statute creating presumption in New York

2019No. 3 , 308 NY 226, 230 ; see generally Alouette Fashions v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 119 AD2d at 487 ).

2013Inasmuch as the notice of claim requirements are “in derogation of [a] plaintiff’s common-law rights,” the statute creating such a requirement should be strictly construed in the plaintiffs favor (Sandak, 308 NY at 230 ).

1936(B ailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 233 .) “ It is not within the province of a Legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.” (McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U. S. 79, 86 .) In this State the doctrine of reasonableness as applied to presumptions in criminal cases has recently been considered by the Court of Appeals in People v. Mancuso ( 255 N. Y. 463 ) and in People v. Pieri (269 id. 315).

1932Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 233 , et seq.

2025Since it was enacted, the Dram Shop Act has been amended and relocated on several occasions and is presently codified in General Obligations Law § 11-101 ( see L 1963, ch 576 § 1, as amended by L 1980, ch 281 § 20; Civil Rights Law § 16, repealed by General Obligations Law § 19-101; Rutledge v Rockwells of Bedford , 200 AD2d 36 ).

2025Since it was enacted, the Dram Shop Act has been amended and relocated on several occasions and is presently codified in General Obligations Law § 11-101 ( see L 1963, ch 576 § 1, as amended by L 1980, ch 281 § 20; Civil Rights Law § 16, repealed by General Obligations Law § 19-101; Rutledge v Rockwells of Bedford , 200 AD2d 36).

2025DECISION & ORDER In 1873, the Legislature enacted the first version of what is now commonly known as "the Dram Shop Act," a statute creating an exception to the common-law rule that "one who provided intoxicating liquor was not liable for injuries caused by the drinker" ( D'Amico v Christie , 71 NY2d 76 ; see L 1873, ch 646).

2025DECISION & ORDER In 1873, the Legislature enacted the first version of what is now commonly known as "the Dram Shop Act," a statute creating an exception to the common-law rule that "one who provided intoxicating liquor was not liable for injuries caused by the drinker" ( D'Amico v Christie , 71 NY2d 76; see L 1873, ch 646).

2019Indeed, inasmuch as the 50-h examination requirements are " in derogation of [a] plaintiff's common-law rights,' the statute creating such a requirement should be strictly construed in the plaintiff's favor" ( Goodwin v Pretorius , 105 AD3d 207, 216 , quoting Sandak v Tuxedo Union School Dist.

1988Accordingly, it has been held that in charging a petit jury with regard to the presumption, it is necessary for the trial court to make it clear that the presumption is permissive and that even if contrary proof is rejected or not offered to nullify the presumption, it may still be rejected by the jury (see, People v Lemmons, supra; see also, Ulster County Ct. v Allen, 442 US 140, 160-161 ; cf, People v Williams, 95 AD2d 866 ; People v Baldwin, 53 AD2d 646 ; People v Jackson, 52 AD2d 630 [the latter three cases involved the analogous presumption of possession of a weapon found in a stolen vehi

1988Accordingly, it has been held that in charging a petit jury with regard to the presumption, it is necessary for the trial court to make it clear that the presumption is permissive and that even if contrary proof is rejected or not offered to nullify the presumption, it may still be rejected by the jury (see, People v Lemmons, supra; see also, Ulster County Ct. v Allen, 442 US 140, 160-161 ; cf, People v Williams, 95 AD2d 866 ; People v Baldwin, 53 AD2d 646 ; People v Jackson, 52 AD2d 630 [the latter three cases involved the analogous presumption of possession of a weapon found in a stolen vehi

1988Accordingly, it has been held that in charging a petit jury with regard to the presumption, it is necessary for the trial court to make it clear that the presumption is permissive and that even if contrary proof is rejected or not offered to nullify the presumption, it may still be rejected by the jury (see, People v Lemmons, supra; see also, Ulster County Ct. v Allen, 442 US 140, 160-161 ; cf, People v Williams, 95 AD2d 866 ; People v Baldwin, 53 AD2d 646 ; People v Jackson, 52 AD2d 630 [the latter three cases involved the analogous presumption of possession of a weapon found in a stolen vehi

1988Accordingly, it has been held that in charging a petit jury with regard to the presumption, it is necessary for the trial court to make it clear that the presumption is permissive and that even if contrary proof is rejected or not offered to nullify the presumption, it may still be rejected by the jury (see, People v Lemmons, supra; see also, Ulster County Ct. v Allen, 442 US 140, 160-161 ; cf, People v Williams, 95 AD2d 866 ; People v Baldwin, 53 AD2d 646 ; People v Jackson, 52 AD2d 630 [the latter three cases involved the analogous presumption of possession of a weapon found in a stolen vehi

1985(Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings [Doe], 56 NY2d 348, 352 .) In interpreting the scope and application of a statutorily created privilege it is an oft-stated principle that the statute creating a privilege must be given a broad and liberal construction in favor of the protection of confidential communications, while a statute waiving or suspending the privilege must be “strictly construed and confined to the specific exception created by it”.

