Kentucky rule in Indiana

1981"The granting of a motion for summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact presented by the case and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Kendrick Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Totten, (1980) Ind. App., 408 N.E.2d 130, 131 .

1981“The granting of a motion for summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact presented by the case and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Kendrick Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Totten, (1980) Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 130, 131 .

2018He then asserts that a Kentucky stop by an Indiana officer violates Kentucky law unless the Indiana officer entered Kentucky in "fresh pursuit" and that the Indiana officers in this case did not enter Kentucky in "fresh pursuit." 5 But we need not address this argument because Whitt's starting premise is faulty. [20] The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a violation of state law is generally irrelevant to the question of whether a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment: "[W]hether or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment ... has

2018He then asserts that a Kentucky stop by an Indiana officer violates Kentucky law unless the Indiana officer entered Kentucky in "fresh pursuit" and that the Indiana officers in this case did not enter Kentucky in "fresh pursuit." 5 But we need not address this argument because Whitt's starting premise is faulty. [20] The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a violation of state law is generally irrelevant to the question of whether a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment: "[W]hether or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment ... has

2007Id.

2007Id.

2005The majority in Hall declined to follow the Kentucky rule approved of in Parke because in Indiana, post-conviction relief is the only way a defendant can challenge the validity of a guilty plea; the majority concluded, “such petition is not ‘collateral’ in the sense used by the Court in Parke. • It is instead a direct attack on the validity of the underlying conviction with no other independent purpose.” Id.

2005The majority in Hall declined to follow the Kentucky rule approved of in Parke because in Indiana, post-conviction relief is the only way a defendant can challenge the validity of a guilty plea; the majority concluded, “such petition is not ‘collateral’ in the sense used by the Court in Parke. • It is instead a direct attack on the validity of the underlying conviction with no other independent purpose.” Id.

1999Id.

1997The court explicitly declined to determine whether a nonparticipating royalty interest was subject to the Kentucky rule against perpetuities, that being “an issue for the Kentucky courts.” Id. at 810 .

1997The court explicitly declined to determine whether a nonparticipating royalty interest was subject to the Kentucky rule against perpetuities, that being “an issue for the Kentucky courts.” Id. at 810 .