community caretaking exception in Vermont

2007We first addressed the community caretaking exception in State v. Marcello, stating that in certain circumstances, “police officers without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity are allowed to intrude on a person’s privacy to carry out ‘community caretaking’ functions to enhance public safety.” 157 Vt. 657, 658 , 599 A.2d 357, 358 (1991) (mem.).

2007We first addressed the community caretaking exception in State v. Marcello, stating that in certain circumstances, “police officers without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity are allowed to intrude on a person’s privacy to carry out ‘community caretaking’ functions to enhance public safety.” 157 Vt. 657, 658 , 599 A.2d 357, 358 (1991) (mem.).

2014“The distinguishing feature of a stop and seizure under the community caretaking exception is that it is generated from a desire to aid victims rather than investigate criminals.” State v. Campbell, 173 Vt. 575, 576 , 789 A.2d 926, 928 (2001) (mem.) (quotation omitted).

2014“The distinguishing feature of a stop and seizure under the community caretaking exception is that it is generated from a desire to aid victims rather than investigate criminals.” State v. Campbell, 173 Vt. 575, 576 , 789 A.2d 926, 928 (2001) (mem.) (quotation omitted).

2007See State v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 320 (Me.1989) (Glassman, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree . . . that a possible future risk to the safety of persons or property warrants the intrusion of a present stop of a motor vehicle.").

2007See State v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 320 (Me. 1989) (Glassman, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree ... that a possible future risk to the safety of persons or property warrants the intrusion of a present stop of a motor vehicle.”).

2007If we adopt the State's position, that it is objectively reasonable to believe that the general motoring public is sufficiently endangered by a one-time premature activation of high-beam headlights to justify a motor-vehicle stop, the community caretaking exception will likely "devour the requirement of reasonable articulable suspicion" —a result that we cautioned against in Burgess, 163 Vt. at 262 , 657 A.2d at 204 .

2007If we adopt the State's position, that it is objectively reasonable to believe that the general motoring public is sufficiently endangered by a one-time premature activation of high-beam headlights to justify a motor-vehicle stop, the community caretaking exception will likely "devour the requirement of reasonable articulable suspicion" —a result that we cautioned against in Burgess, 163 Vt. at 262 , 657 A.2d at 204 .

2013On the other hand, in State v. Jestice, we held that the fact that a car was parked at nighttime in a relatively busy lot by a trailhead near a state highway that was regularly patrolled by police was not sufficient to support a seizure predicated on the community caretaking doctrine. 2004 VT 65, ¶ 10 , 177 Vt. 513 , 861 A.2d 1060 (mem.).

2013On the other hand, in State v. Jestice, we held that the fact that a car was parked at nighttime in a relatively busy lot by a trailhead near a state highway that was regularly patrolled by police was not sufficient to support a seizure predicated on the community caretaking doctrine. 2004 VT 65, ¶ 10 , 177 Vt. 513 , 861 A.2d 1060 (mem.).

2014See Edwards, 2008 VT 23, ¶ 8 (“Since Marcello , the test for the community caretaking exception for a traffic stop has consistently turned on whether there were specific and articulable facts objectively leading the officer to reasonably believe that the defendant was in distress or needed assistance, or reasonably prompted an inquiry in that regard.” (citing cases)). ¶ 12.

2013The propriety of a traffic stop based on the community caretaking doctrine turns on “whether there were specific and articulable facts objectively leading the officer to reasonably believe that the defendant was in distress or needed assistance, or reasonably prompted an inquiry in that regard.” Edwards, 2008 VT 23, ¶ 8 ; see also State v. St.

2008Affirmed. 1 As indicated in Mountford , “[w]e prefer to view the emergency assistance exception as separate from the community caretaking exception, although both involve the police operating outside of a criminal law enforcement role.” 171 Vt. at 490 n*, 769 A.2d at 644 n*. 2 Although Campbell recited the observation in Mountford that community caretaking stops can be distinguished by police motivation to aid victims rather than investigate crime, the holding of the case depended entirely upon “specific and articulable facts” objectively justifying the officer’s reasonable belief that defenda

2008Affirmed. 1 As indicated in Mountford , “[w]e prefer to view the emergency assistance exception as separate from the community caretaking exception, although both involve the police operating outside of a criminal law enforcement role.” 171 Vt. at 490 n*, 769 A.2d at 644 n*. 2 Although Campbell recited the observation in Mountford that community caretaking stops can be distinguished by police motivation to aid victims rather than investigate crime, the holding of the case depended entirely upon “specific and articulable facts” objectively justifying the officer’s reasonable belief that defenda

2014See, e.g., Button, 2013 VT 92, ¶¶ 2-5, 10-18 (concluding, in “close case,” that stop was not justified under community-caretaking doctrine where officer simply decided to follow defendant, who was driving on rural road late at night, and then approached defendant’s car to see if defendant was okay less than a minute after defendant pulled to side of road); State v. Edwards, 2008 VT 23, ¶ 6 , 183 Vt. 584 , 945 A.2d 915 (mem.) (officer could reasonably believe that defendant needed assistance based on abnormal and unsafe location of defendant’s car, which was parked barely off travel lane of hig

2000As an adjunct to, or part of, the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, courts have recognized an exception *490 for entry to render emergency assistance. * The United States Supreme Court recognized such an exception in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978), and this Court did so in State v. Connolly, 133 Vt. 565, 571 , 350 A.2d 364, 368 (1975), although neither case sets out the contours of the exception.

2000As an adjunct to, or part of, the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, courts have recognized an exception *490 for entry to render emergency assistance. * The United States Supreme Court recognized such an exception in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978), and this Court did so in State v. Connolly, 133 Vt. 565, 571 , 350 A.2d 364, 368 (1975), although neither case sets out the contours of the exception.

2000As an adjunct to, or part of, the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, courts have recognized an exception *490 for entry to render emergency assistance. * The United States Supreme Court recognized such an exception in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978), and this Court did so in State v. Connolly, 133 Vt. 565, 571 , 350 A.2d 364, 368 (1975), although neither case sets out the contours of the exception.