Mayfield test in Pennsylvania

2024See also Commonwealth v. Hann, 622 Pa. 636 , 81 A.3d 57 (2013) (holding that courts should consider Mayfield factors along with host of other factors that are equally relevant to determination of whether justice requires full enforcement of forfeiture order; other relevant factors include, but are not limited to: (1) whether applicant is commercial bondsman; (2) extent of bondsman’s supervision of defendant; (3) whether defendant’s breach of recognizance of bail conditions was willful; (4) any explanation or mitigating factors presented by defendant; (5) deterrence value of forfeiture; (6) ser

2024See also Commonwealth v. Hann, 622 Pa. 636 , 81 A.3d 57 (2013) (holding that courts should consider Mayfield factors along with host of other factors that are equally relevant to determination of whether justice requires full enforcement of forfeiture order; other relevant factors include, but are not limited to: (1) whether applicant is commercial bondsman; (2) extent of bondsman’s supervision of defendant; (3) whether defendant’s breach of recognizance of bail conditions was willful; (4) any explanation or mitigating factors presented by defendant; (5) deterrence value of forfeiture; (6) ser

2015Mayfield, 827 A.2d at 468 . -4- J-A06035-15, J-A06036-15 On October 30, 2013, during the pendency of the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Commonwealth v. Hann, 81 A.3d 57 (Pa.2013), which abandoned the Ciotti/Mayfield test in favor of a new set of factors courts should consider to determine whether justice requires the enforcement of a forfeiture order under Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(d).

2015The Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court. ____________________________________________ 6 United States v. Ciotti, 579 F.Supp. 276 (W.D.Pa.1984). 7 Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 827 A.2d 462 (Pa.Super.2003). 8 At the time of the en banc hearing, Pennsylvania courts followed the Ciotti/Mayfield test.

2015The Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court. ____________________________________________ 6 United States v. Ciotti, 579 F.Supp. 276 (W.D.Pa.1984). 7 Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 827 A.2d 462 (Pa.Super.2003). 8 At the time of the en banc hearing, Pennsylvania courts followed the Ciotti/Mayfield test.

2008Id. at 468 (citing United States v. Ciotti, 579 F.Supp. 276, 278 (W.D.Pa.1984)). ¶ 8 Later, in Hernandez , this Court considered this Mayfield test in light of the law and policy surrounding bail forfeitures: Bail forfeiture is a process whereby an individual defendant surrenders part or all of his bond and is appropriate when he breaches a condition of his bail.

2012We again addressed the application of the Ciotti/Mayfield test in Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 886 A.2d 231, 235 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 720 , 899 A.2d 1122 (2006).

2012Id. at 702 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

2012Id. at 702 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

2005We disagree. ¶ 6 “Bail has long been recognized as a procedure whereby an individual defendant provides a form of collateral in exchange for the defendant’s release from custody; it secures his future appearance and other requirements of his bond....” Commonwealth v. Chopak, 532 Pa. 227, 238 , 615 A.2d 696, 702 (1992) (internal citations omitted).

2005We disagree. ¶ 6 “Bail has long been recognized as a procedure whereby an individual defendant provides a form of collateral in exchange for the defendant’s release from custody; it secures his future appearance and other requirements of his bond....” Commonwealth v. Chopak, 532 Pa. 227, 238 , 615 A.2d 696, 702 (1992) (internal citations omitted).

1985See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 248 Pa.Super. 348 , 375 A.2d 132 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gilliam, supra (Cirillo, J. concurring).

1985See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 248 Pa.Super. 348 , 375 A.2d 132 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gilliam, supra (Cirillo, J. concurring).

1983See Commonwealth v. Levitt, 287 Pa.Super. 115 , 429 A.2d 1126 (1981); Commonwealth v. Crowley, 281 Pa.Super. 26 , 421 A.2d 1129 (1980); See also Commonwealth v. Ryan, 306 Pa.Super. 159 , 170 n. 7, 452 A.2d 264 , 269 n. 7 (1982).

1983See Commonwealth v. Levitt, 287 Pa.Super. 115 , 429 A.2d 1126 (1981); Commonwealth v. Crowley, 281 Pa.Super. 26 , 421 A.2d 1129 (1980); See also Commonwealth v. Ryan, 306 Pa.Super. 159 , 170 n. 7, 452 A.2d 264 , 269 n. 7 (1982).

1983See Commonwealth v. Levitt, 287 Pa.Super. 115 , 429 A.2d 1126 (1981); Commonwealth v. Crowley, 281 Pa.Super. 26 , 421 A.2d 1129 (1980); See also Commonwealth v. Ryan, 306 Pa.Super. 159 , 170 n. 7, 452 A.2d 264 , 269 n. 7 (1982).

1983See Commonwealth v. Levitt, 287 Pa.Super. 115 , 429 A.2d 1126 (1981); Commonwealth v. Crowley, 281 Pa.Super. 26 , 421 A.2d 1129 (1980); See also Commonwealth v. Ryan, 306 Pa.Super. 159 , 170 n. 7, 452 A.2d 264 , 269 n. 7 (1982).

1977Here, as previously demonstrated, the record does not show compliance with those requirements. *575 Secondly, this case certainly does not fit "squarely within the mandate of the Shelton case." The example used by the court in Shelton, and relied upon by the majority here, depicts a situation in which the trial court is unable, despite due diligence, to hear a case, otherwise ready for trial, within the prescribed time period because of "scheduling difficulties or the like. . . ." Commonwealth v. Shelton, supra, 469 Pa. at 18, 364 A.2d at 699 .

1977Here, as previously demonstrated, the record does not show compliance with those requirements. *575 Secondly, this case certainly does not fit "squarely within the mandate of the Shelton case." The example used by the court in Shelton, and relied upon by the majority here, depicts a situation in which the trial court is unable, despite due diligence, to hear a case, otherwise ready for trial, within the prescribed time period because of "scheduling difficulties or the like. . . ." Commonwealth v. Shelton, supra, 469 Pa. at 18, 364 A.2d at 699 .

1977That is, when we are called upon to review the grant of an extension of time under Rule 1100(c) on account of judicial delay, we must apply the Mayfield standard that ". . . the record must also show the causes of the court delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided." Id. 469 Pa. at 222, 364 A.2d at 1350.

1977That is, when we are called upon to review the grant of an extension of time under Rule 1100(c) on account of judicial delay, we must apply the Mayfield standard that ". . . the record must also show the causes of the court delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided." Id. 469 Pa. at 222, 364 A.2d at 1350.