execution hearing in Georgia

2025See Anytime Bail Bonding, Inc. v. State, 299 Ga. App. 695, 696 (1) ( 683 SE2d 358 ) (2009). judgment of bond forfeiture under OCGA § 9-11-60(d),3 an appeal from the denial of an OCGA § 9-11-60(d) motion requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal.

2025See Anytime Bail Bonding, Inc. v. State, 299 Ga. App. 695, 696 (1) ( 683 SE2d 358 ) (2009). judgment of bond forfeiture under OCGA § 9-11-60(d),3 an appeal from the denial of an OCGA § 9-11-60(d) motion requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal.

2019Professsional Bail v. Perdue, 306 Ga. App. 72, 74 (1) ( 701 SE2d 542 ) (2010). 6 Don Johnson Bonding Co. v. State, 309 Ga. App. 6, 8 ( 709 SE2d 50 ) (2011). 7 OCGA § 17-6-71 (a). 4 ten days of Veal’s failure to appear, i.e., by Monday, November 27, 2017, which accounts for the intervening Thanksgiving holiday.8 It is undisputed that notice was not sent to ABB until November 28, 2017, at the earliest – one day after the expiration of the statutory deadline.

2019Professsional Bail v. Perdue, 306 Ga. App. 72, 74 (1) ( 701 SE2d 542 ) (2010). 6 Don Johnson Bonding Co. v. State, 309 Ga. App. 6, 8 ( 709 SE2d 50 ) (2011). 7 OCGA § 17-6-71 (a). 4 ten days of Veal’s failure to appear, i.e., by Monday, November 27, 2017, which accounts for the intervening Thanksgiving holiday.8 It is undisputed that notice was not sent to ABB until November 28, 2017, at the earliest – one day after the expiration of the statutory deadline.

2019Professsional Bail v. Perdue, 306 Ga. App. 72, 74 (1) ( 701 SE2d 542 ) (2010). 6 Don Johnson Bonding Co. v. State, 309 Ga. App. 6, 8 ( 709 SE2d 50 ) (2011). 7 OCGA § 17-6-71 (a). 4 ten days of Veal’s failure to appear, i.e., by Monday, November 27, 2017, which accounts for the intervening Thanksgiving holiday.8 It is undisputed that notice was not sent to ABB until November 28, 2017, at the earliest – one day after the expiration of the statutory deadline.

2019Professsional Bail v. Perdue, 306 Ga. App. 72, 74 (1) ( 701 SE2d 542 ) (2010). 6 Don Johnson Bonding Co. v. State, 309 Ga. App. 6, 8 ( 709 SE2d 50 ) (2011). 7 OCGA § 17-6-71 (a). 4 ten days of Veal’s failure to appear, i.e., by Monday, November 27, 2017, which accounts for the intervening Thanksgiving holiday.8 It is undisputed that notice was not sent to ABB until November 28, 2017, at the earliest – one day after the expiration of the statutory deadline.

2011Miller, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur. 1 Notably, Don Johnson Bonding states that the principal first failed to appear as scheduled on March 23, 2009. 2 See Ga. L. 2009, p. 688, § 2. 3 See OCGA § 17-6-71 (a) (showing effective date of May 5, 2009). 4 Morrell v. State, 297 Ga. App. 592 ( 677 SE2d 771 ) (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). 5 See, e.g., Troup Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 292 Ga. App. 5, 6-7 ( 663 SE2d 734 ) (2008) (decided prior to 2009 amendment; triggering dates for applicable statutory notice and hearing provisions were not limited to calculation from date of principa

1997This interpretation of OCGA § 17-6-71 (a) has not only been rejected by this Court in Griffin v. State of Ga., 194 Ga. App. 624, 625 (2), supra, and AAA Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 192 Ga. App. 684 (1) ( 386 SE2d 50 ), but Jim Kiser’s assumption that the surety was relieved of liability after the initial execution hearings were not conducted ignores the bonds’ express terms providing that U. S. Bonds will not be relieved as surety until the trial court excuses the principals — via leave of court — from having to appear in court “from day to day and from term to term of said courts. . . .” See

2017And the rationale of that division still holds true: “Little would be gained by requiring the court to quickly issue an order [of forfeiture], which may then be ignored until service to the parties ten days later [of notice of the execution hearing on the forfeiture].” Id. at 706 (1).

