otca claim in Oregon

2014In the context of an OTCA claim, that rule provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until “a plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover his injury and the identity of the party responsible for that injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).

2014In the context of an OTCA claim, that rule provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until “a plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover his injury and the identity of the party responsible for that injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).

2013In Adams v. Oregon State Police, 289 Or 233, 239 , 611 P2d 1153 (1980), this court construed those terms and held that the limitations period for an OTCA claim for “alleged loss or injury” does not begin to run until a “plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover his injury and the identity of the party responsible for that injury.” (Emphasis added.) That rule, the court explained, avoids the mockery that would follow if the law were to say to one who had been wronged, “[y]ou had a remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of your remedy.” Id. at 238 (q

2013In Adams v. Oregon State Police, 289 Or 233, 239 , 611 P2d 1153 (1980), this court construed those terms and held that the limitations period for an OTCA claim for “alleged loss or injury” does not begin to run until a “plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover his injury and the identity of the party responsible for that injury.” (Emphasis added.) That rule, the court explained, avoids the mockery that would follow if the law were to say to one who had been wronged, “[y]ou had a remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of your remedy.” Id. at 238 (q

2013In Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247, 252-56 , 864 P2d 1319 (1994), this court considered the meaning of the 9 However, the Court of Appeals required a different form of limited judgment than had been entered by the trial court.

2013In Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247, 252-56 , 864 P2d 1319 (1994), this court considered the meaning of the 9 However, the Court of Appeals required a different form of limited judgment than had been entered by the trial court.

2012Because ORS 30.275(9) incorporates a discovery rule, the “two-year statute of limitations applicable [to an OTCA claim does] not begin to run until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the facts giving rise to his claim.” Doe v. Lake Oswego School District, 242 Or App 605, 613 , 259 P3d 27 (2011), rev allowed, 351 Or 678 (2012).

2012Because ORS 30.275(9) incorporates a discovery rule, the “two-year statute of limitations applicable [to an OTCA claim does] not begin to run until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the facts giving rise to his claim.” Doe v. Lake Oswego School District, 242 Or App 605, 613 , 259 P3d 27 (2011), rev allowed, 351 Or 678 (2012).

2025Cite as 346 Or App 166 (2025) 169 disagree about whether the ELL creates a separate cause of action that amounts to an exception to OTCA immunity.

2015As Justice Linde observed for the Supreme Court in Bradford v. Davis, 290 Or 855, 861 , 626 P2d 1376 (1981), “tort actions against public bodies * * * are not a specially created type of action but ordinary tort actions to which the legislature has consented to subject the government and its personnel [.]” The issue in Bradford was whether the plaintiff, a minor, was “entitled to an extension” of the time limitation for commencement of his OTCA claim, pursuant to ORS 12.160 (1979). 290 Or at 860 .

2015As Justice Linde observed for the Supreme Court in Bradford v. Davis, 290 Or 855, 861 , 626 P2d 1376 (1981), “tort actions against public bodies * * * are not a specially created type of action but ordinary tort actions to which the legislature has consented to subject the government and its personnel [.]” The issue in Bradford was whether the plaintiff, a minor, was “entitled to an extension” of the time limitation for commencement of his OTCA claim, pursuant to ORS 12.160 (1979). 290 Or at 860 .

2012Stated another way, the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of “facts that would make an objectively reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that all three of the following elements exist: an injury occurred, the injury harmed one or more of the plaintiffs legally protected interests, and the defendant is the responsible party.” Edwards v. DHS, 217 Or App 188, 197 , 175 P3d 490 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2012Stated another way, the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of “facts that would make an objectively reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that all three of the following elements exist: an injury occurred, the injury harmed one or more of the plaintiffs legally protected interests, and the defendant is the responsible party.” Edwards v. DHS, 217 Or App 188, 197 , 175 P3d 490 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2012Because ORS 30.275(9) incorporates a discovery rule, the “two-year statute of limitations applicable [to an OTCA claim does] not begin to run until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the facts giving rise to his claim.” Doe v. Lake Oswego School District, 242 Or App 605, 613 , 259 P3d 27 (2011), rev allowed, 351 Or 678 (2012).

2012Because ORS 30.275(9) incorporates a discovery rule, the “two-year statute of limitations applicable [to an OTCA claim does] not begin to run until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the facts giving rise to his claim.” Doe v. Lake Oswego School District, 242 Or App 605, 613 , 259 P3d 27 (2011), rev allowed, 351 Or 678 (2012).

2012Under that rule, “the * * * notice period and two-year statute of limitations applicable [to an OTCA claim] do not begin to run until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the facts giving rise to his claim.” Doe v. Lake Oswego School District, 242 Or App 605, 613 , 259 P3d 27 , rev den, 351 Or 254 (2011).

2012Under that rule, “the * * * notice period and two-year statute of limitations applicable [to an OTCA claim] do not begin to run until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the facts giving rise to his claim.” Doe v. Lake Oswego School District, 242 Or App 605, 613 , 259 P3d 27 , rev den, 351 Or 254 (2011).

2012We have elaborated on the meaning of the phrase “the facts giving rise to his claim” as follows: “The 180-day period does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care should know, facts that would make an objectively reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that all three of the following elements exist: an injury occurred, the injury harmed one or more of the plaintiffs legally protected interests, and the defendant is the responsible party.” Benson v. State of Oregon, 196 Or App 211, 215 , 100 P3d 1077 (2004).

2012We have elaborated on the meaning of the phrase “the facts giving rise to his claim” as follows: “The 180-day period does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care should know, facts that would make an objectively reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that all three of the following elements exist: an injury occurred, the injury harmed one or more of the plaintiffs legally protected interests, and the defendant is the responsible party.” Benson v. State of Oregon, 196 Or App 211, 215 , 100 P3d 1077 (2004).

2011The county does not address plaintiffs allegations regarding that additional property. 14 The comment to section 27 of Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides, in part: “If the judgment of the court of first instance was based on a determination of two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, and the appellate court upholds * * * one of these determinations as sufficient and refuses to consider whether or not the other is sufficient and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to the first determination.” 15 As to the A

2011Cf. Dickens v. DeBolt, 288 Or 3, 14-15 , 602 P2d 246 (1979) (discussing OTCA immunity in context of state police officer who seized and then ate sturgeon that he believed to have been caught illegally; if the officer “ate most of the sturgeon and at that time was not acting within the course and scope of his employment, as the jury was entitled to find from the evidence of this case, he would then be subject to punitive damages on the same basis as any other person who commits an act of conversion”) (emphasis omitted). 13 Incidentally, plaintiffs claims also allege conversion and trespass to p

2011Cf. Dickens v. DeBolt, 288 Or 3, 14-15 , 602 P2d 246 (1979) (discussing OTCA immunity in context of state police officer who seized and then ate sturgeon that he believed to have been caught illegally; if the officer “ate most of the sturgeon and at that time was not acting within the course and scope of his employment, as the jury was entitled to find from the evidence of this case, he would then be subject to punitive damages on the same basis as any other person who commits an act of conversion”) (emphasis omitted). 13 Incidentally, plaintiffs claims also allege conversion and trespass to p