Kentucky rule in Kentucky

2023“It is well established that Kentucky courts rely upon Federal caselaw when interpreting a Kentucky rule of procedure that is similar to its federal counterpart.” Nebraska Alliance Realty Co. v. Brewer, 529 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Ky. App. 2017); Curtis Green & Clay Green, Inc. v. Clark, 318 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Ky. App. 2010). -6- result of any abuse of discretion by the trial court.

2023“It is well established that Kentucky courts rely upon Federal caselaw when interpreting a Kentucky rule of procedure that is similar to its federal counterpart.” Nebraska Alliance Realty Co. v. Brewer, 529 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Ky. App. 2017); Curtis Green & Clay Green, Inc. v. Clark, 318 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Ky. App. 2010). -6- result of any abuse of discretion by the trial court.

2018Resources L. 349, 369-70 (2016). 29 Lexington Retail Beverage Dealers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 303 S.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Ky. 1957). 30 Id. 13 public generally, or who suffers injury only in common with the general public.”31 Under the modem Kentucky test, “[t]o have standing to sue, one must have a judicially cognizable interest in the subject matter of the suit” that is not “remote and speculative,” but “a present and substantial interest in the subject matter.”32 Kentucky courts have not adopted the Lujan test, but have adopted elements of federal decisions on associat

2018Resources L. 349, 369-70 (2016). 29 Lexington Retail Beverage Dealers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 303 S.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Ky. 1957). 30 Id. 13 public generally, or who suffers injury only in common with the general public.”31 Under the modem Kentucky test, “[t]o have standing to sue, one must have a judicially cognizable interest in the subject matter of the suit” that is not “remote and speculative,” but “a present and substantial interest in the subject matter.”32 Kentucky courts have not adopted the Lujan test, but have adopted elements of federal decisions on associat

2011See, Isaacs v. Cox, Ky., 431 S.W.2d 494 (1968).

2011See, Isaacs v. Cox, Ky., 431 S.W.2d 494 (1968).

2018As we explained in Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, the general rule in appellate procedure is that only a trial court's final orders are appealable. s An exception to this general ·rule, an interlocutory appeal is a mechanism used to address less-than-final orders of a trial court of select issues. 6 One such issue that can 4 "It is well established that KentUcky courts rely upon Federal caselaw when interpreting a Kentucky rule of procedure that is similar to its federal counterpart." Curtis Green & Clay Green, Inc. v. Clark, 318 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Newsome By and

2018As we explained in Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, the general rule in appellate procedure is that only a trial court's final orders are appealable. s An exception to this general ·rule, an interlocutory appeal is a mechanism used to address less-than-final orders of a trial court of select issues. 6 One such issue that can 4 "It is well established that KentUcky courts rely upon Federal caselaw when interpreting a Kentucky rule of procedure that is similar to its federal counterpart." Curtis Green & Clay Green, Inc. v. Clark, 318 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Newsome By and

2021In Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 523 (Ky. 2001), the landmark Kentucky immunity opinion, the Court similarly tried to explain good faith by discussing bad faith: [I]n the context of qualified official immunity, “bad faith” can be predicated on a violation of a constitutional, statutory, or other clearly established right which a person in the public employee’s position presumptively -40- would have known was afforded to a person in the plaintiff’s position, i.e., objective unreasonableness; or if the officer or employee willfully or maliciously intended to harm the plaintiff or acted with a

2009Thus, contrary to assertions sometimes found in our case law, Sections 230 and 231 of our Constitution are not the source of sovereign immunity in Kentucky, but are provisions that permit the General Assembly to waive the Commonwealth's inherent immunity either by direct appropriation of money from the state treasury (Section 230) and/or by specifying where and in what manner the Commonwealth may be sued (Section 231)." Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 523-524 (Ky.2001) (internal citations omitted). [6] Yanero , which is presently the seminal Kentucky immunity case, did not expressly address th

2024In reaching this decision, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s analysis in McGuire, 805 S.W.2d at 121 (“Where, and as we have held here, there is a binding and enforceable contract between a party and the personal representatives for the estate, and where the parties to that contract are before the court, it has in its sound judicial discretion the equity power to enforce that contract for the purpose of settling the estate.”).

2024In reaching this decision, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s analysis in McGuire, 805 S.W.2d at 121 (“Where, and as we have held here, there is a binding and enforceable contract between a party and the personal representatives for the estate, and where the parties to that contract are before the court, it has in its sound judicial discretion the equity power to enforce that contract for the purpose of settling the estate.”).

2017We disagree with Wiest’s argument as to the aggravator.for the same reasons enunciated above. 9 Kentucky BarAss'n v. Truman, 457 S.W.3d 325, 327 (Ky. 2015].