2011Miller, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur. 1 Notably, Don Johnson Bonding states that the principal first failed to appear as scheduled on March 23, 2009. 2 See Ga. L. 2009, p. 688, § 2. 3 See OCGA § 17-6-71 (a) (showing effective date of May 5, 2009). 4 Morrell v. State, 297 Ga. App. 592 ( 677 SE2d 771 ) (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). 5 See, e.g., Troup Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 292 Ga. App. 5, 6-7 ( 663 SE2d 734 ) (2008) (decided prior to 2009 amendment; triggering dates for applicable statutory notice and hearing provisions were not limited to calculation from date of principa

2011Miller, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur. 1 Notably, Don Johnson Bonding states that the principal first failed to appear as scheduled on March 23, 2009. 2 See Ga. L. 2009, p. 688, § 2. 3 See OCGA § 17-6-71 (a) (showing effective date of May 5, 2009). 4 Morrell v. State, 297 Ga. App. 592 ( 677 SE2d 771 ) (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). 5 See, e.g., Troup Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 292 Ga. App. 5, 6-7 ( 663 SE2d 734 ) (2008) (decided prior to 2009 amendment; triggering dates for applicable statutory notice and hearing provisions were not limited to calculation from date of principa

2011“People would laugh at the law if it required any such thing.” Fletcher Guano Co. v. Vorus, 10 Ga. App. 380, 382 ( 73 SE 348 ) (1912).

2011“People would laugh at the law if it required any such thing.” Fletcher Guano Co. v. Vorus, 10 Ga. App. 380, 382 ( 73 SE 348 ) (1912).

2011Miller, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur. 1 Notably, Don Johnson Bonding states that the principal first failed to appear as scheduled on March 23, 2009. 2 See Ga. L. 2009, p. 688, § 2. 3 See OCGA § 17-6-71 (a) (showing effective date of May 5, 2009). 4 Morrell v. State, 297 Ga. App. 592 ( 677 SE2d 771 ) (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). 5 See, e.g., Troup Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 292 Ga. App. 5, 6-7 ( 663 SE2d 734 ) (2008) (decided prior to 2009 amendment; triggering dates for applicable statutory notice and hearing provisions were not limited to calculation from date of principa

2011Miller, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur. 1 Notably, Don Johnson Bonding states that the principal first failed to appear as scheduled on March 23, 2009. 2 See Ga. L. 2009, p. 688, § 2. 3 See OCGA § 17-6-71 (a) (showing effective date of May 5, 2009). 4 Morrell v. State, 297 Ga. App. 592 ( 677 SE2d 771 ) (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). 5 See, e.g., Troup Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 292 Ga. App. 5, 6-7 ( 663 SE2d 734 ) (2008) (decided prior to 2009 amendment; triggering dates for applicable statutory notice and hearing provisions were not limited to calculation from date of principa

2009See Confidential Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 279 Ga. App. 794, 797, n. 5 ( 632 SE2d 684 ) (2006).

2009See Confidential Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 279 Ga. App. 794, 797, n. 5 ( 632 SE2d 684 ) (2006).

2009See Anytime Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 228 Ga. App. 232, 233 (1) ( 491 SE2d 399 ) (1997); Spring-U Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 200 Ga. App. 533 ( 408 SE2d 831 ) (1991).

2009See Anytime Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 228 Ga. App. 232, 233 (1) ( 491 SE2d 399 ) (1997); Spring-U Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 200 Ga. App. 533 ( 408 SE2d 831 ) (1991).

2006Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur. 1 Curiously, in none of these four cases did the trial court follow the requirement of OCGA § 17-6-71 (a) that the execution hearing be “not sooner than 120 days but not later than 150 days after such failure to appear.” Because no party at any point has complained about this oversight, we consider the issue waived and therefore do not address it. 2 Spivey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 834 (1) ( 619 SE2d 346 ) (2005). 3 Reliable Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 280, 282 ( 585 SE2d 192 ) (2003). 4 Osborne Bonding &c.

