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12 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Inmangreen2 sentences2014“Among the factors in determining the substantiality of a Scales violation is whether the violation is prejudicial to the accused.” Inman, 692 N.W.2d at 81 (citing Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592 n.5; Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 150.3(2)(a) 5 (1975)). 2014See id. at 81 . 6 The other factors relevant to substantiality also support the conclusion that any Scales violation is not substantial. | 4 | 5 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2014Accordingly, a Scales violation is not substantial “[i]f it is undisputed that the Miranda warning was administered, or that the accused waived his or her right to remain silent” because in such a case “the lack of a recording creates no prejudice to the accused.” Id.; see also Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d at 69 ; State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 674-75 (Minn. 1998); Williams, 535 N.W.2d at 289 . 2014Accordingly, a Scales violation is not substantial “[i]f it is undisputed that the Miranda warning was administered, or that the accused waived his or her right to remain silent” because in such a case “the lack of a recording creates no prejudice to the accused.” Id.; see also Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d at 69 ; State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 674-75 (Minn. 1998); Williams, 535 N.W.2d at 289 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Buckinghamgreen2 sentences2014We need not address the state’s first argument concerning whether Compardo was in custody because, given the facts in the district court record and the parties’ respective arguments, it is clear that, even if there is a Scales violation, the violation is not “substantial.” See State v. Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Minn. 2009) (“We need not determine if there was a Scales violation here because, if there was, it was not substantial.”). 2014We need not address the state’s first argument concerning whether Compardo was in custody because, given the facts in the district court record and the parties’ respective arguments, it is clear that, even if there is a Scales violation, the violation is not “substantial.” See State v. Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Minn. 2009) (“We need not determine if there was a Scales violation here because, if there was, it was not substantial.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Sandersgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 888-89 (Minn.2009) (explaining that we need not reach the issue of whether Scales applies to interrogations conducted outside Minnesota because we concluded that the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the alleged Scales violation). 2013See State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 888-89 (Minn.2009) (explaining that we need not reach the issue of whether Scales applies to interrogations conducted outside Minnesota because we concluded that the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the alleged Scales violation). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Scalesgreen2 sentences2014“Among the factors in determining the substantiality of a Scales violation is whether the violation is prejudicial to the accused.” Id. at 81 (citing State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 , 592 n.5 (Minn. 1994)). 2014“Among the factors in determining the substantiality of a Scales violation is whether the violation is prejudicial to the accused.” Inman, 692 N.W.2d at 81 (citing Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592 n.5; Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 150.3(2)(a) 5 (1975)). | 1 | 7 |
State v. Jenkinsgreen1 sentence2014Destruction of evidence “A defendant’s right to due process of law is implicated when the [s]tate loses, destroys, or otherwise fails to preserve material evidence.” State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 235 (Minn. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2014Accordingly, a Scales violation is not substantial “[i]f it is undisputed that the Miranda warning was administered, or that the accused waived his or her right to remain silent” because in such a case “the lack of a recording creates no prejudice to the accused.” Id.; see also Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d at 69 ; State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 674-75 (Minn. 1998); Williams, 535 N.W.2d at 289 . 2014Accordingly, a Scales violation is not substantial “[i]f it is undisputed that the Miranda warning was administered, or that the accused waived his or her right to remain silent” because in such a case “the lack of a recording creates no prejudice to the accused.” Id.; see also Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d at 69 ; State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 674-75 (Minn. 1998); Williams, 535 N.W.2d at 289 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. M.D.T.green2 sentences2013See M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 284 (Stras, J„ concurring) (characterizing our “inherent authority” as “judicial power” granted to the judicial branch in Article VI, Section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution). 2013See M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 284 (Stras, J„ concurring) (characterizing our “inherent authority” as “judicial power” granted to the judicial branch in Article VI, Section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution). | 1 | 1 |
