execution doctrine in Massachusetts

2021See Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 687 (1999) (interlocutory rulings, such as denial of motion to dismiss, are not final orders and thus generally not appealable until ultimate disposition of case).12 The conservator fares no better with her argument that the issue whether the judge in the probate court failed to afford "full faith and credit" to a final judgment in the Minnesota litigation is the proper subject of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the doctrine of present execution.

2013According to the doctrine of present execution, however, an interlocutory order is immediately appealable if “it concerns an issue that is ‘collateral to the basic controversy,’ ” Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 687 (1999), quoting Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 600 (1988), and the ruling “ ‘will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal’ from the final judgment.” 2 Elles v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Quincy, supra at 674, quoting Maddocks v. Ricker, supra at 597-600 .

2024Cf. Elles v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Quincy, 450 Mass. 671, 673-674 (2008) (recognizing doctrine of present execution as "narrow exception" to usual rule).

2015So ordered. 1 We understand that the Federal case is still pending. 2 We need not address whether Warren’s claim under the present execution doctrine also fails under the second part of the test, namely, whether “the matter is ‘collateral’ to the merits of the controversy.” Elles v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Quincy, supra.

2025In Fabre v. Walton, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that right, reasoning that the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute "are similar in purpose to the protections afforded public officials by the doctrine of governmental immunity" and that 6 interlocutory orders denying claims of governmental immunity can be appealed under the doctrine of present execution because "[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Fabre, supra at 521-522 & n.7, citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

2021See, e.g., Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517 , 521- 522 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004) (pursuant to doctrine of present execution, "there is a right to interlocutory appellate review from the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute"). 9 Indeed, and again as we noted in Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 162 , "[t]he legislative history in Massachusetts demonstrates that in response to the problem of SLAPP suits the Legislature intended to enact very broad protection for petitioning activities." That said, we also noted that we were "dubious that the Legislature inten

2018So ordered . 3 The phrase "doctrine of present execution" appears to derive from Vincent v. Plecker , 319 Mass. 560 , 564 n.2, 67 N.E.2d 145 (1946), where this court, in deciding whether an order was appealable as a "final decree," noted, "Though part of a single controversy remains undetermined, if the decree is to be executed presently, so that appeal would be futile unless the decree could be vacated by the prompt entry of an appeal in the full court, the decree is a final one." We first used the phrase "doctrine of present execution" in Borman v. Borman , 378 Mass. 775 , 780, 393 N.E.2d 84

2018So ordered . 3 The phrase "doctrine of present execution" appears to derive from Vincent v. Plecker , 319 Mass. 560 , 564 n.2, 67 N.E.2d 145 (1946), where this court, in deciding whether an order was appealable as a "final decree," noted, "Though part of a single controversy remains undetermined, if the decree is to be executed presently, so that appeal would be futile unless the decree could be vacated by the prompt entry of an appeal in the full court, the decree is a final one." We first used the phrase "doctrine of present execution" in Borman v. Borman , 378 Mass. 775 , 780, 393 N.E.2d 84

2025L. c. 258, § 10 (b), an argument it does not press on appeal. [7] The MBTA's appeal was proper under the doctrine of present execution, which is a narrow exception to the finality rule, permitting "immediate appeal from an interlocutory order if the order will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from a final judgment." Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312 , 315 n.6 (2002).

2017Affirmed. "[A]n order denying a motion to dismiss based on immunity from suit [such as the underlying order here] enjoys the benefit of the present execution rule because it is a final order that meets the criteria for immediate appeal." Kent v. Commonwealth , 437 Mass. 312 , 316 (2002).

2017Pursuant to the present execution doctrine, an order is "immediately appealable if it concerns an issue that is collateral to the basic controversy . . . and the ruling will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment." Rodriguez v. Somerville, 472 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2015), quoting from Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 264 (2013). 9 The defendant is correct that disqualification orders in civil cases are immediately appealable under the doctrine of present execution.4 See Maddocks, supra. See also Smaland Beach Assn., Inc. v. Genova, 461 Mass. 21

2017Pursuant to the present execution doctrine, an order is "immediately appealable if it concerns an issue that is collateral to the basic controversy . . . and the ruling will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment." Rodriguez v. Somerville, 472 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2015), quoting from Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 264 (2013). 9 The defendant is correct that disqualification orders in civil cases are immediately appealable under the doctrine of present execution.4 See Maddocks, supra. See also Smaland Beach Assn., Inc. v. Genova, 461 Mass. 21

2025In Fabre v. Walton, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that right, reasoning that the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute "are similar in purpose to the protections afforded public officials by the doctrine of governmental immunity" and that 6 interlocutory orders denying claims of governmental immunity can be appealed under the doctrine of present execution because "[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Fabre, supra at 521-522 & n.7, citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

2022Under the doctrine of present execution, however, "immediate appeal of an interlocutory order is allowed if the order will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment." Fabre, supra, citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-525 (1985).

