conflict waiver in Washington

2020Sealing Conflict Waiver Letters Stevens maintains the trial court erred in sealing, rather than redacting, attorney-client communications in the conflict waiver letters that BFOA and the Owner Plaintiffs executed. 28 Article I, section 10 of our state constitution requires that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly.” Hundtofte v. Encarnación, 181 Wn.2d 1, 7 , 330 P.3d 168 (2014).

2020Sealing Conflict Waiver Letters Stevens maintains the trial court erred in sealing, rather than redacting, attorney-client communications in the conflict waiver letters that BFOA and the Owner Plaintiffs executed. 28 Article I, section 10 of our state constitution requires that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly.” Hundtofte v. Encarnación, 181 Wn.2d 1, 7 , 330 P.3d 168 (2014).

2020The court found that the conflict waivers were protected by the attorney-client privilege; that the public had no interest in seeing these documents; that under GR 15(c) and Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30 , 640 P.2d 716 (1982), BFOA and the Owner Plaintiffs had a compelling interest in protecting their privileged communications; and that the Owner Plaintiffs’ interest outweighed any public interest in access to those communications.

2020The court found that the conflict waivers were protected by the attorney-client privilege; that the public had no interest in seeing these documents; that under GR 15(c) and Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30 , 640 P.2d 716 (1982), BFOA and the Owner Plaintiffs had a compelling interest in protecting their privileged communications; and that the Owner Plaintiffs’ interest outweighed any public interest in access to those communications.

2008The court must “ ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights.’ ” United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1498 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 , 62 S. Ct. 457 , 86 L.

2008The court must “ ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights.’ ” United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1498 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 , 62 S. Ct. 457 , 86 L.

2023Id. 5 Cadman argues alternatively and for the first time on appeal that we should vacate the default judgment under CR 60(b)(4) because of WK’s “misconduct” in not requesting a conflict waiver specific to Cyrus and not notifying Cadman that Cyrus filed a lawsuit.

2023Id. 10 No. 84291-9-I/11 First, Cadman argues that WK’s failure to explain in its request for a conflict waiver that it sought to represent both Cyrus and Orca amounts to extraordinary circumstances justifying vacation of the default judgment.

2019Id.

2017App. 489, 528 , 246 P.3d 558 (plurality opinion), aff’d, 172 Wn.2d 802 , 262 P.3d 1225 (2011). 6 In response, the State stresses that, at this point, it has been granted approval only to interview Vargas.

2017App. 489, 528 , 246 P.3d 558 (plurality opinion), aff’d, 172 Wn.2d 802 , 262 P.3d 1225 (2011). 6 In response, the State stresses that, at this point, it has been granted approval only to interview Vargas.

2017App. 489, 528 , 246 P.3d 558 (plurality opinion), aff’d, 172 Wn.2d 802 , 262 P.3d 1225 (2011). 6 In response, the State stresses that, at this point, it has been granted approval only to interview Vargas.

2017And, most importantly for this conflict analysis, Aralica is still responsible for providing input on promotional and disciplinary matters. 5 “A trial court must sentence a defendant to life without possibility of parole upon a conviction for a third strike offense.” State v. McKagne, 159 Wn.

2012Id. ¶82 In Wheat, 486 U.S. 153 , the Supreme Court set forth the standards under which a trial court constitutionally could refuse to allow conflicting representation whether or not a defendant was willing to waive a conflict — in Wheat , the particular conflict was defense counsel’s representation of multiple defendants.

2012Id. ¶82 In Wheat, 486 U.S. 153 , the Supreme Court set forth the standards under which a trial court constitutionally could refuse to allow conflicting representation whether or not a defendant was willing to waive a conflict — in Wheat , the particular conflict was defense counsel’s representation of multiple defendants.

2012The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that waivers from affected defendants cured the problem, noting that the courts “have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.” Id. at 160 .

2004See, e.g., Anschell II, 149 Wash.2d at 510, 69 P.3d 844 (applying Standard 4.32 for a single instance of failing to adequately disclose a conflict between a current and a former client); McKean, 148 Wash.2d at 871 , 64 P.3d 1226 (applying Standard 4.32 for a single conflict violation involving entering into a business transaction with a client).

1997Williams v. State, 76 Wn.