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12 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 2022–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2023See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972) (setting forth the requirements to satisfy due process for parole revocation hearings including that a “hearing must be tendered within a reasonable time”); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973) (reiterating that the revocation of parole is a “loss of liberty” that “is a serious deprivation requiring that the parolee be accorded due process” and extending that analysis to probationers). 2023See 6 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972) (setting forth the requirements to 7 satisfy due process for parole revocation hearings including that a “hearing must be 8 tendered within a reasonable time”); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 781-82 9 (1973) (reiterating that the revocation of parole is a “loss of liberty” that “is a serious 10 deprivation requiring that the parolee be accorded due process” and extending that 11 analysis to probationers). | 2 | 2 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences2023See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972) (setting forth the requirements to satisfy due process for parole revocation hearings including that a “hearing must be tendered within a reasonable time”); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973) (reiterating that the revocation of parole is a “loss of liberty” that “is a serious deprivation requiring that the parolee be accorded due process” and extending that analysis to probationers). 2023See 6 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972) (setting forth the requirements to 7 satisfy due process for parole revocation hearings including that a “hearing must be 8 tendered within a reasonable time”); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 781-82 9 (1973) (reiterating that the revocation of parole is a “loss of liberty” that “is a serious 10 deprivation requiring that the parolee be accorded due process” and extending that 11 analysis to probationers). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Chavezgreen2 sentences2025Section 14 31-20-5.2(A)(1)-(5); see State v. Chavez, 2019-NMCA-068, ¶ 16 , 451 P.3d 115 15 (holding that the statutory criteria in Subsection A of Section 31-20-5.2 are intended 16 to guide the district court’s exercise of its discretion in deciding whether a sex 17 offender should remain on probation following a duration review hearing). 2025Section 14 31-20-5.2(A)(1)-(5); see State v. Chavez, 2019-NMCA-068, ¶ 16 , 451 P.3d 115 15 (holding that the statutory criteria in Subsection A of Section 31-20-5.2 are intended 16 to guide the district court’s exercise of its discretion in deciding whether a sex 17 offender should remain on probation following a duration review hearing). | 1 | 1 |
Olim v. Wakinekonagreen1 sentence2025See Olim, 461 U.S. at 249 . 7 {31} The duration review hearing process outlined in Section 31-21-10.1(C) 8 requires regular and consistent evaluations of the duration and conditions of parole 9 for sex offenders at clearly defined intervals. | 1 | 1 |
Cordova v. LeMastergreen2 sentences2023To help resolve the dispute, it is helpful to survey the interests of 2 probationers in general compared to those created by virtue of Section 31-20-5.2(B). 3 See Cordova v. Lemaster, 2004-NMSC-026, ¶ 18 , 136 N.M. 217 , 96 P.3d 778 4 (recognizing that state law may give rise to a protected liberty interest); Garcia v. 5 Las Vegas Med. 2023To help resolve the dispute, it is helpful to survey the interests of 2 probationers in general compared to those created by virtue of Section 31-20-5.2(B). 3 See Cordova v. Lemaster, 2004-NMSC-026, ¶ 18 , 136 N.M. 217 , 96 P.3d 778 4 (recognizing that state law may give rise to a protected liberty interest); Garcia v. 5 Las Vegas Med. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2025ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI Britt Baca-Miller, District Judge Edward Emord Pro se Chaparral, NM for Petitioner Raúl Torrez, Attorney General Van Snow, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Respondent DISPOSITIONAL ORDER OF REMAND VIGIL, Justice. {1} WHEREAS, this matter came before the Court on petition for writ of certiorari under Rule 12-501 NMRA seeking review of the Second Judicial District Court’s order (1) denying Petitioner’s request to include his time serving in-house parole when determining his eligibility for a duration review hearing under NMSA 1978, Section 31- 21-10.1 2025ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI Britt Baca-Miller, District Judge Edward Emord Pro se Chaparral, NM for Petitioner Raúl Torrez, Attorney General Van Snow, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Respondent DISPOSITIONAL ORDER OF REMAND VIGIL, Justice. {1} WHEREAS, this matter came before the Court on petition for writ of certiorari under Rule 12-501 NMRA seeking review of the Second Judicial District Court’s order (1) denying Petitioner’s request to include his time serving in-house parole when determining his eligibility for a duration review hearing under NMSA 1978, Section 31- 21-10.1 | 6 | 2023–2025 |
Brock v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2022Id. {14} Third, the district court determined that the State’s interpretation of Section 31- 21-10.1(B) (2004) “leads to a nonsensical result.” The result referenced by the district court was that an inmate could remain in prison for the entire duration of the parole period—either twenty years or a life term, depending on the offense—without being afforded the duration-review hearing contemplated by the Legislature. {15} The district court therefore concluded that “there exists a level of ambiguity that requires application of the rule of lenity” notwithstanding that the statutory definition o 2022Id. 5 {14} Third, the district court determined that the State’s interpretation of Section 6 31-21-10.1(B) (2004) “leads to a nonsensical result.” The result referenced by the 7 district court was that an inmate could remain in prison for the entire duration of the 8 parole period—either twenty years or a life term, depending on the offense—without 9 being afforded the duration-review hearing contemplated by the Legislature. 10 {15} The district court therefore concluded that “there exists a level of ambiguity 11 that requires application of the rule of lenity” notwithstanding that the statuto | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Ferebee v. Hume
green
2 sentences2025The State opposed Defendant’s 18 request for summary discharge of Defendant from probation and for summary 19 dismissal of the State’s motion to revoke probation, the central issues it raises on 20 appeal. 15 1 {27} Although we agree that the State failed to argue that the hearing it now seeks 2 should be provided prior to any consideration of its motion to revoke probation, we 3 nonetheless find that the purposes of preservation were substantially served. “[T]he 4 primary purposes for the preservation rule are: (1) to specifically alert the district 5 court to a claim of error so any mistake 2025The State opposed Defendant’s 18 request for summary discharge of Defendant from probation and for summary 19 dismissal of the State’s motion to revoke probation, the central issues it raises on 20 appeal. 15 1 {27} Although we agree that the State failed to argue that the hearing it now seeks 2 should be provided prior to any consideration of its motion to revoke probation, we 3 nonetheless find that the purposes of preservation were substantially served. “[T]he 4 primary purposes for the preservation rule are: (1) to specifically alert the district 5 court to a claim of error so any mistake | 1 | 2025–2025 |
MacKey v. Montrym
green
1 sentence2023Such 18 delay, by itself, can inform the risk of error caused by post-deprivation proceedings. 19 See Mackey, 443 U.S. at 14-15 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.