Alaska Constitution privilege in Alaska

2025See, e.g., Shortridge v. State, 2013 WL 3322297 , at *3-4 (Alaska App. June 26, 2013) (unpublished) (applying Criminal Rule 16 in the context of a traffic infraction); Rodes v. City of Kenai, 1996 WL 33686482 , at *4 (Alaska App. Feb. 21, 1996) (unpublished) (applying Criminal Rule 16 in the context of city offense for leaving nonoperating vehicle on property). 17 Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alaska 1974); see also State v. Summerville, 948 P.2d 469, 470 (Alaska 1997) (per curiam) (holding that an amendment to the Alaska Criminal Rules requiring reciprocal discovery violated the Alaska C

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

2012Instead, the challengers argued, witnesses would be fully protected only if they received "transactional" immunity-which is traditionally defined as "absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense[s] to which the [witness's compelled testimony] relates". 14 In State v. Gonzalez (Gonzalez I), 825 P.2d 920, 936 (Alaska App.1992), this Court held that a witness's immunity from the use and derivative use of their compelled testimony was not sufficient to fully protect them from the danger of self-incrimination-and that, for this reason, when a witness validly invoked the Alaska Const

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

1997Sehwin based his motion to dismiss primarily on State v. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993), in which the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination to require that transactional immunity be given before the state can compel an unwilling witness to testify.

2026First, as a substantive matter, as we previously noted, Rumph has never argued that the Alaska Constitution requires an exception to the no-impeachment 73 Id. at 1177, 1180 . 74 Id. at 1178 . 75 Id. at 1180 . 76 Id. at 1181 . 77 Id. at 1182 . – 31 – 2826 rule that is broader than Peña-Rodriguez and encompasses claims of implicit bias.

2026First, as a substantive matter, as we previously noted, Rumph has never argued that the Alaska Constitution requires an exception to the no-impeachment 73 Id. at 1177, 1180 . 74 Id. at 1178 . 75 Id. at 1180 . 76 Id. at 1181 . 77 Id. at 1182 . – 31 – 2826 rule that is broader than Peña-Rodriguez and encompasses claims of implicit bias.

2025See, e.g., Shortridge v. State, 2013 WL 3322297 , at *3-4 (Alaska App. June 26, 2013) (unpublished) (applying Criminal Rule 16 in the context of a traffic infraction); Rodes v. City of Kenai, 1996 WL 33686482 , at *4 (Alaska App. Feb. 21, 1996) (unpublished) (applying Criminal Rule 16 in the context of city offense for leaving nonoperating vehicle on property). 17 Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alaska 1974); see also State v. Summerville, 948 P.2d 469, 470 (Alaska 1997) (per curiam) (holding that an amendment to the Alaska Criminal Rules requiring reciprocal discovery violated the Alaska C

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

2005Compare Vogler I, 651 P.2d 1 (holding unconstitutional under the Alaska Constitution a requirement that independent candidates submit petitions with signatures of three percent of the vote cast at the last election in order to be placed on the general election ballot) with Jenness v. *1061 Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 , 91 S.Ct. 1970 , 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (finding constitutional under the United States Constitution a requirement that independent candidates submit petitions with signatures of at least five percent of eligible voters in order to be placed on the general election ballot). 34 .

2005Compare Vogler I, 651 P.2d 1 (holding unconstitutional under the Alaska Constitution a requirement that independent candidates submit petitions with signatures of three percent of the vote cast at the last election in order to be placed on the general election ballot) with Jenness v. *1061 Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 , 91 S.Ct. 1970 , 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (finding constitutional under the United States Constitution a requirement that independent candidates submit petitions with signatures of at least five percent of eligible voters in order to be placed on the general election ballot). 34 .

2005Compare Vogler I, 651 P.2d 1 (holding unconstitutional under the Alaska Constitution a requirement that independent candidates submit petitions with signatures of three percent of the vote cast at the last election in order to be placed on the general election ballot) with Jenness v. *1061 Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 , 91 S.Ct. 1970 , 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (finding constitutional under the United States Constitution a requirement that independent candidates submit petitions with signatures of at least five percent of eligible voters in order to be placed on the general election ballot). 34 .