Russell brief in Alabama

2017Russell, however, contends that any error was not harmless because he "was forced to use a peremptory strike" to remove J.J., and, as a result, "several biased veniremembers ended up on the jury." (Russell's brief, p. 76.) Specifically, Russell argues that, "[g]iven the circumstances of the case, the inclusion of jurors [D.C. and D.E. who had] family in law enforcement was particularly prejudicial." (Russell's brief, p. 76.) To support his argument, Russell cites Ex parte Colby , 41 So.3d 1 (Ala. 2009), for the proposition that a trial court's error in failing to grant for-cause strikes is not

2017Russell, however, contends that any error was not harmless because he "was forced to use a peremptory strike" to remove J.J., and, as a result, "several biased veniremembers ended up on the jury." (Russell's brief, p. 76.) Specifically, Russell argues that, "[g]iven the circumstances of the case, the inclusion of jurors [D.C. and D.E. who had] family in law enforcement was particularly prejudicial." (Russell's brief, p. 76.) To support his argument, Russell cites Ex parte Colby , 41 So.3d 1 (Ala. 2009), for the proposition that a trial court's error in failing to grant for-cause strikes is not

2017Testimony that has no probative value on any material question of fact or inquiry is inadmissible.' Ex parte Crymes , 630 So.2d 125 , 126 (Ala. 1993), citing Charles W.

2017Testimony that has no probative value on any material question of fact or inquiry is inadmissible.' Ex parte Crymes , 630 So.2d 125 , 126 (Ala. 1993), citing Charles W.

2017Furthermore, Russell's claim more closely resembles an issue of lost or destroyed evidence that the defense did not have the opportunity to examine for potentially exculpatory evidence akin to that of Arizona v. Youngblood , 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed. 2d 281 (1988).

2017Furthermore, Russell's claim more closely resembles an issue of lost or destroyed evidence that the defense did not have the opportunity to examine for potentially exculpatory evidence akin to that of Arizona v. Youngblood , 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed. 2d 281 (1988).

2017This Court has stated: " 'For this court to find a violation of due process because evidence has been lost, we must consider (1) the culpability of the prosecution, (2) the materiality of the lost evidence, and the (3) sufficiency of the other evidence.' Grimsley v. State , 678 So.2d 1197 , 1206 (Ala. Crim.

2017This Court has stated: " 'For this court to find a violation of due process because evidence has been lost, we must consider (1) the culpability of the prosecution, (2) the materiality of the lost evidence, and the (3) sufficiency of the other evidence.' Grimsley v. State , 678 So.2d 1197 , 1206 (Ala. Crim.

2017App. 2000), aff'd, 808 So.2d 1215 (Ala. 2001). 'The question of admissibility of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's determination on that question will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.' Ex parte Loggins , 771 So.2d 1093 , 1103 (Ala. 2000).

2017App. 2000), aff'd, 808 So.2d 1215 (Ala. 2001). 'The question of admissibility of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's determination on that question will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.' Ex parte Loggins , 771 So.2d 1093 , 1103 (Ala. 2000).

2017App. 2000), aff'd, 808 So.2d 1215 (Ala. 2001). 'The question of admissibility of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's determination on that question will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.' Ex parte Loggins , 771 So.2d 1093 , 1103 (Ala. 2000).

2017App. 2000), aff'd, 808 So.2d 1215 (Ala. 2001). 'The question of admissibility of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's determination on that question will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.' Ex parte Loggins , 771 So.2d 1093 , 1103 (Ala. 2000).

2017Russell contends that the "trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that the extensive evidence of collateral bad acts that were admitted over defense counsel's objections could be used for limited purposes, and not as evidence of bad or guilty character." 28 (Russell's brief, p. 69.) Specifically, Russell challenges the lack of a limiting instruction regarding evidence that he pointed a cellular telephone at a police officer in an attempt to resist arrest in 2008, evidence that implied that he stole the firearm used in the shooting, and evidence that he told McCurdy t

2017Russell contends that the "trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that the extensive evidence of collateral bad acts that were admitted over defense counsel's objections could be used for limited purposes, and not as evidence of bad or guilty character." 28 (Russell's brief, p. 69.) Specifically, Russell challenges the lack of a limiting instruction regarding evidence that he pointed a cellular telephone at a police officer in an attempt to resist arrest in 2008, evidence that implied that he stole the firearm used in the shooting, and evidence that he told McCurdy t

2017Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2017Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2015See Bui v. State , 551 So.2d 1094 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 551 So.2d 1125 (1989), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 971 , 111 S.Ct. 1613 , 113 L.Ed.2d 712 (1991) ; Hallford v. State , 548 So.2d 526 , 541-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 , 110 S.Ct. 354 , 107 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989)." Freeman v. State , 776 So.2d 160 , 196 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).

2015See Bui v. State , 551 So.2d 1094 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 551 So.2d 1125 (1989), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 971 , 111 S.Ct. 1613 , 113 L.Ed.2d 712 (1991) ; Hallford v. State , 548 So.2d 526 , 541-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 , 110 S.Ct. 354 , 107 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989)." Freeman v. State , 776 So.2d 160 , 196 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015See Bui v. State , 551 So.2d 1094 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 551 So.2d 1125 (1989), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 971 , 111 S.Ct. 1613 , 113 L.Ed.2d 712 (1991) ; Hallford v. State , 548 So.2d 526 , 541-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 , 110 S.Ct. 354 , 107 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989)." Freeman v. State , 776 So.2d 160 , 196 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).

2015See Bui v. State , 551 So.2d 1094 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 551 So.2d 1125 (1989), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 971 , 111 S.Ct. 1613 , 113 L.Ed.2d 712 (1991) ; Hallford v. State , 548 So.2d 526 , 541-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 , 110 S.Ct. 354 , 107 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989)." Freeman v. State , 776 So.2d 160 , 196 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015See Bui v. State , 551 So.2d 1094 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 551 So.2d 1125 (1989), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 971 , 111 S.Ct. 1613 , 113 L.Ed.2d 712 (1991) ; Hallford v. State , 548 So.2d 526 , 541-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 , 110 S.Ct. 354 , 107 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989)." Freeman v. State , 776 So.2d 160 , 196 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).

2015See Bui v. State , 551 So.2d 1094 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 551 So.2d 1125 (1989), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 971 , 111 S.Ct. 1613 , 113 L.Ed.2d 712 (1991) ; Hallford v. State , 548 So.2d 526 , 541-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 , 110 S.Ct. 354 , 107 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989)." Freeman v. State , 776 So.2d 160 , 196 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015Specifically, he argues that the State presented no witness to the murder, that the alleged murder weapon did not have Russell's fingerprints on it, and that the evidence concerning the murder weapon was "conflicting, inconclusive, and insignificant." (Russell's brief, at p. 64.) "Alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that, to be convicted of [a] capital offense and sentenced to death, a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill." Ziegler v. State , 886 So.2d 127 , 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "[I]ntent to kill may be 'inferred from the use of a deadly weapon or other attenda

2015"There is no reason to disturb the jury's verdict in this case." Doster v. State , 72 So.3d 50 , 98 (Ala.Crim.App.2010).

2015"There is no reason to disturb the jury's verdict in this case." Doster v. State , 72 So.3d 50 , 98 (Ala.Crim.App.2010).