11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Berman v. RCA Auto Corp.green1 sentence2016(Berman v. RCA Auto Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 321, 325 [termination through the immunity of the litigation privilege constitutes a favorable termination].) Regarding Silva’s claim for unfair business practices, Siciliano asserted that he was protected by the agent immunity rule and that he could not commit an unfair business practice against a nonclient by settling a matter on his own client’s behalf. | 1 | 1 |
Panoutsopoulos v. Chamblissgreen2 sentences2010(See Panoutsopoulos v. Chambliss (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 297, 304 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 ] [“the exceptions in section 1714.10, subdivision (c) have the effect of exempting any viable attorney-client claims from section 1714.10’s requirements”]; Pavicich, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 395 [“[W]hen an attorney is acting in his or her official capacity, there are only the situations articulated in Doctors’ Co., in which an attorney could be liable for conspiring with his or her client. 2010(See Panoutsopoulos v. Chambliss (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 297, 304 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 ] [“the exceptions in section 1714.10, subdivision (c) have the effect of exempting any viable attorney-client claims from section 1714.10’s requirements”]; Pavicich, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 395 [“[W]hen an attorney is acting in his or her official capacity, there are only the situations articulated in Doctors’ Co., in which an attorney could be liable for conspiring with his or her client. | 1 | 1 |
Royal Insurance v. Amerford Air Cargogreen1 sentence2003(Reed v. Wiser (2d Cir. 1977) 555 F.2d 1079 , 1092, 38 A.L.R.Fed. 928 [carrier’s employees are protected]; Royal Ins. v. Amerford Air Cargo (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 654 F.Supp. 679, 682 [a carrier’s agent may claim the protection of the limitation of liability provision]; Kemper Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Howell v. Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc.green2 sentences1993(See Howell v. Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 391, 401 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 33 ].) Although a principal is liable for die torts of an agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “for this liability to be *1589 imposed on the innocent principal, the agent’s tort must have been committed during the course and scope of his employment. [Citation.]” (Shultz Steel Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 513, 518 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 715 ].) We conclude that as a matter of law, the type and extent of activities that REPCO engaged in at the cancha were not enough to con 1993(See Howell v. Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 391, 401 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 33 ].) Although a principal is liable for die torts of an agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “for this liability to be *1589 imposed on the innocent principal, the agent’s tort must have been committed during the course and scope of his employment. [Citation.]” (Shultz Steel Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 513, 518 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 715 ].) We conclude that as a matter of law, the type and extent of activities that REPCO engaged in at the cancha were not enough to con | 1 | 1 |
Shultz Steel Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.green2 sentences1993(See Howell v. Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 391, 401 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 33 ].) Although a principal is liable for die torts of an agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “for this liability to be *1589 imposed on the innocent principal, the agent’s tort must have been committed during the course and scope of his employment. [Citation.]” (Shultz Steel Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 513, 518 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 715 ].) We conclude that as a matter of law, the type and extent of activities that REPCO engaged in at the cancha were not enough to con 1993(See Howell v. Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 391, 401 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 33 ].) Although a principal is liable for die torts of an agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “for this liability to be *1589 imposed on the innocent principal, the agent’s tort must have been committed during the course and scope of his employment. [Citation.]” (Shultz Steel Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 513, 518 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 715 ].) We conclude that as a matter of law, the type and extent of activities that REPCO engaged in at the cancha were not enough to con | 1 | 1 |
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Associationgreen2 sentences1963Plaintiffs claim to have relied, in forming their opinion, upon such cases as Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812-813 [ 122 P.2d 892 ], and Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 183 P.2d 4 ], to the effect that a judgment in favor of an agent is a bar to an action against the principal. 1963Plaintiffs claim to have relied, in forming their opinion, upon such cases as Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812-813 [ 122 P.2d 892 ], and Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 183 P.2d 4 ], to the effect that a judgment in favor of an agent is a bar to an action against the principal. | 1 | 1 |
Freeman v. Churchillgreen2 sentences1963Plaintiffs claim to have relied, in forming their opinion, upon such cases as Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812-813 [ 122 P.2d 892 ], and Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 183 P.2d 4 ], to the effect that a judgment in favor of an agent is a bar to an action against the principal. 1963Plaintiffs claim to have relied, in forming their opinion, upon such cases as Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812-813 [ 122 P.2d 892 ], and Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 183 P.2d 4 ], to the effect that a judgment in favor of an agent is a bar to an action against the principal. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corporation
green
