Credit Alliance test in New York

1992In opposing Peat Marwick's motion for summary judgment, SPBC was required to produce evidentiary proof, in admissible form, of all three elements of the Credit Alliance analysis, warranting a trial on material questions of fact ( see , Iselin & Co. v Mann Judd Landau , 71 N.Y.2d 420, 425 , supra ; Zuckerman v City of New York , 49 N.Y.2d 557 ).

1992In opposing Peat Marwick's motion for summary judgment, SPBC was required to produce evidentiary proof, in admissible form, of all three elements of the Credit Alliance analysis, warranting a trial on material questions of fact ( see , Iselin & Co. v Mann Judd Landau , 71 N.Y.2d 420, 425 , supra ; Zuckerman v City of New York , 49 N.Y.2d 557 ).

2001Here, we examine the element of “linkage” required by the third prong of the Credit Alliance test (Credit Alliance Corp. v Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 NY2d 536 ), and more recently articulated in Parrott v Coopers & Lybrand ( 95 NY2d 479 ) and Securities Investor Protection Corp. v BDO Seidman ( 95 NY2d 702 ).

2001Here, we examine the element of “linkage” required by the third prong of the Credit Alliance test (Credit Alliance Corp. v Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 NY2d 536 ), and more recently articulated in Parrott v Coopers & Lybrand ( 95 NY2d 479 ) and Securities Investor Protection Corp. v BDO Seidman ( 95 NY2d 702 ).

2017In any event, there is nothing in the engagement letters by which UHY was retained or in the audit reports supplied by UHY to indicate that the retention of the Trust's independent auditor — an engagement mandated by WCB regulations — was intended for the benefit of the Members or that the Members were anything more than incidental beneficiaries of the professional engagement ( cf. Accredited Aides, 147 AD3d at 129-130).

2017In any event, there is nothing in the engagement letters by which UHY was retained or in the audit reports supplied by UHY to indicate that the retention of the Trust's independent auditor — an engagement mandated by WCB regulations — was intended for the benefit of the Members or that the Members were anything more than incidental beneficiaries of the professional engagement ( cf. Accredited Aides, 147 AD3d at 129-130).

2015“The words ‘known party . . .’in the Credit Alliance test mean what they say,” and if defendant “did not know ‘the identity of the specific nonprivy party who would be relying’ [upon the credit reports], the complaint falls short of satisfying the Credit Alliance test” (Sykes v RFD Third Ave. 1 Assoc., LLC, 15 NY3d 370, 373-374 [2010]).

2015“The words ‘known party . . .’in the Credit Alliance test mean what they say,” and if defendant “did not know ‘the identity of the specific nonprivy party who would be relying’ [upon the credit reports], the complaint falls short of satisfying the Credit Alliance test” (Sykes v RFD Third Ave. 1 Assoc., LLC, 15 NY3d 370, 373-374 [2010]).

2005In addition, we note with respect to actual privity of contract that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that defendant had a duty to act in a non- negligent manner toward plaintiff because plaintiff was known to defendant to be a limited partner of one of the companies to which it was contractually obligated to furnish the report at issue (see White v Guarente, 43 NY2d 356, 361-362 [1977]; see also Credit Alliance, 65 NY2d at 550 n 9; cf. Parrott, 95 NY2d at 484-485 ).

2005In addition, we note with respect to actual privity of contract that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that defendant had a duty to act in a non- negligent manner toward plaintiff because plaintiff was known to defendant to be a limited partner of one of the companies to which it was contractually obligated to furnish the report at issue (see White v Guarente, 43 NY2d 356, 361-362 [1977]; see also Credit Alliance, 65 NY2d at 550 n 9; cf. Parrott, 95 NY2d at 484-485 ).

2002Plaintiff has also set forth sufficient facts to conclude—as required by the second prong—that he relied on the information, although whether such reliance was justifiable is questionable (see, Kimmell v Schaefer, 89 NY2d 257, 263 [requiring that the plaintiffs reliance be justifiable]).

2002Plaintiff has also set forth sufficient facts to conclude—as required by the second prong—that he relied on the information, although whether such reliance was justifiable is questionable (see, Kimmell v Schaefer, 89 NY2d 257, 263 [requiring that the plaintiffs reliance be justifiable]).

2001Here, we examine the element of “linkage” required by the third prong of the Credit Alliance test (Credit Alliance Corp. v Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 NY2d 536 ), and more recently articulated in Parrott v Coopers & Lybrand ( 95 NY2d 479 ) and Securities Investor Protection Corp. v BDO Seidman ( 95 NY2d 702 ).

2001Here, we examine the element of “linkage” required by the third prong of the Credit Alliance test (Credit Alliance Corp. v Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 NY2d 536 ), and more recently articulated in Parrott v Coopers & Lybrand ( 95 NY2d 479 ) and Securities Investor Protection Corp. v BDO Seidman ( 95 NY2d 702 ).

1991The policy reason underlying the "known plaintiff” component of the Credit Alliance test is to keep a defendant’s potential liability within reasonable bounds, particularly to assure that it will not be potentially liable to " 'any member of an indeterminate class * * * present and prospective, known and unknown’ ” (Credit Alliance Corp. v Andersen & Co., supra, at 548, quoting Ultramares Corp. v Touche, supra, at 184).

1991The policy reason underlying the "known plaintiff” component of the Credit Alliance test is to keep a defendant’s potential liability within reasonable bounds, particularly to assure that it will not be potentially liable to " 'any member of an indeterminate class * * * present and prospective, known and unknown’ ” (Credit Alliance Corp. v Andersen & Co., supra, at 548, quoting Ultramares Corp. v Touche, supra, at 184).

1991Thus, we have no difficulty in concluding that Havens has met the first two prongs of the Credit Alliance test (see, Credit Alliance Corp. v Andersen & Co., supra, at 551; see also, Ossining Union Free School Dist. v Anderson LaRocca Anderson, supra).

1991Thus, we have no difficulty in concluding that Havens has met the first two prongs of the Credit Alliance test (see, Credit Alliance Corp. v Andersen & Co., supra, at 551; see also, Ossining Union Free School Dist. v Anderson LaRocca Anderson, supra).

1991"To speculate that something might be caught on a fishing expedition provides no basis to postpone decision on the summary judgment [motion] under the authority of CPLR 3212 (subd [f]).” (Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 636 ; see also, Trails W. v Wolff, 32 NY2d 207, 221 .) Milonas and Ellerin, JJ., concur with Kupferman, J.; Carro, J.

1991"To speculate that something might be caught on a fishing expedition provides no basis to postpone decision on the summary judgment [motion] under the authority of CPLR 3212 (subd [f]).” (Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 636 ; see also, Trails W. v Wolff, 32 NY2d 207, 221 .) Milonas and Ellerin, JJ., concur with Kupferman, J.; Carro, J.