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11 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leuch v. Stategreen2 sentences1986See Leuch v. State, 633 P.2d 1006 , 1013-14 and n. 22 (Alaska 1981) (a probationary sentence is defined as a sentence of sixty days or less. 1986See Leuch v. State, 633 P.2d 1006, 1013-14 (Alaska 1981). | 2 | 2 |
Peetook v. Stategreen2 sentences1984On the other hand, in Peetook v. State, 655 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Alaska App.1982), we held that sentences for first-degree sexual assault under former law should not exceed the six-year presumptive sentence for first offenders using a firearm or causing serious physical injury in the absence of aggravating factors or extraordinary circumstances. 1984In Peetook v. State, 655 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Alaska App.1982), we applied the reasoning of Austin to first-degree sexual assault and indicated that a first offender who does not use a firearm or cause serious physical injury should receive a more favorable sentence than the six-year term prescribed under AS 12.55.-125(c)(1), in the absence of aggravating factors or extraordinary circumstances. | 2 | 2 |
Austin v. Stategreen2 sentences1987Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska App. 1981). 1984See also Willard v. State, 662 P.2d 971, 979-80 (Alaska App.1983); Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska App.1981) (first offenders should not receive sentences in excess of those prescribed for second felony offenders in the absence of aggravating factors or extraordinary circumstances). | 1 | 3 |
Brezenoff v. Stategreen1 sentence1990Later, in Brezenoff v. State, 658 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Alaska App.1983), we held that the presumptive term for a second felony offender constitutes a ceiling on an appropriate sentence for a first felony offender in the absence of aggravating factors, or the kind of extraordinary circumstances that would warrant referral of a second felony offender to a three-judge panel for sentencing. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence1990Id. at 1309-10. | 1 | 1 |
Willard v. Stategreen1 sentence1984See also Willard v. State, 662 P.2d 971, 979-80 (Alaska App.1983); Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska App.1981) (first offenders should not receive sentences in excess of those prescribed for second felony offenders in the absence of aggravating factors or extraordinary circumstances). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gibbs
green
2 sentences2005As we explained in our opinion in this ease, State v. Gibbs, Alaska App. Opinion No.1966, 105 P.3d 145 , 2005 WL 32081 (January 5, 2005), we have repeatedly and consistently construed Alaska’s sentencing statutes as authorizing such a sentence, even in the absence of aggravating factors, so long as the time-to-serve component of the defendant’s sentence does not exceed the presumptive term for a second felony offender. 2005As we explained in our opinion in this case, State v. Gibbs, Alaska App. Opinion No.1966, ___ P.3d ___, 2005 WL 32081 (January 5, 2005), we have repeatedly and consistently construed Alaska's sentencing statutes as authorizing such a sentence, even in the absence of aggravating factors, so long as the time-to-serve component of the defendant's sentence does not exceed the presumptive term for a second felony offender. | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2007On appeal, Active contends that Judge Torrisi, by finding the three aggrava- *366 tors without submitting them to a jury, violated Active's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial as interpreted in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). 2007On appeal, Active contends that Judge Torrisi, by finding the three aggrava- *366 tors without submitting them to a jury, violated Active's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial as interpreted in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Milligrock v. State
green
1 sentence2006Here, for instance, is what we said about this issue in Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11 (Alaska App.2005): Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive sentencing laws are directly affected by the Blakely decision — because, under those laws, if a felony defendant was subject to a presumptive term of imprisonment, the superior court had no authority to increase that term of imprisonment (even by the addition of suspended imprisonment) unless the State proved one or more of the aggravating factors listed in AS 12.55.155(c), or unless the State proved extraordinary circumstances as defined in AS 12.55.165. [[ | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Dayton v. State
green
2 sentences2006And in Dayton, 120 P.3d at 1079-1083 , we upheld the constitutionality of this statute, so construed. 2006Dayton, 120 P.3d at 1078-1080 ; Gibbs, 105 P.3d at 148 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.