2017Pursuant to the present execution doctrine, an order is "immediately appealable if it concerns an issue that is collateral to the basic controversy . . . and the ruling will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment." Rodriguez v. Somerville, 472 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2015), quoting from Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 264 (2013). 9 The defendant is correct that disqualification orders in civil cases are immediately appealable under the doctrine of present execution.4 See Maddocks, supra. See also Smaland Beach Assn., Inc. v. Genova, 461 Mass. 21

2017Pursuant to the present execution doctrine, an order is "immediately appealable if it concerns an issue that is collateral to the basic controversy . . . and the ruling will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment." Rodriguez v. Somerville, 472 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2015), quoting from Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 264 (2013). 9 The defendant is correct that disqualification orders in civil cases are immediately appealable under the doctrine of present execution.4 See Maddocks, supra. See also Smaland Beach Assn., Inc. v. Genova, 461 Mass. 21

2020"Pursuant to the present execution doctrine, an order is 'immediately appealable if it concerns an issue that is collateral to the basic controversy . . . and the ruling will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment.'" Commonwealth v. Delnegro, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 337 , 341 (2017), quoting Rodriguez v. Somerville, 472 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2015).

2017Pursuant to the present execution doctrine, an order is "immediately appealable if it concerns an issue that is collateral to the basic controversy . . . and the ruling will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment." Rodriguez v. Somerville, 472 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2015), quoting from Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 264 (2013). 9 The defendant is correct that disqualification orders in civil cases are immediately appealable under the doctrine of present execution.4 See Maddocks, supra. See also Smaland Beach Assn., Inc. v. Genova, 461 Mass. 21

2014An interlocutory order may be appealed under the doctrine of present execution “if the order will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from a final judgment.” Commonwealth v. Al Saud, 459 Mass. 221 , 227 n.15 (2011), quoting Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 151-152 (2009).

2013An interlocutory order may be appealed under the doctrine of present execution “if the order will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from a final judgment.” Commonwealth v. Al Saud, 459 Mass. 221 , 227 n.15 (2011), quoting Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 151-152 (2009).

2012Under this rule, litigants claiming immunity may only avail themselves of the doctrine of present execution if § 17C provides immunity from suit, rather than merely an exemption from liability for ordinary negligence. 5 See Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26 , 31 (1987), cert. denied sub nom.

1999Maddocks, supra. In Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Springfield, supra at 31, which dealt with an immunity defense under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , this court distinguished between immunity from liability and immunity from suit, holding that only orders denying immunity from suit enjoy the benefit of the present execution rule.

2025See Patel v. Martin, 481 Mass. 29, 32 (2018) (doctrine of present execution applies only in "narrowly limited circumstances").

2022Although the court recognized that a postjudgment appeal might be an imperfect remedy, the court saw it nonetheless as a viable one, and held that "orders requiring the disclosure of privileged material, such as the order in this case, are not categorically irremediable, and therefore are not appealable under the doctrine of present execution." Id. at 36 .

2024"Under the present execution doctrine, a disqualification order, as we have here, is treated as a final judgment that is immediately appealable." Slade, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 544 , citing Borman, 378 Mass. at 780.

2018See Slade v. Ormsby , 69 Mass. App. Ct. 542 , 544-545, 872 N.E.2d 223 (2007) (because disqualification order is subject to doctrine of present execution, it is treated as final judgment, and timely motion to reconsider such ruling is treated as motion for amendment of judgment pursuant to Mass. R.

2025While it is true that the denial of a motion to dismiss is typically not appealable, Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004), in this case, "there is already one question properly before the court that must be decided in any event," and the actual malice issue "is fully developed in the record, extensively argued by the parties, and certain to reappear in later stages" of litigation, Maxwell v. AIG Dom.

2021See, e.g., Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517 , 521- 522 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004) (pursuant to doctrine of present execution, "there is a right to interlocutory appellate review from the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute"). 9 Indeed, and again as we noted in Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 162 , "[t]he legislative history in Massachusetts demonstrates that in response to the problem of SLAPP suits the Legislature intended to enact very broad protection for petitioning activities." That said, we also noted that we were "dubious that the Legislature inten

2008See also R.J.A. v. K.A.V., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 372-374 (1993) (trial judge’s finding that party had standing not subject to doctrine of present execution).

2001See R.J.A. v. K.A.V., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 374 (1993) (issue “inextricably intertwined” with ultimate matters to be decided is not collateral and not appeal-able under doctrine of present execution).

2002In so holding, we noted the importance of determining immrmity issues early to protect government agencies and public officials from unwarranted disruption and harassing litigation, and recognized that the right to immunity from suit is effectively “lost as litigation proceeds past motion practice,” id., quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993), and is not adequately vindicated “if an order denying it were not appealable until the close of litigation.” Brum v. Dartmouth, supra, citing Matthews v. Rakiey, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (1995).

