12 New York opinions name it 7 courts 1906–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Trombley & Carrier Co. v. Seligmangreen2 sentences1982This does not mean that a higher court is required to follow the determination of a lower court but does mean that the lower or the same court must abide by the prior determination in the same case * * * While it is the duty of an appellate court to follow its former decision in the same case on a subsequent appeal, the court is not precluded from correcting a manifest error in its former judgment, and it may, for cogent reasons, reverse or qualify a prior decision” (Baylies, New Trials and Appeals, pp 760-762; emphasis added; Successive Appeals and the Law of the Case, 62 Harv L Rev 286; see, 1980In recognizing the application of the law of the case to an appellate court, the Third Department, in Trombley & Carrier Co. v Seligman ( 133 App Div 525, 526, 527 ) observed that the appellate court may ignore the doctrine in correcting manifest error in its former decision, but that it must do so “for cogent reasons” and that “the eases in which this will be done are exceptional and the power should be sparingly exercised.” The Third Department determined under the circumstances therein that “it is our duty to follow and abide by our former decision” (Trombley & Carrier Co. v Seligman, supra | 1 | 2 |
People v. Palumbogreen1 sentence1982This does not mean that a higher court is required to follow the determination of a lower court but does mean that the lower or the same court must abide by the prior determination in the same case * * * While it is the duty of an appellate court to follow its former decision in the same case on a subsequent appeal, the court is not precluded from correcting a manifest error in its former judgment, and it may, for cogent reasons, reverse or qualify a prior decision” (Baylies, New Trials and Appeals, pp 760-762; emphasis added; Successive Appeals and the Law of the Case, 62 Harv L Rev 286; see, | 1 | 1 |
Rankin v. Shankergreen1 sentence1982This does not mean that a higher court is required to follow the determination of a lower court but does mean that the lower or the same court must abide by the prior determination in the same case * * * While it is the duty of an appellate court to follow its former decision in the same case on a subsequent appeal, the court is not precluded from correcting a manifest error in its former judgment, and it may, for cogent reasons, reverse or qualify a prior decision” (Baylies, New Trials and Appeals, pp 760-762; emphasis added; Successive Appeals and the Law of the Case, 62 Harv L Rev 286; see, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States
green
1 sentence2009(See Holy Trinity Church v United States, 143 US 457 [1892]; Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F2d 487 [2d Cir 1960].) The meaning of a word such as “or” may be construed in other than its plain and ordinary sense so as to correct a mistake and to meet constitutional muster. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Ham v. South Carolina
green
2 sentences1983On the basis of this evidence, the court cannot conclude that the trial court should have treated Moriah’s statements either as indicators of potential actual bias constitutionally requiring further investigation under Aldridge and Ham (supra), or as triggers of a manifest presumption of bias perhaps constitutionally warranting further inquiry under Jackson and De Vita. 1983Nor can the trial court be said to have violated constitutional due process rights derived from statutory procedural requirements — the articulated basis for the decision in Ham (supra), that the trial court should have permitted the defendant to question potential jurors. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
In re the Application for Opening a New Highway in the Town of Whitestown
neutral
1 sentence1965The County Court confirmed the determination of the commisisoners, using the following language: ‘ ‘ The court cannot vacate the decision of the commissioners except for a manifest error of law (Matter of Burdick, 27 Misc. 298 ; Matter of Town of Whitestone [sic], 24 Misc. 150 ). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
In re Burdick
neutral
1 sentence1965The County Court confirmed the determination of the commisisoners, using the following language: ‘ ‘ The court cannot vacate the decision of the commissioners except for a manifest error of law (Matter of Burdick, 27 Misc. 298 ; Matter of Town of Whitestone [sic], 24 Misc. 150 ). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Ladd v. . Stevenson
green