Rauen v. PARK NICOLLET MEDICAL CENTERgreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Waddell, 655 N.W.2d at 811 n. 3 (stating “criminal defendants are ... protected against coerced confessions by the recording requirement”); Miller, 573 N.W.2d at 674 (“The underlying rationale for our decision in Scales was to prevent factual disputes about the existence and context of Miranda warnings and any ensuing waiver of rights.”). 2013See, e.g., Waddell, 655 N.W.2d at 811 n. 3 (stating “criminal defendants are ... protected against coerced confessions by the recording requirement”); Miller, 573 N.W.2d at 674 (“The underlying rationale for our decision in Scales was to prevent factual disputes about the existence and context of Miranda warnings and any ensuing waiver of rights.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Edrozogreen2 sentences2013Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592 ; see also State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719 , 722 n. 3 (Minn.1998). 2013Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592 ; see also State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719 , 722 n. 3 (Minn.1998). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sandersgreen1 sentence2012Id. at 620 (“Because the Scales requirement is not a part of either Illinois law or federal law, we conclude that the FBI did not willfully deviate from lawful conduct during the interrogation and that suppression of this evidence would not prevent future violations in Minnesota.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2009Because we have yet to determine whether a Scales violation implicates a constitutional right, we have not decided whether to apply the constitutional standard for reviewing harmless error, i.e., whether the verdict was surely unattributable to the error, State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997), or the standard we apply to non-constitutional error, i.e., whether the error substantially influenced the jury’s verdict, State v. Anderson, 763 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn.2009). 2009Because we have yet to determine whether a Scales violation implicates a constitutional right, we have not decided whether to apply the constitutional standard for reviewing harmless error, i.e., whether the verdict was surely unattributable to the error, State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997), or the standard we apply to non-constitutional error, i.e., whether the error substantially influenced the jury’s verdict, State v. Anderson, 763 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn.2009). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Juarezgreen2 sentences2009Because we have yet to determine whether a Scales violation implicates a constitutional right, we have not decided whether to apply the constitutional standard for reviewing harmless error, i.e., whether the verdict was surely unattributable to the error, State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997), or the standard we apply to non-constitutional error, i.e., whether the error substantially influenced the jury’s verdict, State v. Anderson, 763 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn.2009). 2009Because we have yet to determine whether a Scales violation implicates a constitutional right, we have not decided whether to apply the constitutional standard for reviewing harmless error, i.e., whether the verdict was surely unattributable to the error, State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997), or the standard we apply to non-constitutional error, i.e., whether the error substantially influenced the jury’s verdict, State v. Anderson, 763 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn.2009). | 1 | 1 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770 (Minn.1989); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 2003State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770 (Minn.1989); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Robinson
green
1 sentence2013We have previously recognized that the Scales requirement has a procedural purpose — preserving an accurate record of an interrogation, and a substantive purpose — "discouraging] unfair and psychologically coercive police tactics” resulting "in [a] more professional law enforcement.” Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591 ; cf. State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217 , 224 n. 5 (Minn.1988) (asking law enforcement to record interrogation before the adoption of Scales , not only to create an "objective record,” but also to validate the "integrity of the actual interrogation” and "the integrity of the process”). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Davis v. Furlong
green
2 sentences2013On that basis, I would apply the lex fori approach and conclude that Scales applies to the admission of Castillo-Alvarez’s statement in a Minnesota state court. 5 -See Davis, 328 N.W.2d at 152-53 . 2013On that basis, I would apply the lex fori approach and conclude that Scales applies to the admission of Castillo-Alvarez’s statement in a Minnesota state court. 5 -See Davis, 328 N.W.2d at 152-53 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2009Scales arose from cases involving defendants’ constitutional rights against compelled self-incrimination and the procedures required by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2009Scales arose from cases involving defendants’ constitutional rights against compelled self-incrimination and the procedures required by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Warndahl
green
1 sentence2003State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770 (Minn.1989); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Thaggard
green
1 sentence1996The purpose of the Scales requirement, “to assist the trial court in the resolution of evidentiary disputes,” Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d at 807 , was not significantly violated in this case. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.