community caretaking exception in Texas

2020App. 1999), he contends that the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in the circumstances present here because he was not in distress when the police detained him, because he was on his property when the officers detained him, and because he and his stationary car did not present a danger to himself or others, see id. at 859 n.3 (listing factors to be considered when determining if detention is justified by community- caretaking exception).

2015The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the community-caretaking exception in Wright v. State, holding that “[a]s part of his duty to ‘serve and protect’ a police officer may stop and assist an individual whom a reasonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would believe is in need of help.” Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. Crim.

2021In effect, the community caretaking function imposes a duty on an officer to “serve and protect” the public, which in turn, allows an officer to “stop and assist” an individual in a vehicle without a warrant when a reasonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would believe the individual was “in need of help.” Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 276-77 , citing Wright, 7 S.W.3d 276 (emphasis original); see also Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1598 (2021) (while noting that there is no “standalone” or “freestanding” community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment for searches and sei

2021In addition, the area in which Appellant stopped his vehicle also appeared 6 And, as our sister court has recognized, the contention that an officer must know all operative facts is “nonsensical given the purpose of the community caretaking exception,” as the “entire reason for the detention is to ascertain whether this member of the public needs assistance.” Rodgers v. State, No. 07-14-00054-CR, 2014 WL 3647786 , at *3-5 (Tex.App.--Amarillo July 22, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication), citing Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 276 . 13 relatively isolated, making it questionable wh

2015Appellant contends other than depending on Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), which established the community- caretaking exception, the State provides no authority for why that doctrine, which recognizes that "[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency," should be expanded to cover the situation present here, in which officers, in an attempt to make contact with the Appellant reference a possible class C ticket did invade the property and privacy righ

2015Appellant contends other than depending on Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), which established the community- caretaking exception, the State provides no authority for why that doctrine, which recognizes that "[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency," should be expanded to cover the situation present here, in which officers, in an attempt to make contact with the Appellant reference a possible class C ticket did invade the property and privacy righ

2015This Court “use[s] an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a warrantless search is justified under the Emergency Doctrine.”28 “The distinction between the emergency doctrine and the community caretaking doctrine . . . is a narrow, but critical one.”29 “[W]hile both doctrines are based on an officer’s reasonable belief in the need to act pursuant to his or her ‘community caretaking functions,’ the emergency doctrine is limited to the functions of protecting or preserving life or avoiding serious injury.”30 The other difference is that while the community caretaking doctri

2015This Court “use[s] an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a warrantless search is justified under the Emergency Doctrine.”28 “The distinction between the emergency doctrine and the community caretaking doctrine . . . is a narrow, but critical one.”29 “[W]hile both doctrines are based on an officer’s reasonable belief in the need to act pursuant to his or her ‘community caretaking functions,’ the emergency doctrine is limited to the functions of protecting or preserving life or avoiding serious injury.”30 The other difference is that while the community caretaking doctri

2008T HE S TOP IS N OT J USTIFIED ON THE B ASIS OF THE C OMMUNITY C ARETAKING D OCTRINE “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” 19 Therefore, “even without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that an offense has been committed, a police officer may reasonably seize an individual through the exercise of his 18 … See Griffey, 241 S.W.3d at 704 . 19 … Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (1978). 11 community caretaking function.” 20 Thus,

2008T HE S TOP IS N OT J USTIFIED ON THE B ASIS OF THE C OMMUNITY C ARETAKING D OCTRINE “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” 19 Therefore, “even without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that an offense has been committed, a police officer may reasonably seize an individual through the exercise of his 18 … See Griffey, 241 S.W.3d at 704 . 19 … Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (1978). 11 community caretaking function.” 20 Thus,

2021Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277 ; see also Byram v. State, 510 S.W.3d 918, 922 (Tex.Crim.App. 2017) (reaffirming the two-step inquiry set forth in Corbin).