1985(Matter of Investigation of Criminal Abortions, 286 App Div 270, 274 , lv denied 309 NY 1031 .) More to the point, the Court of Appeals recently explicitly rejected the notion that judicial exceptions to the privilege can be created.

1985In this court’s view, the reasoning in Sandstrom v Montana ( 442 US 510 [1979]) mandates not only that a petit jury be clearly instructed as to rebuttable nature of this presumption but that a Grand Jury be similarly advised (see, People v Garcia, 103 Misc 2d 915, 918 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 1980]).

1976In holding that this irrefutable assumption was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive the taxpayer of his property without due process of law, the Court stated that it had 'held more than once that a statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ Id., at 329 .” The rationale of those cases dictates the striking down of the regulation here under attack as violative of the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1976Nor do the Supreme Court’s decisions in Arnett v Kennedy ( 416 US 134 ) and Weinberger v Salfi ( 422 US 749 ), cited by respondent, require a different result.

1976Nor do the Supreme Court’s decisions in Arnett v Kennedy ( 416 US 134 ) and Weinberger v Salfi ( 422 US 749 ), cited by respondent, require a different result.

1972As the Supreme Court noted in Yee Hem v. United States ( 268 U. S. 178, 185 ), in dealing with a statute creating a presumption that opium would he presumed to have been imported in violation of law: “ The point that the practical effect of the statute creating the presumption is to compel the accused person to be a witness against himself may be put aside with slight discussion.

1947Where two constructions of a statute are possible, one of which would render it unconstitutional or raise grave doubts on that score and the other of which would absolve it of such defect, it is the duty of the court to adopt the interpretation which saves its constitutionality (Matter of Fay, 291 N. Y. 198, 207 ; Matthews v. Matthews, 240 N. Y. 28, 35 ).

1947Where two constructions of a statute are possible, one of which would render it unconstitutional or raise grave doubts on that score and the other of which would absolve it of such defect, it is the duty of the court to adopt the interpretation which saves its constitutionality (Matter of Fay, 291 N. Y. 198, 207 ; Matthews v. Matthews, 240 N. Y. 28, 35 ).

1936(B ailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 233 .) “ It is not within the province of a Legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.” (McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U. S. 79, 86 .) In this State the doctrine of reasonableness as applied to presumptions in criminal cases has recently been considered by the Court of Appeals in People v. Mancuso ( 255 N. Y. 463 ) and in People v. Pieri (269 id. 315).

1936(B ailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 233 .) “ It is not within the province of a Legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.” (McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U. S. 79, 86 .) In this State the doctrine of reasonableness as applied to presumptions in criminal cases has recently been considered by the Court of Appeals in People v. Mancuso ( 255 N. Y. 463 ) and in People v. Pieri (269 id. 315).

1909FTeither the statute nor the acts of executors or administrators under it are to receive a liberal interpretation or to be extended by implication beyond their natural and ordinary import; * * * justice to the claimant, as well as the reasonable interpretation of the statute, requires that the act of the executor or administrator, in disputing or rejecting the claim which is to put the claimant to an action within the brief period prescribed, upon pain of forfeiting his claim, should not be ambiguous or equivocal, capable of two interpretations, but de tided, unequivocal and absolute; such an

1909In Hoyt v. Bennett, 50 N. Y. 538 , Allen, J., considering this proposition, says: “ To entitle an executor or administrator to the benefit of the short Statute of Limitations, by which one having a claim against the estate of a deceased person may be barred of his action and forfeit his claim, the representative of ■the estate must, in all essentials, comply with the statute creating the bar.

1909FTeither the statute nor the acts of executors or administrators under it are to receive a liberal interpretation or to be extended by implication beyond their natural and ordinary import; * * * justice to the claimant, as well as the reasonable interpretation of the statute, requires that the act of the executor or administrator, in disputing or rejecting the claim which is to put the claimant to an action within the brief period prescribed, upon pain of forfeiting his claim, should not be ambiguous or equivocal, capable of two interpretations, but de tided, unequivocal and absolute; such an

1909FTeither the statute nor the acts of executors or administrators under it are to receive a liberal interpretation or to be extended by implication beyond their natural and ordinary import; * * * justice to the claimant, as well as the reasonable interpretation of the statute, requires that the act of the executor or administrator, in disputing or rejecting the claim which is to put the claimant to an action within the brief period prescribed, upon pain of forfeiting his claim, should not be ambiguous or equivocal, capable of two interpretations, but de tided, unequivocal and absolute; such an