Pepper factors in New York

2018Accordingly, its application to cases pending on appeal is not automatic, but depends on a balancing of the three factors set forth in the Mitchell - Pepper test ( People v Mitchell , 80 NY2d 519, 528 [1992]; People v Pepper , 53 NY2d 213, 220 [1981], cert denied 454 US 967 [1981]).

2016That holding, however, arose from what the Court found were procedural barriers in that particular case, rather than an analysis of general retroactivity principles, and is discussed infra. Catu Cannot be Applied Retroactively under the Three-Part Pepper Test With respect to whether a new precedent should be given retroactive application in a collateral attack on a conviction under New York law, the Court of Appeals has articulated a three-part test: “the purpose to be served by the new standard; the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standard; and the effect on t

2017In determining whether a state court decision should be given retroactive effect, a court must “weigh three factors to determine whether a new precedent operates retroactively: the purpose to be served by the new standard; the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standard; and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standard.” (People v Baret, 23 NY3d 777, 793 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted].) “The Pepper factors disfavor retroactivity.” (Id. at 799.) The issue of whether Bridgeforth should be applied retroactive

2017In determining whether a state court decision should be given retroactive effect, a court must “weigh three factors to determine whether a new precedent operates retroactively: the purpose to be served by the new standard; the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standard; and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standard.” (People v Baret, 23 NY3d 777, 793 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted].) “The Pepper factors disfavor retroactivity.” (Id. at 799.) The issue of whether Bridgeforth should be applied retroactive

2018Accordingly, its application to cases pending on appeal is not automatic, but depends on a balancing of the three factors set forth in the Mitchell - Pepper test ( People v Mitchell , 80 NY2d 519, 528 [1992]; People v Pepper , 53 NY2d 213, 220 [1981], cert denied 454 US 967 [1981]).

1995In New York, even when a new legal principle is established, whether it is to be held retroactive depends, generally, upon three factors — the purpose of the new rule, the reliance on the old rule, and the effect of the new rule on the administration of justice (People v Pepper, 53 NY2d 213, 220; see also, People v Favor, 82 NY2d 254, 260-262 , supra; People v Mitchell, 80 NY2d 519, 527-529 ). *263 Application of the Pepper factors would support a retroactive application, of Ryan .

2018In Policano v Herbert ( 7 NY3d at 588, 603-604 ), the Court of Appeals, applying the three-factor Pepper test, determined that its then-new depraved indifference standard should not be applied on collateral review to defendants whose convictions became final prior to the Court's new interpretation of that law ( see People v DiGuglielmo , 17 NY3d 771, 772 ; People v Jean-Baptiste , 11 NY3d at 543 ).

2018The Court explained that the purpose of its gradually changing interpretation of the depraved indifference standard was to "dispel the confusion between intentional and depraved indifference murder, and thus cut off the continuing improper expansion of depraved indifference murder," and "to make future homicide prosecutions more sustainable, increasing the likelihood that defendants who are proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed intentional murder will be properly held to account for that crime" ( Policano v Herbert , 7 NY3d at 603, 603-604 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2018As to the first factor, the Court of Appeals in Dubarry clarified the proper application of the transferred intent theory, which should be employed, not to multiply criminal liability, "but to prevent a defendant who has committed all the elements of a crime (albeit not upon the same victim) from escaping responsibility for that crime" ( People v Dubarry , 25 NY3d at 171-172 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2018As to the first factor, the Court of Appeals in Dubarry clarified the proper application of the transferred intent theory, which should be employed, not to multiply criminal liability, "but to prevent a defendant who has committed all the elements of a crime (albeit not upon the same victim) from escaping responsibility for that crime" ( People v Dubarry , 25 NY3d at 171-172 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2014Seeking a balance between “full retroactive application (permitting a collateral attack on a conviction no longer in normal appellate channels)” and “limit[ing] relief to prospective police conduct or trials” ( 53 NY2d at 220 ), the Pepper court adopted the three-part test set out by the Supreme Court in Linkletter v Walker ( 381 US 618, 629 [1965]) and recapitulated in Stovall v Denno ( 388 US 293, 297 [1967]) and Desist (394 US at 249). 11 The Pepper test requires us to “weigh three factors to determine whether a new precedent operates retroactively: the purpose to be served by the new stand

2014Seeking a balance between “full retroactive application (permitting a collateral attack on a conviction no longer in normal appellate channels)” and “limit[ing] relief to prospective police conduct or trials” ( 53 NY2d at 220 ), the Pepper court adopted the three-part test set out by the Supreme Court in Linkletter v Walker ( 381 US 618, 629 [1965]) and recapitulated in Stovall v Denno ( 388 US 293, 297 [1967]) and Desist (394 US at 249). 11 The Pepper test requires us to “weigh three factors to determine whether a new precedent operates retroactively: the purpose to be served by the new stand

2014Seeking a balance between “full retroactive application (permitting a collateral attack on a conviction no longer in normal appellate channels)” and “limit[ing] relief to prospective police conduct or trials” ( 53 NY2d at 220 ), the Pepper court adopted the three-part test set out by the Supreme Court in Linkletter v Walker ( 381 US 618, 629 [1965]) and recapitulated in Stovall v Denno ( 388 US 293, 297 [1967]) and Desist (394 US at 249). 11 The Pepper test requires us to “weigh three factors to determine whether a new precedent operates retroactively: the purpose to be served by the new stand

2014Seeking a balance between “full retroactive application (permitting a collateral attack on a conviction no longer in normal appellate channels)” and “limit[ing] relief to prospective police conduct or trials” ( 53 NY2d at 220 ), the Pepper court adopted the three-part test set out by the Supreme Court in Linkletter v Walker ( 381 US 618, 629 [1965]) and recapitulated in Stovall v Denno ( 388 US 293, 297 [1967]) and Desist (394 US at 249). 11 The Pepper test requires us to “weigh three factors to determine whether a new precedent operates retroactively: the purpose to be served by the new stand

2006For two decades prosecutors relied on Register’s objectively determined degree-of-risk formulation when making their charging decisions (see Sanchez, 98 NY2d at 387 [Appendix]).

1995In New York, even when a new legal principle is established, whether it is to be held retroactive depends, generally, upon three factors — the purpose of the new rule, the reliance on the old rule, and the effect of the new rule on the administration of justice (People v Pepper, 53 NY2d 213, 220; see also, People v Favor, 82 NY2d 254, 260-262 , supra; People v Mitchell, 80 NY2d 519, 527-529 ). *263 Application of the Pepper factors would support a retroactive application, of Ryan .

1995In New York, even when a new legal principle is established, whether it is to be held retroactive depends, generally, upon three factors — the purpose of the new rule, the reliance on the old rule, and the effect of the new rule on the administration of justice (People v Pepper, 53 NY2d 213, 220; see also, People v Favor, 82 NY2d 254, 260-262 , supra; People v Mitchell, 80 NY2d 519, 527-529 ). *263 Application of the Pepper factors would support a retroactive application, of Ryan .