2017Byram, 2017 WL 359791, at *4 (citing Laney, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Alford, 400 S.W.3d at 929 (“[A]lthough the trial court made a conclusion of law denying appellant’s motion to suppress under the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, the appellate court was not limited to consideration of that legal theory and could uphold the trial court’s ruling under any legal theory supported by the facts.”). 27 In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a warrant is invalid under the Fourth Amendment if an affiant makes an affirmative misrepresentation in a warrant affidavit and the misrepresentation is material and n

2019See id. at 929 (stating 1) “regardless of whether the trial court has made express conclusions of law, we uphold the trial court’s ruling under any theory supported by the facts because an appellate court reviews conclusions of law de novo” and 2) “although the trial court made a conclusion of law denying appellant’s motion to suppress under the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, the appellate court was not limited to consideration of that legal theory and could uphold the trial court’s ruling under any legal theory supported by the facts.” Given that 1) Fernandez raise

2020See Hurley, 2008 WL 2544780 , at *6 (noting that encounter between officer and defendant “became a temporary investigative detention” “as the facts developed”); Bryant, 161 S.W.3d at 762 (stating that interaction “did not become an investigative detention until after appellee opened his car door”).

2006See Guzman , 955 S.W.2d at 89 ; State v. Bryant , 161 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).

2015See id.; see also Bishop, 85 S.W. 3d at 821 ; Rodriguez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex. Crim.

2015See, id.; see also Bishop, 85 S.W.3d at 821 ; Rodriguez v. State, 844 *766 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (considering motion to suppress together with attached affidavit to determine motion’s merits). 2.

2013See id. at 819 n. 21.

2013See id. at 819 n.21.

2008Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim.App.2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 2 .

2006See Guzman , 955 S.W.2d at 89 ; State v. Bryant , 161 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).

1999Wright, 959 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex.App. — Austin, pet.granted).

1998Contra Wright, 959 S.W.2d at 358 (refusing to adopt the community caretaking doctrine without direction from the Court of *813 Criminal Appeals); Rheinlander v. State, 888 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994), pet. dism’d, 918 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Crim.App.l996)(finding community earetaking doctrine to be at odds with the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity standard).

2025App. 2002): Because the purpose of the community caretaking exception is to allow an officer to “seize” and assist an individual whom he reasonably believes is in need of help, the first factor is entitled to the greatest weight…This is not to say that the weight of the first factor alone will always be dispositive…A particular level of exhibited distress may be seen as more or less serious depending on the presence or absence of the remaining three factors. 14 To prove a stop proper pursuant to the community caretaking function, the Court considers “(1) whether the officer was primarily motiv

2025To determine if the community caretaking exception applies to an officer’s conduct, we first ask “whether the officer was primarily motivated by a community caretaking purpose,” and, if so, we then ask “whether the officer's belief that the individual needs help was reasonable.” Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851 , 854–55 (Tex. Crim.

2008Finally, although I believe that the stop here was permissible under the community caretaking exception discussed in Cady and Wright , it could be argued that the information available to Officer Carrillo might well have justified a brief investigatory detention based upon reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2008Finally, although I believe that the stop here was permissible under the community caretaking exception discussed in Cady and Wright , it could be argued that the information available to Officer Carrillo might well have justified a brief investigatory detention based upon reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2003The trial court found, "There's no doubt, no question exigent circumstances existed, allowing the officers to enter the trailer to secure the person." The court of appeals analyzed the case under what it labeled a community caretaking doctrine using the *862 factors set forth in Rohrig . [4] This being an emergency doctrine case, however, the proper standards are those set forth by this Court regarding the emergency doctrine, and not those set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Rohrig . [5] "We have used an objective standard of reasonableness in determining w

2003The trial court found, “There’s no doubt, no question exigent circumstances existed, allowing the officers to enter the trailer to secure the person.” The court of appeals analyzed the case under what it labeled a community caretaking doctrine using the factors set forth in Rohrig, 4 This being an emergency doctrine case, however, the proper standards are those set forth by this Court regarding the emergency doctrine, and not those set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Rohrig . 5 “We have used an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a w

2002See Corbin v. State, 33 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. granted) (“The location of the individual was on a somewhat isolated stretch of interstate highway.”). 2 Although the court ultimately concluded that the stop at issue was justified by the community caretaking exception, the court characterized the strength of this factor as “fairly low.” Id. at 95 ; cf. Morfin v. State, 34 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (car parked in “very high crime area”); Chilman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex.App.

2002See Corbin v. State, 33 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. granted) (“The location of the individual was on a somewhat isolated stretch of interstate highway.”). 2 Although the court ultimately concluded that the stop at issue was justified by the community caretaking exception, the court characterized the strength of this factor as “fairly low.” Id. at 95 ; cf. Morfin v. State, 34 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (car parked in “very high crime area”); Chilman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex.App.

2015The trial court was within its discretion to deny appellant’s motion to suppress based upon the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. ..............................................................................................16 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................. 19 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 20 iii INDEX OF AUTHORI

2008Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim.App.2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 2 .

