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12 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
D.C. v. Department of Human Servicesgreen2 sentences2019Additionally, "a person whose name is entered into the ChildLine Registry as a perpetrator of child abuse is entitled to a clear and unequivocal notice of his or her right to a post-deprivation hearing as a matter of due process." D.C. v. Dep't of Human Servs. , 150 A.3d 558 , 570 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) ( en banc ). 2019Additionally, “a person whose name is entered into the ChildLine Registry as a perpetrator of child abuse is entitled to a clear and unequivocal notice of his or her right to a post-deprivation hearing as a matter of due process.” D.C. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 150 A.3d 558, 570 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc). | 1 | 2 |
cluster 699217green1 sentence2025Veit v. N. Wales Borough, 800 A.2d 391, 398 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002);8 see also McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 460 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting a claim that due process has been denied where the discharged employee “has not taken advantage of his right to a post- deprivation hearing before an impartial tribunal that can rectify any possible wrong committed by the initial decisionmaker”). | 1 | 1 |
Veit v. North Wales Boroughgreen1 sentence2025Veit v. N. Wales Borough, 800 A.2d 391, 398 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002);8 see also McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 460 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting a claim that due process has been denied where the discharged employee “has not taken advantage of his right to a post- deprivation hearing before an impartial tribunal that can rectify any possible wrong committed by the initial decisionmaker”). | 1 | 1 |
Fuentes v. Shevingreen2 sentences2023Washington further notes that when this Court decided Johnson, the 2019 amendment to Act 84 was already in effect.14 Moreover, even if the amended version Act 84 can be read to conflict with the due process requirements articulated in 14 Although the 2019 Amendment to Act 84 was in effect when this Court issued Johnson in October of 2020, we did not mention the amendment or otherwise discuss its text. [J-32-2023] - 16 Montañez, Bundy, and Johnson, Washington suggests that the legislature “cannot legislate away [his] right to be heard on the rate increase[,] and the Commonwealth Court’s displac 2023Washington contends that it is wholly unremarkable that many claims by incarcerated individuals will ultimately prove to be meritless, arguing that due process in this context guarantees the opportunity to seek a remedy, not the remedy itself.16 He points out that Montañez did not require the DOC “to implement a deduction policy that permitted ‘exceptions to its across-the board 20% rate of deduction.’” Id. at 25 (quoting Montañez, 773 F.3d at 486 ). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Cejagreen1 sentence2023Verbonitz cited with approval Justice Flaherty's concurring opinion in Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 647 (Pa. 1981), which stated that: “f]undamental due process requires that no adjudication be based solely on hearsay evidence.” If more than “rank hearsay” is required in an administrative context, the standard must be higher in a criminal proceeding where a person may be deprived of his liberty. | 1 | 1 |
Bhalerao v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulationsgreen1 sentence2018See Horvat, 563 A.2d at 1310-11 ; see also The Summit Academy v. Department of Human Services, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 257 C.D. 2015, filed December 12, 2015) (unreported), slip op at 14-17; 3 Bhalerao v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulations, 834 F.Supp.2d 775, 787-88 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
Horvat v. DEPT. OF STATE PRO. & OCC. AFF.green1 sentence2018See Horvat, 563 A.2d at 1310-11 ; see also The Summit Academy v. Department of Human Services, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 257 C.D. 2015, filed December 12, 2015) (unreported), slip op at 14-17; 3 Bhalerao v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulations, 834 F.Supp.2d 775, 787-88 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
R. v. Com., Dept. of Public Welfaregreen1 sentence2016The court posited that the state’s significant interest in protecting children from abuse and neglect could be fulfilled by other means such as by the criminal justice system and the Division’s authority to physically remove children from dangerous environments. 11 liberty interest is more straightforward because in Pennsylvania reputation is expressly protected in Sections 1 and 11 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution.14 Citing Sections 1 and 11, our Supreme Court has held that reputation is “a fundamental interest which cannot be abridged without compliance with constitutional stand | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Homargreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931 , 117 S.Ct. 1807, 1812 , 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997). 2003See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931 , 117 S.Ct. 1807, 1812 , 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
green
2 sentences2025It claims that “notice and an opportunity to be heard” before being placed on the ChildLine Registry, provides all the necessary process that is due and aligns with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 - 43. 1987Id. at 542 n. 7. | 2 | 1987–2025 |
Bundy, K., Aplt v. Wetzel
green
1 sentence2023Bundy, 184 A.3d at 559 . [J-32-2023] - 63 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz
green
2 sentences2023Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 525 Pa. 413 , 581 A.2d 172 (1990), that hearsay alone is not sufficient to make out a prima facie case, unlike here, where even there was a post-deprivation hearing – the criminal trial. 2023Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 525 Pa. 413 , 581 A.2d 172 (1990), that hearsay alone is not sufficient to make out a prima facie case, unlike here, where even there was a post-deprivation hearing – the criminal trial. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2023Washington contends that it is wholly unremarkable that many claims by incarcerated individuals will ultimately prove to be meritless, arguing that due process in this context guarantees the opportunity to seek a remedy, not the remedy itself.16 He points out that Montañez did not require the DOC “to implement a deduction policy that permitted ‘exceptions to its across-the board 20% rate of deduction.’” Id. at 25 (quoting Montañez, 773 F.3d at 486 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bruce Brown and Daniel Charest v. Department of Justice and Immigration & Naturalization Service
green
2 sentences1999In Brown and Charest v. Department of Justice and Immigration & Naturalization Service, 715 F.2d 662 (D.C.Cir.1983), the D.C. 1999In Brown and Charest v. Department of Justice and Immigration & Naturalization Service, 715 F.2d 662 (D.C.Cir.1983), the D.C. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Barry v. Barchi
green
2 sentences1999In Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 , 99 S.Ct. 2642 , 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979), Barchi was a horse trainer whose license was suspended for 15 days when a horse in his' possession tested positive for drugs post-race. 1999In Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 , 99 S.Ct. 2642 , 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979), Barchi was a horse trainer whose license was suspended for 15 days when a horse in his' possession tested positive for drugs post-race. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Mallen
green
2 sentences1999In Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 , 108 S.Ct. 1780 , 100 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that an indictment alone was sufficient to deny a bank president of a pre-deprivation hearing, but that a post-deprivation hearing was required to be held in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time in order to meet due process requirements. 1999In Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 , 108 S.Ct. 1780 , 100 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that an indictment alone was sufficient to deny a bank president of a pre-deprivation hearing, but that a post-deprivation hearing was required to be held in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time in order to meet due process requirements. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.
green
2 sentences1995To adopt the majority’s interpretation of Parratt would be the same as saying a plaintiff has to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action, a view expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 , 102 S.Ct. 2557 , 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). 1995To adopt the majority’s interpretation of Parratt would be the same as saying a plaintiff has to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action, a view expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 , 102 S.Ct. 2557 , 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.