1999See Hopper v. Callahan, 408 Mass. 621, 624 (1990) (interlocutory appeal of denial of summary judgment motion asserting immunity); Matthews v. Rakiey, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (1995).

1994Compare cases involving the doctrine of present execution, such as Vincent v. Plecker, 319 Mass. 560 , 564 & n.2 (1946); Lynde v. Vose, 326 Mass. 621, 622-623 (1951); Borman v. Bor-man, 378 Mass. 775, 779-781 (1979).

1982See Wax v. Monks, 327 Mass. 1, 2-3 (1951); Lynde v. Vose, 326 Mass. 621, 622 (1951).

2026See Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 485 (2014) (present execution doctrine applies where "protection from the burden of litigation and trial is precisely the right to which [a party] asserts an entitlement").

2018Id . at 485-486, 5 N.E.3d 908 .

2025Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 98 (2011). [5] We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Children's Law Center of Massachusetts in support of neither party; and the Juvenile Law Center, the National Center for Youth Law, and Children's Rights in support of the plaintiffs. [6] The department "screens" 51A reports -- i.e., gathers information -- to identify children at risk of abuse or neglect by a caregiver." 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.21 (2023).

2014Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91 , 106 n.12 (2011), citing E lles v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Quincy, 450 Mass. 671, 673-674 (2008).

2022See Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 687-688 (1999); Walenty v. Mendon, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 914 , 914 n.2 (2002).

2004See Walenty v. Mendon, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 914 , 914 n.2 (2002).

2018So ordered . 3 The phrase "doctrine of present execution" appears to derive from Vincent v. Plecker , 319 Mass. 560 , 564 n.2, 67 N.E.2d 145 (1946), where this court, in deciding whether an order was appealable as a "final decree," noted, "Though part of a single controversy remains undetermined, if the decree is to be executed presently, so that appeal would be futile unless the decree could be vacated by the prompt entry of an appeal in the full court, the decree is a final one." We first used the phrase "doctrine of present execution" in Borman v. Borman , 378 Mass. 775 , 780, 393 N.E.2d 84

2018So ordered . 3 The phrase "doctrine of present execution" appears to derive from Vincent v. Plecker , 319 Mass. 560 , 564 n.2, 67 N.E.2d 145 (1946), where this court, in deciding whether an order was appealable as a "final decree," noted, "Though part of a single controversy remains undetermined, if the decree is to be executed presently, so that appeal would be futile unless the decree could be vacated by the prompt entry of an appeal in the full court, the decree is a final one." We first used the phrase "doctrine of present execution" in Borman v. Borman , 378 Mass. 775 , 780, 393 N.E.2d 84

2018We have no basis for distinguishing this case from Marcus , 462 Mass. at 153 , 967 N.E.2d 140 , and therefore hold that the doctrine of present execution does not apply with respect to Crawford's claimed immunity under State law. *536 We turn then to whether the plaintiffs nonetheless have the right to pursue their interlocutory appeal by force of the VPA.

2018We have no basis for distinguishing this case from Marcus , 462 Mass. at 153 , 967 N.E.2d 140 , and therefore hold that the doctrine of present execution does not apply with respect to Crawford's claimed immunity under State law. *536 We turn then to whether the plaintiffs nonetheless have the right to pursue their interlocutory appeal by force of the VPA.

2017Visnick v. Caulfield, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 809 , 811 n.4 (2009). 9 Patrick’s status as governor also provides an independent basis for the imposition of the actual malice standard.

2017See Visnick v. Caulfield, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 809 , 811 n.4 (2009).

2015Health Comm’n, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 401, 405-406 (2007) (noting that in Daveiga case, this court “accepted the view that the denial of a motion for summary judgment brought on the basis of defective presentment related to immunity under G.

2014Similarly, nothing in Bellanti v. Boston Pub, Health Commn., 70 Mass. App. Ct. at 404-406 , renders the denial of the city’s motion to dismiss on presentment grounds a matter of immunity that is immediately appealable as of right under the present execution doctrine.

2026See CP 200 State, LLC, 488 Mass. at 849 ("The doctrine of present execution is a long-standing exception to [the rule that there is no right to appeal from an interlocutory order unless a statute or rule authorizes it], applicable in limited circumstances"). 14"The term 'interactive computer service' means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that 21 the publisher or speaker of information; and that the information was provided by another "informat

2025Given that "an accepted purpose of [the bond requirement] is to discourage a plaintiff from pressing forward with what a tribunal has determined to be unmeritorious claims," Polanco v. Sandor, 480 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2018), it appears that an appeal from the final disposition of the case would be inadequate to protect the defendants' interests.

2023See Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 483 Mass. 200, 212-213 (2019) (Blanchard II).