1 sentence1961(Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N. Y. 325 ; Furman v. Furman, 153 N. Y. 309 .) Despite the obvious error which was induced by the submission of papers by defendant, he resists restitution. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Furman v. . Furman
green
1 sentence1961(Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N. Y. 325 ; Furman v. Furman, 153 N. Y. 309 .) Despite the obvious error which was induced by the submission of papers by defendant, he resists restitution. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Matter of Rindone v. Kern
neutral
1 sentence1944In Matter of Rindone v. Kern ( 282 N. Y. 214 ), the court held that the provisionals should be permitted to retain their positions until the special examination was had and the candidates rated. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Matter of Staples v. Kern
green
1 sentence1944In Matter of Staples v. Kern ( 282 N. Y. 205 ), the Court of Appeals held that the present petitioners and those similarly situated, all of whom were provisional employees of the Emergency Relief Bureau, had been improperly denied an opportunity to participate in an examination for the position of messenger-attendants and that the Municipal Civil Service Commission, acting under a provision of its rules permitting it to correct a manifest error, had properly directed a special supplementary examination to be given for the benefit of pro visionals who had failed to receive proper notice of the | 1 | 1944–1944 |
People v. . Sutherland
neutral
1 sentence1932(Cf. People v. Sutherland, 207 N. Y. 22 ; People v. Journal Co., 213 N. Y. 1 .) We may, hardly, presume that the Legislature intended to give conclusive effect to a manifest error in computation, even where there never has been room for possible dispute. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
People v. . Journal Co.
green
1 sentence1932(Cf. People v. Sutherland, 207 N. Y. 22 ; People v. Journal Co., 213 N. Y. 1 .) We may, hardly, presume that the Legislature intended to give conclusive effect to a manifest error in computation, even where there never has been room for possible dispute. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Cluff v. . Day
green
1 sentence1931(Cluff v. Day, 141 N. Y. 580, 582 .) Ordinarily a court may not treat a question as res nova which it had theretofore decided (Leavitt v. Blatchford, 17 N. Y. 521 ), but it was there stated to be the duty of the court “ freely to examine its own decisions ” and to correct error by overruling a prior decision (Leavitt v. Blatchford, supra, 533 ; Rumsey v. New York & New England R. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Leavitt v. . Blatchford
neutral
2 sentences1931(Cluff v. Day, 141 N. Y. 580, 582 .) Ordinarily a court may not treat a question as res nova which it had theretofore decided (Leavitt v. Blatchford, 17 N. Y. 521 ), but it was there stated to be the duty of the court “ freely to examine its own decisions ” and to correct error by overruling a prior decision (Leavitt v. Blatchford, supra, 533 ; Rumsey v. New York & New England R. 1931(Cluff v. Day, 141 N. Y. 580, 582 .) Ordinarily a court may not treat a question as res nova which it had theretofore decided (Leavitt v. Blatchford, 17 N. Y. 521 ), but it was there stated to be the duty of the court “ freely to examine its own decisions ” and to correct error by overruling a prior decision (Leavitt v. Blatchford, supra, 533 ; Rumsey v. New York & New England R. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Rumsey v. New York & New England R. R.
green
1 sentence1931Co., 133 N. Y. 79, 85 .) In a court of last resort it may be held controlling, though there “ a manifest error in its former judgment ” may be corrected. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
In re Opening Brook Avenue
neutral
1 sentence1914(Matter of Brook Avenue, 8 App. Div. 294 .) The really' serious objection which the appellants raise to the assessment is, that under the provisions of the charter, properly construed, their land is not liable to assessment for prospective damages to buildings not taken. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Heinemann v. . Heard
green
1 sentence1912Heinemann v. Herd, 62 N. Y. 448 . | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Gearty v. . Mayor, Etc., of New York
neutral
1 sentence1906(Gearty v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 183 N. Y. 233 .) "The objectionable testimony Was received under a ruling of the court which in effect instructed the'jury'that it was proper evidence, for them to. consider in determining' the issues. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.