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12 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kilgore v. Mageegreen2 sentences1996The Courts have abstained from consideration of many perceived procedural irregularities under the enrolled bill doctrine, which, as explained in Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401, 412 (1877), states that: [Wjhen a law has been passed and approved and certified in dué form, it is not part of the duty of the judiciary to go behind the law as duly certified to inquire into the observance of its passage.... 1996The courts have abstained from consideration of many perceived procedural irregularities under the enrolled bill doctrine, which, as explained in Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401, 412 (1877), states that: [W]hen a law has been passed and approved and certified in due form, it is not part of the duty of the judiciary to go behind the law as duly certified to inquire into the observance of its passage. ... | 6 | 8 |
Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Com.green2 sentences2002See Consumer Party v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158 , 507 A.2d 323 (1986). 14 . 2002See Consumer Party v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158 , 507 A.2d 323 (1986). 14 . | 3 | 3 |
Mikell v. Philadelphia School Districtgreen2 sentences2002Applying a strict application of the enrolled bill doctrine, we stated, "in order to show that Act No. 319 was introduced in the General Assembly as a Senate bill, evidence aliunde is necessary for which purpose legislative journals, records and reports are not competent.” 58 A.2d at 345 . 1986Our abstention in this area has been articulated by employing the enrolled bill doctrine, [13] see, e.g., Mikell v. School District of Philadelphia, 359 Pa. 113 , 58 A.2d 339 (1948); Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401, 412 (1877); Speer v. Plank-Road Co., 22 Pa. 376, 378 (1853); or a determination that a provision is directory and not mandatory. | 1 | 3 |
Speer v. Plank-Road Co.green2 sentences1988Turning first to the claim of the legislatures failure to comply with Article III, Section 3, we initially note that the Attorney General contends that this is not a justiciable issue under the enrolled bill doctrine announced in cases such as Speer v. Plank Road Co., 22 Pa. 376 (1853) and Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401 (1877). 1986Our abstention in this area has been articulated by employing the enrolled bill doctrine, [13] see, e.g., Mikell v. School District of Philadelphia, 359 Pa. 113 , 58 A.2d 339 (1948); Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401, 412 (1877); Speer v. Plank-Road Co., 22 Pa. 376, 378 (1853); or a determination that a provision is directory and not mandatory. | 1 | 2 |
League of Women Voters v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 692 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997)(the court took judicial notice of legislative journals as well as various versions of the Senate Bill in that case, thus looking behind the enrolled bill and yet concluded that “judicial scrutiny of petitioners’ constitutional claims is barred by the Enrolled Bill doctrine.”). 1998See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 692 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997)(the court took judicial notice of legislative journals as well as various versions of the Senate Bill in that case, thus looking behind the enrolled bill and yet concluded that “judicial scrutiny of petitioners’ constitutional claims is barred by the Enrolled Bill doctrine.”). | 1 | 1 |
Altoona City v. Bowmangreen2 sentences1987See Altoona City v. Bowman, 171 Pa. 307 , 33 A. 187 (1895), and Mixell v. Hellertown Borough Council, 374 Pa. 412 , 97 A.2d 822 (1953), respectively. 1987See Altoona City v. Bowman, 171 Pa. 307 , 33 A. 187 (1895), and Mixell v. Hellertown Borough Council, 374 Pa. 412 , 97 A.2d 822 (1953), respectively. | 1 | 1 |
Meixell v. Hellertown Borough Councilgreen2 sentences1987See Altoona City v. Bowman, 171 Pa. 307 , 33 A. 187 (1895), and Mixell v. Hellertown Borough Council, 374 Pa. 412 , 97 A.2d 822 (1953), respectively. 1987See Altoona City v. Bowman, 171 Pa. 307 , 33 A. 187 (1895), and Mixell v. Hellertown Borough Council, 374 Pa. 412 , 97 A.2d 822 (1953), respectively. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2011“One aspect of such restraint has been the principle, embodied in the enrolled bill doctrine, that, once a statute is attested by the presiding officers of the Legislature, approved by the Governor, and officially lodged, it is presumed to have been enacted in the manner required by law.” Id. 2011The doctrine provides that “the subjective, individualized motivations or impressions of specific legislators would not be an appropriate basis upon which to rest a determination as to its validity.” Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Dintzis v. Hayden
green
2 sentences1997Dintzis v. Hayden, 146 Pa.Cmwlth. 618 , 606 A.2d 660 (1992). 1997Dintzis v. Hayden, 146 Pa.Cmwlth. 618 , 606 A.2d 660 (1992). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Common Cause of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1996The presumption in favor of regularity is essential to the peace and order of the state. 668 A.2d at 195 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Armstrong v. King
green
2 sentences1986See, e.g., Mikell v. School District of Philadelphia, supra, 359 Pa. at 123-124, 58 A.2d at 344: The legal distinction between directory and mandatory laws is as applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory law: Armstrong v. King, 281 Pa. 207, 216 , 126 A. 263 . 1986See, e.g., Mikell v. School District of Philadelphia, supra, 359 Pa. at 123-124, 58 A.2d at 344: The legal distinction between directory and mandatory laws is as applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory law: Armstrong v. King, 281 Pa. 207, 216 , 126 A. 263 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.