Russell claim in Mississippi

2002Holyfield, 476 F.Supp. at 110 .

2001Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. at 110 .

1997The Commission stated that although Wigginton had not been decided when the panel hearing took place, "it has been the law in this state that a judge does not have the authority to suspend the execution of a sentence after it has been imposed." The Commission, citing Denton v. Maples, 394 So.2d 895 (Miss. 1981) and Harrigill v. State, 403 So.2d 867 (Miss. 1981), stated that "Judge Russell clearly should have known he had no authority to release a felon unless there was a statute specifically authorizing him to do so." In addressing, Judge Russell's defense of Miss.

1997The Commission stated that although Wig-ginton had not been decided when the panel hearing took place, “it has been the law in this state that a judge does not have the authority to suspend the execution of a sentence after it has been imposed.” The Commission, citing Denton v. Maples, 394 So.2d 895 (Miss.1981) and Harrigill v. State, 403 So.2d 867 (Miss.1981), stated that “Judge Russell clearly should have known he had no authority to release a felon unless there was a statute specifically authorizing him to do so.” In addressing, Judge Russell’s defense of Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-47, the Commi

1997The Commission stated that although Wigginton had not been decided when the panel hearing took place, "it has been the law in this state that a judge does not have the authority to suspend the execution of a sentence after it has been imposed." The Commission, citing Denton v. Maples, 394 So.2d 895 (Miss. 1981) and Harrigill v. State, 403 So.2d 867 (Miss. 1981), stated that "Judge Russell clearly should have known he had no authority to release a felon unless there was a statute specifically authorizing him to do so." In addressing, Judge Russell's defense of Miss.

1997The Commission stated that although Wig-ginton had not been decided when the panel hearing took place, “it has been the law in this state that a judge does not have the authority to suspend the execution of a sentence after it has been imposed.” The Commission, citing Denton v. Maples, 394 So.2d 895 (Miss.1981) and Harrigill v. State, 403 So.2d 867 (Miss.1981), stated that “Judge Russell clearly should have known he had no authority to release a felon unless there was a statute specifically authorizing him to do so.” In addressing, Judge Russell’s defense of Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-47, the Commi

2015Id.

2015Similarly, in Nicolaou v. State, 612 So. 2d 1080 (Miss. 1992), this Court affirmed another conviction for murder where the appellant claimed insufficient evidence of malice aforethought had been presented.

2015In light of the evidence, this Court explicitly held, “The jury’s rejection of Russell’s claim of self-defense was supported by the evidence, which indicated that Gaines was unarmed and that he was stabbed after Russell had stated his desire to kill him.” Id. at 76-77 . ¶37; Similarly, in Nicolaou v. State, 612 So.2d 1080 (Miss.1992), this Court affirmed another conviction for murder where the appellant claimed insufficient evidence of malice aforethought had been presented.

2015In light of the evidence, this Court explicitly held, “The jury’s rejection of Russell’s claim of self-defense was supported by the evidence, which indicated that Gaines was unarmed and that he was stabbed after Russell had stated his desire to kill him.” Id. at 76-77 . ¶37.

2015In light of the evidence, this Court explicitly held, “The jury’s rejection of Russell’s claim of self-defense was supported by the evidence, which indicated that Gaines was unarmed and that he was stabbed after Russell had stated his desire to kill him.” Id. at 76-77 . ¶37; Similarly, in Nicolaou v. State, 612 So.2d 1080 (Miss.1992), this Court affirmed another conviction for murder where the appellant claimed insufficient evidence of malice aforethought had been presented.

2011See Birkley, 750 So.2d at 1252 ; Perry, 637 So.2d at 876 .

2004However, "[i]n 1976, the Mississippi Legislature enacted [Section 15-1-36,] a [specific] statute of limitations for medical malpractice tort claims." Kilgore, 508 So.2d at 1044 .

2004"This is consistent with our general principle that an act remedial in its character embraces claims existing when the [new] act [is] passed." Kilgore, 508 So.2d at 1045 (citing Excelsior Mfg.

1995Russell argues that the prosecution's attempt to question Rogers about Russell's confession given on the witness stand during the guilt phase was a comment on his failure *836 to take the stand and violates this Court's rulings in Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314 (1992) and Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542 (Miss. 1990).

1995In Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078 (Miss. 1987), the defendant made an argument similar to that now advanced by Russell.

1995Russell argues that the prosecution's attempt to question Rogers about Russell's confession given on the witness stand during the guilt phase was a comment on his failure *836 to take the stand and violates this Court's rulings in Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314 (1992) and Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542 (Miss. 1990).

1988Pyron v. Joiner, 381 So.2d 627 (Miss. 1980) (disqualification of 3.9 percent of the votes did not warrant special election.) Walker v. Smith, 213 Miss. 255 , 56 So.2d 84 , suggestion of error 57 So.2d 166 (1952) (disqualification of six percent of the total vote did not warrant a special primary election.) Applying the Russell test to the facts of this case, it is apparent that a new election is unnecessary.

1988Pyron v. Joiner, 381 So.2d 627 (Miss. 1980) (disqualification of 3.9 percent of the votes did not warrant special election.) Walker v. Smith, 213 Miss. 255 , 56 So.2d 84 , suggestion of error 57 So.2d 166 (1952) (disqualification of six percent of the total vote did not warrant a special primary election.) Applying the Russell test to the facts of this case, it is apparent that a new election is unnecessary.

1988Pyron v. Joiner, 381 So.2d 627 (Miss. 1980) (disqualification of 3.9 percent of the votes did not warrant special election.) Walker v. Smith, 213 Miss. 255 , 56 So.2d 84 , suggestion of error 57 So.2d 166 (1952) (disqualification of six percent of the total vote did not warrant a special primary election.) Applying the Russell test to the facts of this case, it is apparent that a new election is unnecessary.

1988Pyron v. Joiner, 381 So.2d 627 (Miss. 1980) (disqualification of 3.9 percent of the votes did not warrant special election.) Walker v. Smith, 213 Miss. 255 , 56 So.2d 84 , suggestion of error 57 So.2d 166 (1952) (disqualification of six percent of the total vote did not warrant a special primary election.) Applying the Russell test to the facts of this case, it is apparent that a new election is unnecessary.