2015In affirming the application of the community caretaking exception, the court stated that the defendant was “a motorist in obvious distress” because “a reasonable person ... would have believed that the driver of the truck needed help.” Id. at 777 .

2006See, e.g., Lebron v. State , 35 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (applying exception when officer found motorist slowly driving away from reported accident on two flat tires before coming to a full stop on the roadway) .

2015Likewise, in Ortega v. State, the appeals court noted that the appellant was driving at less than half the posted speed limit as “perhaps [the] most important[ ]” fact justifying the stop of the appellant’s vehicle as an exercise of community caretaking. 974 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd); see also Cunningham v. State, 966 S.W.2d 811, 812-13 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1998, no pet.) (concluding stop justified under the community caretaking exception where, among other factors, officer observed appellant driving on a flat tire at about five miles per hour on the shoulder of the

1999Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 438 . [3] Citing Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431 ; McDonald v. State, 759 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, no pet.); Cunningham v. State, 966 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1998); Ortega v. State, 974 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998); and Rheinlander v. State, 888 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994), pet. dism'd permanently abated, 918 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). [4] See, e.g., Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) ("Under the modified objective standard, a reasonable police officer, without a traffic citation book ..."); Brimage v. State

2015Likewise, in Ortega v. State, the appeals court noted that the appellant was driving at less than half the posted speed limit as “perhaps [the] most important[ ]” fact justifying the stop of the appellant’s vehicle as an exercise of community caretaking. 974 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd); see also Cunningham v. State, 966 S.W.2d 811, 812-13 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1998, no pet.) (concluding stop justified under the community caretaking exception where, among other factors, officer observed appellant driving on a flat tire at about five miles per hour on the shoulder of the

1999Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 438 . [3] Citing Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431 ; McDonald v. State, 759 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, no pet.); Cunningham v. State, 966 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1998); Ortega v. State, 974 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998); and Rheinlander v. State, 888 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994), pet. dism'd permanently abated, 918 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). [4] See, e.g., Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) ("Under the modified objective standard, a reasonable police officer, without a traffic citation book ..."); Brimage v. State

2014See Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277 ; Hernandez, 376 S.W.3d at 874 .

2013Because we find that the State met its burden of proving that the cooperating officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate Appellant’s stop, we need not determine whether the community caretaking function was also 4 The community caretaking exception allows an officer to reasonably seize an individual without having reasonable suspicion or probable cause when, as part of his duty to “serve and protect,” he “stop[s] and assist[s] an individual whom a reasonable person, given the totality of circumstances, would believe is in need of help.” See Hernandez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 863, 873 (Tex.App.—

2006See McDonald , 759 S.W.2d at 785 .

1999Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 438 . [3] Citing Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431 ; McDonald v. State, 759 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, no pet.); Cunningham v. State, 966 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1998); Ortega v. State, 974 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998); and Rheinlander v. State, 888 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994), pet. dism'd permanently abated, 918 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). [4] See, e.g., Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) ("Under the modified objective standard, a reasonable police officer, without a traffic citation book ..."); Brimage v. State

1999Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 438 . [3] Citing Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431 ; McDonald v. State, 759 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, no pet.); Cunningham v. State, 966 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1998); Ortega v. State, 974 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998); and Rheinlander v. State, 888 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994), pet. dism'd permanently abated, 918 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). [4] See, e.g., Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) ("Under the modified objective standard, a reasonable police officer, without a traffic citation book ..."); Brimage v. State

1998Contra Wright, 959 S.W.2d at 358 (refusing to adopt the community caretaking doctrine without direction from the Court of *813 Criminal Appeals); Rheinlander v. State, 888 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994), pet. dism’d, 918 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Crim.App.l996)(finding community earetaking doctrine to be at odds with the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity standard).

1999See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). 1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not formally recognized a community caretaking exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement, and Texas courts of appeals have differed on whether to recognize it. 2 However, the Texas Court *472 of Criminal Appeals recently addressed “whether Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution was violated by the officers’ detaining the appellant without a warrant to determine if he needed first aid, a seizure which the officers made in performance of a community care-taking function

1999Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 438 . .

2025See Copeland, 501 S.W.3d at 613 ; Mixon, 523 S.W.3d at 769 ; accord Marsh v. State, 343 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (“An appellant must attack all independent grounds supporting a trial court’s ruling.”).