recitation standard in Pennsylvania

2023Second, in both the opening remarks to the jury and the charge prior to deliberations, “the trial court expressly and repeatedly instructed the jury that it was the sole fact-finder and sole judge of credibility.” Id. at 295-96 (quoting the trial court’s recitation of standard jury instructions concerning the role of the jury in determining credibility of witnesses and noting that “[t]he court explicitly instructed the jury to consider whether the ability of a witness to see, hear, know, remember, or describe things was affected by, inter alia, youth”).

2023Third, “and very importantly, the children were unwavering in their testimony that [the defendant] shot their mother[.]” Id. at 296 .

2019“Moreover, the recitation of factors in support of the imposition of consecutive sentences was insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the requisite for a contemporaneous statement in support of the sentence as contemplated and mandated under the [S]entencing [C]ode.” Id. -6- J-S58005-19 Here, the court explicitly stated that it read the pre-sentence report in its entirety and listened to all of the evidence that was presented, both on behalf of the Commonwealth and on behalf of Pacely.

2017Appellant further argues that “the recitation of factors in support of the imposition of consecutive sentences was insufficient” and that the court erred in failing to provide “a legally sufficient contemporaneous statement in support of the imposition of consecutive sentences.” Id.

2017Id. at 6 (citing Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2014), for the recitation of the standard for reviewing challenges to the legality of ____________________________________________ 1 The sentencing court stated that the sentence imposed for PIC (30 months’ or 2½ years’ imprisonment) is in the aggravated range.

2003One earlier case that grappled not only with the applicable standard, but also the process to be employed in determining if the standard was met, was the predecessor of Dugger, Commonwealth v. Lapia, 311 Pa.Super. 264 , 457 A.2d 877 (1983)(en banc), a decision of this Court sitting en banc that was decided along with Dugger .

2003One earlier case that grappled not only with the applicable standard, but also the process to be employed in determining if the standard was met, was the predecessor of Dugger, Commonwealth v. Lapia, 311 Pa.Super. 264 , 457 A.2d 877 (1983)(en banc), a decision of this Court sitting en banc that was decided along with Dugger .

2003In any event, by 1985, more than twenty years after Bosurgi , in Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537 , 486 A.2d 382 (1985), the Supreme Court used the “terminates or substantially handicaps” language in such a manner as to convey the impression that it was by then well established as a recitation of the standard by which the appeala-bility of an adverse pre-trial order would be measured.

2003In any event, by 1985, more than twenty years after Bosurgi , in Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537 , 486 A.2d 382 (1985), the Supreme Court used the “terminates or substantially handicaps” language in such a manner as to convey the impression that it was by then well established as a recitation of the standard by which the appeala-bility of an adverse pre-trial order would be measured.

1999Thus, while we continue to suggest that “prior to sentencing outside the guidelines, [the trial court] would do well to specifically articulate the guideline range of sentences,” see Canfield, 639 A.2d at 51-52 , we recognize that such a recitation is not uniformly necessary to establish “that the court was aware of, and considered, the guidelines,” see Chesson, 509 A.2d at 876 .

1999To do so, we concluded, in the presence of a record that effectively documented the court’s consideration of the guidelines, would merely mandate the use of “magic words” and “exalt form over substance.” Id. ¶ 16 We find the disposition in Can-field a measured and thoughtful resolution of the potential pitfalls likely to arise from strict application of the recitation requirement in Royer .

1999Thus, while we continue to suggest that “prior to sentencing outside the guidelines, [the trial court] would do well to specifically articulate the guideline range of sentences,” see Canfield, 639 A.2d at 51-52 , we recognize that such a recitation is not uniformly necessary to establish “that the court was aware of, and considered, the guidelines,” see Chesson, 509 A.2d at 876 .

1994We rejected this argument and held that in light of our per curiam reversal of the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Mihalaki v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 525 Pa. 332 , 580 A.2d 313 (1990), rev’g, 123 Pa.Cmwlth. 353 , 553 A.2d 1042 (1989), O’Connell must be satisfied when a motorist asks to consult with someone regardless of whether Miranda warnings had been given. 4 Moreover, in McCann we held that the warning issued by the police was inadequate under O’Connell.

1994We rejected this argument and held that in light of our per curiam reversal of the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Mihalaki v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 525 Pa. 332 , 580 A.2d 313 (1990), rev’g, 123 Pa.Cmwlth. 353 , 553 A.2d 1042 (1989), O’Connell must be satisfied when a motorist asks to consult with someone regardless of whether Miranda warnings had been given. 4 Moreover, in McCann we held that the warning issued by the police was inadequate under O’Connell.

1994The majority, citing federal case law, frames the applicable test as follows: “Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, courts have held that a manufacturer or seller is not liable for injuries caused by a defective product if the defect was created by a substantial alteration in the product amounting to a supervening or intervening cause of the plaintiffs injuries.” (Majority opinion at 357, citing Smith v. Hobart Manufacturing Co., 302 F.2d 570 (3d Cir.1962).) Unfortunately, the majority’s recitation of the test falls short of setting forth both parts of the test.

1994The majority, citing federal case law, frames the applicable test as follows: "Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, courts have held that a manufacturer or seller is not liable for injuries caused by a defective product if the defect was created by a substantial alteration in the product amounting to a supervening or intervening cause of the plaintiff's injuries." (Majority opinion at 357, citing Smith v. Hobart Manufacturing Co., 302 F.2d 570 (3d Cir.1962).) Unfortunately, the majority's recitation of the test falls short of setting forth both parts of the test.

1994We rejected this argument and held that in light of our per curiam reversal of the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Mihalaki v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 525 Pa. 332 , 580 A.2d 313 (1990), rev’g, 123 Pa.Cmwlth. 353 , 553 A.2d 1042 (1989), O’Connell must be satisfied when a motorist asks to consult with someone regardless of whether Miranda warnings had been given. 4 Moreover, in McCann we held that the warning issued by the police was inadequate under O’Connell.

1994We rejected this argument and held that in light of our per curiam reversal of the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Mihalaki v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 525 Pa. 332 , 580 A.2d 313 (1990), rev’g, 123 Pa.Cmwlth. 353 , 553 A.2d 1042 (1989), O’Connell must be satisfied when a motorist asks to consult with someone regardless of whether Miranda warnings had been given. 4 Moreover, in McCann we held that the warning issued by the police was inadequate under O’Connell.

1994Foreseeability is also an integral part of the test, as this court made clear in several Pennsylvania cases including Thompson v. Motch & Merryweather Machinery, 358 Pa.Super. 149 , 516 A.2d 1226 (1986).

1994Foreseeability is also an integral part of the test, as this court made clear in several Pennsylvania cases including Thompson v. Motch & Merryweather Machinery, 358 Pa.Super. 149 , 516 A.2d 1226 (1986).

1969Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Co. for the Instruction of the Blind, 214 Pa. 138 , 63 A. 420 (1906), involved the converse situation where a charity was seeking tax-exemption for the second half of the fiscal year on a parcel of land which was taxable on the assessment date.

1969Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Co. for the Instruction of the Blind, 214 Pa. 138 , 63 A. 420 (1906), involved the converse situation where a charity was seeking tax-exemption for the second half of the fiscal year on a parcel of land which was taxable on the assessment date.