2006Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur. 1 Curiously, in none of these four cases did the trial court follow the requirement of OCGA § 17-6-71 (a) that the execution hearing be “not sooner than 120 days but not later than 150 days after such failure to appear.” Because no party at any point has complained about this oversight, we consider the issue waived and therefore do not address it. 2 Spivey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 834 (1) ( 619 SE2d 346 ) (2005). 3 Reliable Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 280, 282 ( 585 SE2d 192 ) (2003). 4 Osborne Bonding &c.

1997As we have previously held, however, “[a] surety must show harm as well as error before it will be relieved of liability based on failure to conduct an execution hearing within the time prescribed by OCGA § 17-6-71 (a). [Cit.]” U. S. Bonds v. State of Ga., 224 Ga. App. 758, 759 ( 481 SE2d 887 ) (1997).

1997As we have previously held, however, “[a] surety must show harm as well as error before it will be relieved of liability based on failure to conduct an execution hearing within the time prescribed by OCGA § 17-6-71 (a). [Cit.]” U. S. Bonds v. State of Ga., 224 Ga. App. 758, 759 ( 481 SE2d 887 ) (1997).

1991Consequently, neither the Internal Revenue Code nor general principles of federal law, see Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 458-459 (n. 19), prohibit a state court's award of the exemption. [W]hat the Davis court missed is that there is no prohibition —expressed or implied—on a state court's requiring the execution of the waiver, and because state court allocation of dependency exemptions has been custom and usage for decades, it is more reasonable than not to infer that if Congress had intended to forbid state courts from allocating the exemption by requiring the waiver to be signed, Congress would have

1991Consequently, neither the Internal Revenue Code nor general principles of federal law, see Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 458-459 (n. 19), prohibit a state court's award of the exemption. [W]hat the Davis court missed is that there is no prohibition —expressed or implied—on a state court's requiring the execution of the waiver, and because state court allocation of dependency exemptions has been custom and usage for decades, it is more reasonable than not to infer that if Congress had intended to forbid state courts from allocating the exemption by requiring the waiver to be signed, Congress would have

1989See Ace Bonding Co. v. State, 180 Ga. App. 261 (1) ( 349 SE2d 15 ) (1986).

1989See Ace Bonding Co. v. State, 180 Ga. App. 261 (1) ( 349 SE2d 15 ) (1986).

1959See also Bishop v. Brown, 138 Ga. 771 (3) ( 76 S. E. 89 ), and Terhune v. Pettit, 195 Ga. 793 ( 25 S. E. 2d 660 ). *705 Applying the foregoing principles and the rulings made in cases cited, it is clear that this petition does not come within the exception provided in Code § 3-202, and that the Superior Court of Hart County does not have jurisdiction.

1959See also Bishop v. Brown, 138 Ga. 771 (3) ( 76 S. E. 89 ), and Terhune v. Pettit, 195 Ga. 793 ( 25 S. E. 2d 660 ). *705 Applying the foregoing principles and the rulings made in cases cited, it is clear that this petition does not come within the exception provided in Code § 3-202, and that the Superior Court of Hart County does not have jurisdiction.

1959See also Bishop v. Brown, 138 Ga. 771 (3) ( 76 S. E. 89 ), and Terhune v. Pettit, 195 Ga. 793 ( 25 S. E. 2d 660 ). *705 Applying the foregoing principles and the rulings made in cases cited, it is clear that this petition does not come within the exception provided in Code § 3-202, and that the Superior Court of Hart County does not have jurisdiction.

1959See also Bishop v. Brown, 138 Ga. 771 (3) ( 76 S. E. 89 ), and Terhune v. Pettit, 195 Ga. 793 ( 25 S. E. 2d 660 ). *705 Applying the foregoing principles and the rulings made in cases cited, it is clear that this petition does not come within the exception provided in Code § 3-202, and that the Superior Court of Hart County does not have jurisdiction.