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18 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1915–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Malcom v. State of Texasgreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Malcom v. State, 628 S.W.2d 790 , 791–92 (Tex. Crim. 2019See, e.g., Malcom v. State, 628 S.W.2d 790, 791-92 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Trautz v. Lempgreen2 sentences1992See Anderson v. Menefee, 174 S.W. 904, 908 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1915, writ ref’d) (“If the will when fairly construed leaves the question [of time of vesting] in doubt, the doubt will be solved in favor of vesting of the title at the earliest possible moment, so as to avoid a conflict with the rule against perpetuities and to uphold the will.”); see also Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580 , 46 S.W.2d 135, 139 (1932) (to avoid the effect of the rule against perpetuities, the court held that legal title passed to the testamentary trustees on the date the will became effective, even though the will 1992See Anderson v. Menefee, 174 S.W. 904, 908 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1915, writ ref’d) (“If the will when fairly construed leaves the question [of time of vesting] in doubt, the doubt will be solved in favor of vesting of the title at the earliest possible moment, so as to avoid a conflict with the rule against perpetuities and to uphold the will.”); see also Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580 , 46 S.W.2d 135, 139 (1932) (to avoid the effect of the rule against perpetuities, the court held that legal title passed to the testamentary trustees on the date the will became effective, even though the will | 2 | 2 |
Anderson v. Menefeegreen2 sentences1992See Anderson v. Menefee, 174 S.W. 904, 908 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1915, writ ref’d) (“If the will when fairly construed leaves the question [of time of vesting] in doubt, the doubt will be solved in favor of vesting of the title at the earliest possible moment, so as to avoid a conflict with the rule against perpetuities and to uphold the will.”); see also Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580 , 46 S.W.2d 135, 139 (1932) (to avoid the effect of the rule against perpetuities, the court held that legal title passed to the testamentary trustees on the date the will became effective, even though the will 1967"In this connection it should be noted that the law favors the vesting of estates rather than otherwise; that is, if the will when fairly construed leaves the question in doubt, the doubt will be solved in favor of the vesting of the title at the earliest possible moment, so as to avoid a conflict with the rule against perpetuities and to uphold the will." Anderson v. Menefee, 174 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ.App., 1915), writ denied. | 1 | 3 |
Tober v. Turner of Texas, Inc.green1 sentence2019The conflict of which standard applies to the dissolution of a temporary injunction arises from the following clash: whether the general rule—that a trial court has broad discretion to alter its interlocutory orders— applies or whether a more tailored rule—which requires a showing of a change of circumstances between the time of the entry of the temporary injunction and a motion seeking its dissolution—should apply in the unique context of temporary injunctions. 15 Those advocating for a rule that vests the trial court with broad discretion to control its interlocutory orders often cite the Au | 1 | 1 |
Sands Motel v. Hargravegreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., Sands Motel, 358 S.W.2d at 674 (stating that Murphree “held that failure to assign the conflict as error in a motion for new trial waived any complaint and precluded a consideration of it on appeal”); Sutton, 405 S.W.2d at 833 (refusing to consider appellants’ conflict argument “since this point was not raised in their motion for new trial”). | 1 | 1 |
Sutton v. Reagan & Geegreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., Sands Motel, 358 S.W.2d at 674 (stating that Murphree “held that failure to assign the conflict as error in a motion for new trial waived any complaint and precluded a consideration of it on appeal”); Sutton, 405 S.W.2d at 833 (refusing to consider appellants’ conflict argument “since this point was not raised in their motion for new trial”). | 1 | 1 |
Ramirez v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Maya, 932 S.W.2d at 636 (noting that absent an express, voluntary waiver, an actual conflict of interest that hinders the effectiveness of counsel will mandate a new trial). 10 The trial court, though expressly disapproving of the conflict waiver, did not stop counsel from continuing to represent appellant. 11 See Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482 , 486–87 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d). 12 See id. at 486 (holding that evidence counsel struggled to “serve two masters” shows that an accused’s defense has been impaired). 13 The trial court explained it agreed with appellant’s posi 2015See Maya, 932 S.W.2d at 636 (noting that absent an express, voluntary waiver, an actual conflict of interest that hinders the effectiveness of counsel will mandate a new trial). 10 The trial court, though expressly disapproving of the conflict waiver, did not stop counsel from continuing to represent appellant. 11 See Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482 , 486–87 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d). 12 See id. at 486 (holding that evidence counsel struggled to “serve two masters” shows that an accused’s defense has been impaired). 13 The trial court explained it agreed with appellant’s posi | 1 | 1 |