2017Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Truman, 457 S.W.3d 325, 327 (Ky. 2015).

2025Anderson, 281 S.W.3d at 765–66.

2023Anderson v. Commonwealth, 281 S.W.3d 761, 764, n.10 (Ky. 2009).

2026In addition, it is notable that while the factors that must be considered to grant a temporary injunction under Michigan law are substantially similar to Kentucky’s factors, Michigan does not consider any one factor to be a necessary “prerequisite.” See Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying Michigan law and noting “[t]hese four considerations are ‘factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met.’”); compare Maupin, 575 S.W.2d at 699 (“[demonstrating irreparable harm] is a mandatory prerequisite to the issuance

2026In addition, it is notable that while the factors that must be considered to grant a temporary injunction under Michigan law are substantially similar to Kentucky’s factors, Michigan does not consider any one factor to be a necessary “prerequisite.” See Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying Michigan law and noting “[t]hese four considerations are ‘factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met.’”); compare Maupin, 575 S.W.2d at 699 (“[demonstrating irreparable harm] is a mandatory prerequisite to the issuance

2025The -66- false grand jury testimony came to light when, after the indictment issued and while under oath during the trial court’s proceedings, Detective Jones risked charges of perjury against himself and “acknowledged that he had testified that Baker struck her children with an aluminum baseball bat, but conceded that there was no evidence that a baseball bat was used.” Id. at 587 .31 Jones could reveal his grand jury testimony despite Kentucky’s rule requiring the secrecy of those proceedings, RCr 5.24,32 because while the prohibition against “disclosing the testimony of another witness rema

2025The -66- false grand jury testimony came to light when, after the indictment issued and while under oath during the trial court’s proceedings, Detective Jones risked charges of perjury against himself and “acknowledged that he had testified that Baker struck her children with an aluminum baseball bat, but conceded that there was no evidence that a baseball bat was used.” Id. at 587 .31 Jones could reveal his grand jury testimony despite Kentucky’s rule requiring the secrecy of those proceedings, RCr 5.24,32 because while the prohibition against “disclosing the testimony of another witness rema

2024Leiserson & Adler, Inc. v. Keam, 266 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Ky. 1954); Louisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. City of St.

2024Leiserson & Adler, Inc. v. Keam, 266 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Ky. 1954); Louisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. City of St.

2024In order to show compliance with a subpoena would be unreasonable or oppressive it must be shown “(1) there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation; or (2) the subpoena is too indefinite; or (3) compliance would be overly burdensome.” Matter of Dillon, 824 F. Supp. 330, 333 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2024In order to show compliance with a subpoena would be unreasonable or oppressive it must be shown “(1) there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation; or (2) the subpoena is too indefinite; or (3) compliance would be overly burdensome.” Matter of Dillon, 824 F. Supp. 330, 333 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023Neil relies upon the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s analysis in Hill v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., 327 S.W.3d 412, 418 (Ky. 2010), to support his position that the family court had the authority to delay finality until the entry of the QDROs. [T]he judgments entered on May 12, 2003, were not final because they were attached to an order which specifically stated that “these Judgments are not final and appealable and are subject to further rulings on the motions currently pending to alter, amend or vacate.” The order specifically reserved for future adjudication the trial court’s ruling on KLC’s Janua

2023“It is well established that Kentucky courts rely upon Federal caselaw when interpreting a Kentucky rule of procedure that is similar to its federal counterpart.” Nebraska Alliance Realty Co. v. Brewer, 529 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Ky. App. 2017); Curtis Green & Clay Green, Inc. v. Clark, 318 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Ky. App. 2010). -6- result of any abuse of discretion by the trial court.

2023“It is well established that Kentucky courts rely upon Federal caselaw when interpreting a Kentucky rule of procedure that is similar to its federal counterpart.” Nebraska Alliance Realty Co. v. Brewer, 529 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Ky. App. 2017); Curtis Green & Clay Green, Inc. v. Clark, 318 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Ky. App. 2010). -6- result of any abuse of discretion by the trial court.

2023See Contino v. United States, 535 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (accepting notice of appeal that was rejected for being eFiled rather than arriving by mail, contrary to local rules); VC & M, Ltd. v. Andrews, 991 N.E.2d 323 , 330 (Ill. 2013) (holding eFiled notice of appeal, although improperly filed, sufficient to confer jurisdiction although it should have been filed as a hard copy).12 This persuasive authority comports with my own understanding of Kentucky’s rule of substantial compliance.

2022Being aware of no fundamental differences, we apply both Kentucky’s standard of review and our own precedent. -9- construed as a whole, giving effect to all parts and every word in it if possible.” City of Louisa v. Newland, 705 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Ky. 1986).