perpetual bar in Pennsylvania

1952The Divorce Law of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, sec. 52, 23 PS 52, provides, inter alia: “In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege and prove, or it shall appear in the evidence, that the libellant has been guilty of a like crime ... it shall be a good defense and a perpetual bar against the same.” In Isaacs v. Isaacs, 149 Pa. Superior Ct. 508 , 27 A. 2d 531 , we had occasion to construe this provision of our divorce law.

1952The Divorce Law of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, sec. 52, 23 PS 52, provides, inter alia: “In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege and prove, or it shall appear in the evidence, that the libellant has been guilty of a like crime ... it shall be a good defense and a perpetual bar against the same.” In Isaacs v. Isaacs, 149 Pa. Superior Ct. 508 , 27 A. 2d 531 , we had occasion to construe this provision of our divorce law.

1971Thus, in Wisnewski v. Wisnewski, 126 Pa. Superior Ct. 540 , at page 544, the court concluded: “The appellate courts of this state have repeatedly held that a husband who procures, encourages, or connives at his wife’s prostitution cannot obtain a decree of divorce against her upon the ground of adultery.” “Connivance” has been defined as plaintiff’s “cor rupt consenting to evil conduct in the other whereof afterward he complains”: Freedman, Law of Marriage and Divorce in Pennsylvania, §214, page 526.

1961By §52 of the Act of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, 23 PS §52, it is provided : “In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege and prove, or it shall appear in the evidence, that the libellant lias been guilty of the like crime, ... it shall be a good defense and a perpetual bar against the same.” It has been expressly decided that a wife may condone the adultery of her husband so as to allow him to be divorced from her for the same offense committed by her subsequently to her condonation: Talley v. Talley, 215 Pa. 281 , 64 A. 523 .

1961By §52 of the Act of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, 23 PS §52, it is provided : “In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege and prove, or it shall appear in the evidence, that the libellant lias been guilty of the like crime, ... it shall be a good defense and a perpetual bar against the same.” It has been expressly decided that a wife may condone the adultery of her husband so as to allow him to be divorced from her for the same offense committed by her subsequently to her condonation: Talley v. Talley, 215 Pa. 281 , 64 A. 523 .

1958Under this section, condonation is recognized a defense: Bowden v. Bow *346 den, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 150 , 53 A. 2d 892 .

1958Under this section, condonation is recognized a defense: Bowden v. Bow *346 den, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 150 , 53 A. 2d 892 .

1946The burden of proof is on respondent: Koch v. Koch, 62 Pa. Superior Ct. 607 .

1937By the 52d Section of “The Divorce Law” of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, 23 PS §52, it is provided: “Defense to Charge of Adultery.—In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege and prove, ...... that the libellant......has admitted the respondent into conjugal society or embraces after he or she knew of the criminal fact, or that the said libellant (if the husband) allowed the wife’s prostitution, or received hire from it, or exposed his wife to lewd company whereby she became insnared to the crime aforesaid, it shall be a good defense and a perpetual

1937By the 52d Section of “The Divorce Law” of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, 23 PS §52, it is provided: “Defense to Charge of Adultery.—In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege and prove, ...... that the libellant......has admitted the respondent into conjugal society or embraces after he or she knew of the criminal fact, or that the said libellant (if the husband) allowed the wife’s prostitution, or received hire from it, or exposed his wife to lewd company whereby she became insnared to the crime aforesaid, it shall be a good defense and a perpetual

1937It is equally well established that condonation is a complete defense: Best v. Best, 161 Pa. 515 , 29 A. 1026 ; Costello v. Costello, 191 Pa. 379 , 43 A. 240 .

1937It is equally well established that condonation is a complete defense: Best v. Best, 161 Pa. 515 , 29 A. 1026 ; Costello v. Costello, 191 Pa. 379 , 43 A. 240 .

1937It is equally well established that condonation is a complete defense: Best v. Best, 161 Pa. 515 , 29 A. 1026 ; Costello v. Costello, 191 Pa. 379 , 43 A. 240 .

1937It is equally well established that condonation is a complete defense: Best v. Best, 161 Pa. 515 , 29 A. 1026 ; Costello v. Costello, 191 Pa. 379 , 43 A. 240 .

1937By the 52d Section of “The Divorce Law” of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, 23 PS §52, it is provided: “Defense to Charge of Adultery.—In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege and prove, ...... that the libellant......has admitted the respondent into conjugal society or embraces after he or she knew of the criminal fact, or that the said libellant (if the husband) allowed the wife’s prostitution, or received hire from it, or exposed his wife to lewd company whereby she became insnared to the crime aforesaid, it shall be a good defense and a perpetual

1937By the 52d Section of “The Divorce Law” of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, 23 PS §52, it is provided: “Defense to Charge of Adultery.—In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege and prove, ...... that the libellant......has admitted the respondent into conjugal society or embraces after he or she knew of the criminal fact, or that the said libellant (if the husband) allowed the wife’s prostitution, or received hire from it, or exposed his wife to lewd company whereby she became insnared to the crime aforesaid, it shall be a good defense and a perpetual

1937By the 52d Section of “The Divorce Law” of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, 23 PS §52, it is provided: “Defense to Charge of Adultery.—In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege and prove, ...... that the libellant......has admitted the respondent into conjugal society or embraces after he or she knew of the criminal fact, or that the said libellant (if the husband) allowed the wife’s prostitution, or received hire from it, or exposed his wife to lewd company whereby she became insnared to the crime aforesaid, it shall be a good defense and a perpetual

1937By the 52d Section of “The Divorce Law” of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, 23 PS §52, it is provided: “Defense to Charge of Adultery.—In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege and prove, ...... that the libellant......has admitted the respondent into conjugal society or embraces after he or she knew of the criminal fact, or that the said libellant (if the husband) allowed the wife’s prostitution, or received hire from it, or exposed his wife to lewd company whereby she became insnared to the crime aforesaid, it shall be a good defense and a perpetual

1935In the case of Hawkins v. Hawkins, 86 N. E. 468 , the Court of Appeals of the State of New York under statutory proceedings for support which provide that defendant might set up in justification the misconduct of the plaintiff, it was held that a wife who has committed adultery is, notwithstanding the fact that her husband has been likewise guilty of adultery, not entitled to judgment of support.

1913We have held that a court has the power to restrain one from prosecuting a proceeding instituted in another jurisdiction for the purpose of interfering with a matter or thing adjudicated by it, and thereby to gain an undue advantage (Kendall v. McClure Coke Co., 182 Pa. 1 ), and this principle justifies the final decree of the court below.