Maya v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Maya, 932 S.W.2d at 636 (noting that absent an express, voluntary waiver, an actual conflict of interest that hinders the effectiveness of counsel will mandate a new trial). 10 The trial court, though expressly disapproving of the conflict waiver, did not stop counsel from continuing to represent appellant. 11 See Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482 , 486–87 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d). 12 See id. at 486 (holding that evidence counsel struggled to “serve two masters” shows that an accused’s defense has been impaired). 13 The trial court explained it agreed with appellant’s posi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Murphree
green
2 sentences2018Murphree , 357 S.W.2d at 748 ; see also Esparza , 2005 WL 3477826 , at *2 (noting that Murphree did not consider "whether assigning error in a motion for new trial would be sufficient to preserve error"). 1962Murphree, Tex, 357 S.W.2d 744 , 5 Tex.Sup.Ct.Journal 376, the Supreme Court refused to treat a conflict in the jury’s verdict on special issues as fundamental error, and held that failure to assign the conflict as error in a motion for new trial waived any complaint and precluded a consideration of it on appeal. | 3 | 1962–2018 |
Landers v. State
green
1 sentence2025Landers, 256 S.W.3d at 304-305 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett
green
1 sentence2020This construction is consistent with the Provisional Authority’s requirement that “the Grantors and Grantee share equally in any and all proceeds related [to the exercise of the executory rights].” - 13 - 04-18-00610-CV We cannot construe this Provisional Authority as applying to only the executive rights relating to Meader’s one-half mineral interest because that construction would create a conflict with the clause granting Meader one-half of the minerals “and related executory rights and interests associated therewith.” See Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 13 ; Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 662 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hysaw v. Dawkins
green
1 sentence2020This construction is consistent with the Provisional Authority’s requirement that “the Grantors and Grantee share equally in any and all proceeds related [to the exercise of the executory rights].” - 13 - 04-18-00610-CV We cannot construe this Provisional Authority as applying to only the executive rights relating to Meader’s one-half mineral interest because that construction would create a conflict with the clause granting Meader one-half of the minerals “and related executory rights and interests associated therewith.” See Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 13 ; Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 662 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Meyer
green
1 sentence2018In the recent case of [Murphree], the Supreme Court refused to treat a conflict in the jury’s verdict on special issues as fundamental error, and held that failure to assign the conflict as error in a motion for new trial waived any complaint and precluded a consideration of it on appeal.”). 53 We did not hold otherwise in our 1973 opinion in Meyer, 502 S.W.2d at 679 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Whittenburg & Alston
green
1 sentence2018A few years later, in Duke , we cited Murphree in support of our holding that "it was necessary to file a motion for new trial assigning as error the entry of judgment on conflicting jury findings." 424 S.W.2d at 898 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sun Oil Co. v. Massey
green
1 sentence2018Sun Oil Co. v. Massey , 594 S.W.2d 125 , 132 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Jackson v. State Office of Administrative Hearings
green
1 sentence2016Gov’t Servs., 368 S.W.2d at 3 567; Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 298 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Government Services Insurance Underwriters v. Jones
green
1 sentence2016Gov’t Servs., 368 S.W.2d at 3 567; Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 298 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Robert M. Gates v. Shell Oil (Shell Offshore, Inc.) v. Total Services, Inc., and Northwest Insurance Co., Intervenors-Appellants
green
1 sentence1993Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Feegles v. Slaughter
green
1 sentence1964In the ■event of repugnancy, that construction is favored which admits of immediate vesting ■of the entire estate; and when the will, fairly construed, leaves the question in doubt, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the vesting of the title at the earliest possible moment, so as to avoid a conflict with the rule against perpetuities and to uphold the will. 44 Tex.Jur. 737-738, § 172; Jones’ Unknown Heirs v. Dorchester, Tex. Civ.App., 224 S.W. 596 ; Feegles v. Slaughter, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W. 10 , err. ref.; Anderson v. Menefee, Tex.Civ.App., 174 S.W. 904 , err. ref. 8. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Jones' Unknown Heirs v. Dorchester
green
1 sentence1964In the ■event of repugnancy, that construction is favored which admits of immediate vesting ■of the entire estate; and when the will, fairly construed, leaves the question in doubt, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the vesting of the title at the earliest possible moment, so as to avoid a conflict with the rule against perpetuities and to uphold the will. 44 Tex.Jur. 737-738, § 172; Jones’ Unknown Heirs v. Dorchester, Tex. Civ.App., 224 S.W. 596 ; Feegles v. Slaughter, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W. 10 , err. ref.; Anderson v. Menefee, Tex.Civ.App., 174 S.W. 904 , err. ref. 8. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Sun Mutual Insurance v. Roberts, Willis & Taylor Co.
green
1 sentence1918We are asked to certify the question considered upon the ground that our decision is in conflict with Blythe v. Crump and Scaling v. Bank, supra. We do not think there is such a conflict under the rule announced in Insurance Co. v. Roberts, supra, as to require this court to certify. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Sumpter v. Carter
green
1 sentence1915See Underhill, on Wills, vol. 2, § 861; Sumpter v. Carter, 115 Ga, 893, 42 S. E. 324 , 60 L. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.