccupied with another lawsuit is not excusable neglect for missing a legal deadline), D.G.M., 111 Ohio App. 3d 134, 136-41 , 675 N.E.2d 1263 (1996) (Being preoccupied with the work concerning a political campaign and had no time to devote to this suit was not excusable neglect), Keaton, 145 Ohio App. 3d 796, 798-806 , 2001-Ohio-2569 , 764 N.E.2d 1043 (Proof of service of complaint required r 2022ANALYSIS A. Vanest, D.G.M., Keaton {¶31} Appellants cite three cases that they claim require us to reverse the trial court’s judgment: Vanest, 124 Ohio App. 3d 525, 528-38 , 706 N.E.2d 825 (1997) (Being preoccupied with another lawsuit is not excusable neglect for missing a legal deadline), D.G.M., 111 Ohio App. 3d 134, 136-41 , 675 N.E.2d 1263 (1996) (Being preoccupied with the work concerning a political campaign and had no time to devote to this suit was not excusable neglect), Keaton, 145 Ohio App. 3d 796, 798-806 , 2001-Ohio-2569 , 764 N.E.2d 1043 (Proof of service of complaint required r | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Hulgin
green
2 sentences2022Summit No. 26719, 2013-Ohio-2794, ¶ 13 , quoting Colley at Ross App. No. 21CA3753 12 249. “[C]ourts must remain mindful of the fact that ‘ “[m]atters involving large sums should not be determined by default judgments if it can reasonabl[y] be avoided.” ’ ” [brackets sic.] Id., quoting Colley at 249, fn.5 , quoting Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir.1951). {¶30} Finally, “ ‘[w]here timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that case 2022Summit No. 26719, 2013-Ohio-2794, ¶ 13 , quoting Colley at Ross App. No. 21CA3753 12 249. “[C]ourts must remain mindful of the fact that ‘ “[m]atters involving large sums should not be determined by default judgments if it can reasonabl[y] be avoided.” ’ ” [brackets sic.] Id., quoting Colley at 249, fn.5 , quoting Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir.1951). {¶30} Finally, “ ‘[w]here timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that case | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Pons v. Ohio State Medical Board
green
2 sentences2018Bd. , 66 Ohio St.3d 619 , 621, 614 N.E.2d 748 (1993). {¶ 43} In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate judgment, the motion must contain operative facts demonstrating three things: (1) the motion is timely, (2) the movant is entitled to relief under at least one of the grounds set forth in the rule, and (3) the movant has a meritorious claim or defense should the motion be granted. 2018Bd. , 66 Ohio St.3d 619 , 621, 614 N.E.2d 748 (1993). {¶ 43} In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate judgment, the motion must contain operative facts demonstrating three things: (1) the motion is timely, (2) the movant is entitled to relief under at least one of the grounds set forth in the rule, and (3) the movant has a meritorious claim or defense should the motion be granted. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kenison v. Kenison
green
1 sentence2016No. 13AP-507, 2014-Ohio-315, ¶ 9 , citing Berk v. Mathews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169 (1990). {¶ 17} To prevail under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must show that (1) the movant has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted, (2) the movant is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5), and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Syphard v. Vrable
green
2 sentences2012Syphard v. Vrable, 141 Ohio App.3d 460 , 751 N.E.2d 564 (2001). 2012Syphard v. Vrable, 141 Ohio App.3d 460 , 751 N.E.2d 564 (2001). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State ex rel. Gyurcsik v. Angelotta
green
1 sentence2011Gyurcsik v. Angelotta (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 345, 346 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
In re Whitman
green
1 sentence2008While Civ.R. 60(B) is a remedial rule and, therefore, to be construed liberally, the trial court must bear in mind that the rule attempts to "strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and justice should be done." Colley v. Bazell (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 243 , 248 , citing 11 Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure 140, Section 2851, as quoted in Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 9 , 12 . *Page 5 {¶ 13} The decision to grant or deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is entrusted "to the sound discretion of the trial court." In re Whitm | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Adomeit v. Baltimore
green
1 sentence2008R. 60(B)(5) provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: * * * (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment." See Adomeit v. Baltimore (1974), 39 Ohio App.2d 97 , 105 (stating that "Civil Rule 60[B][5] is only to be used in an extraordinary and unusual case when the interests of justice warrants it"). {¶ 41} "`A claim under Civ. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Griffey v. Rajan
green
1 sentence2008While Civ.R. 60(B) is a remedial rule and, therefore, to be construed liberally, the trial court must bear in mind that the rule attempts to "strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and justice should be done." Colley v. Bazell (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 243 , 248 , citing 11 Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure 140, Section 2851, as quoted in Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 9 , 12 . *Page 5 {¶ 13} The decision to grant or deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is entrusted "to the sound discretion of the trial court." In re Whitm | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In re Whitman
green
1 sentence2008While Civ.R. 60(B) is a remedial rule and, therefore, to be construed liberally, the trial court must bear in mind that the rule attempts to "strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and justice should be done." Colley v. Bazell (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 243 , 248 , citing 11 Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure 140, Section 2851, as quoted in Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 9 , 12 . *Page 5 {¶ 13} The decision to grant or deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is entrusted "to the sound discretion of the trial court." In re Whitm | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Newark Orthopedics, Inc. v. Brock
green
1 sentence2008Newark Orthopedics, Inc. v. Brock (1994), 92 Ohio App.3d 117 , 122 ; Jordan v. Sitosky (Jan. 24, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 57913. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Svoboda v. City of Brunswick
green
1 sentence2006Svoboda v. Brunswick (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 348 , 351." Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 17 , 20 . {¶ 9} "Where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits." GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. , supra at paragraph three of the syllabus. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Davidson v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2006See Medina Supply Co. v. Corrado (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 847 , 850-851 , 689 N.E.2d 600 ; Davidson v. Hayes (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 28 , 590 N.E.2d 18 ; Society Natl. 2006See Medina Supply Co. v. Corrado (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 847 , 850-851 , 689 N.E.2d 600 ; Davidson v. Hayes (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 28 , 590 N.E.2d 18 ; Society Natl. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Blakemore v. Blakemore green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| In re Jane Doe 1 green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Knapp v. Knapp green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| DeHart v. Aetna Life Insurance green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Bancroft v. Communicators, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.