2 sentences1998In Tomka, the Second Circuit rejected ‘a narrow, literal reading of the agent clause’ which implied ‘that an employer’s agent is a statutory employer for purposes of liability.’ Instead, on ‘a broader consideration’ of the purposes of Title VII, Tomka found that the ‘agent’ language was intended as a simple expression of respondeat superior liability. ( 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 .) “Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp. [(4th Cir. 1994)] 30 F.3d 507 was an ADEA case. 1998It noted that, since 1993, eight federal circuits have either (1) held that the "agent" language does not create individual liability for discrimination, or (2) found that, although individuals can be sued in their official or representative capacity, they may not be sued in their individual capacity and have no personal liability, or (3) interpreted similar language in a state statute as not creating individual liability. ( Janken, supra, 46 Cal. App.4th at p. 67 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 .) The court discussed these circuit decisions individually. " Tomka v. Seiler Corp. (2d Cir.1995) 66 F.3d 129 | 2 | 1996–1998 |
Carole Tomka v. The Seiler Corporation, Daniel Lucey, David Polonsky and Timothy Conroy
green
2 sentences1998It noted that, since 1993, eight federal circuits have either (1) held that the "agent" language does not create individual liability for discrimination, or (2) found that, although individuals can be sued in their official or representative capacity, they may not be sued in their individual capacity and have no personal liability, or (3) interpreted similar language in a state statute as not creating individual liability. ( Janken, supra, 46 Cal. App.4th at p. 67 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 .) The court discussed these circuit decisions individually. " Tomka v. Seiler Corp. (2d Cir.1995) 66 F.3d 129 1998It noted that, since 1993, eight federal circuits have either (1) held that the "agent" language does not create individual liability for discrimination, or (2) found that, although individuals can be sued in their official or representative capacity, they may not be sued in their individual capacity and have no personal liability, or (3) interpreted similar language in a state statute as not creating individual liability. ( Janken, supra, 46 Cal. App.4th at p. 67 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 .) The court discussed these circuit decisions individually. " Tomka v. Seiler Corp. (2d Cir.1995) 66 F.3d 129 | 2 | 1996–1998 |
Laswell v. Ag Seal Beach, LLC
green
1 sentence2023Because Hernandez can compel arbitration, he is not a third party within the meaning of section 1281.2(c). ( Laswell, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1405–1406; Molecular Analytical, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 709 .) The arbitration agreement at issue here is very broadly worded, requiring arbitration of “any and all claims between [Tam] and the Dealership (or its parent or subsidiary companies, owners, directors, officers, managers, employees, agents, and parties affiliated with its employee benefit and health plans) arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoeve | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Because Hernandez can compel arbitration, he is not a third party within the meaning of section 1281.2(c). ( Laswell, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1405–1406; Molecular Analytical, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 709 .) The arbitration agreement at issue here is very broadly worded, requiring arbitration of “any and all claims between [Tam] and the Dealership (or its parent or subsidiary companies, owners, directors, officers, managers, employees, agents, and parties affiliated with its employee benefit and health plans) arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoeve | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Wise v. Southern Pacific Co.
green
1 sentence2015As described by the California Supreme Court in Applied Equipment, this rule provides that “duly acting agents and employees cannot be held liable for conspiring with their own principals (the ‘agent’s immunity rule’).” (Applied Equipment, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 512 .) The court explained the rule further in footnote 4: “The agent’s immunity rule emanates from a … holding in Wise [v. Southern Pacific Co. (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 50, 72 ] that: ‘Agents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacities on behalf of | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.
green
1 sentence2015As described by the California Supreme Court in Applied Equipment, this rule provides that “duly acting agents and employees cannot be held liable for conspiring with their own principals (the ‘agent’s immunity rule’).” (Applied Equipment, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 512 .) The court explained the rule further in footnote 4: “The agent’s immunity rule emanates from a … holding in Wise [v. Southern Pacific Co. (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 50, 72 ] that: ‘Agents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacities on behalf of | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Reed v. Wiser
green
1 sentence2003(Reed v. Wiser (2d Cir. 1977) 555 F.2d 1079 , 1092, 38 A.L.R.Fed. 928 [carrier’s employees are protected]; Royal Ins. v. Amerford Air Cargo (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 654 F.Supp. 679, 682 [a carrier’s agent may claim the protection of the limitation of liability provision]; Kemper Ins. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics
green
2 sentences1998It noted that, since 1993, eight federal circuits have either (1) held that the "agent" language does not create individual liability for discrimination, or (2) found that, although individuals can be sued in their official or representative capacity, they may not be sued in their individual capacity and have no personal liability, or (3) interpreted similar language in a state statute as not creating individual liability. ( Janken, supra, 46 Cal. App.4th at p. 67 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 .) The court discussed these circuit decisions individually. " Tomka v. Seiler Corp. (2d Cir.1995) 66 F.3d 129 1998It noted that, since 1993, eight federal circuits have either (1) held that the "agent" language does not create individual liability for discrimination, or (2) found that, although individuals can be sued in their official or representative capacity, they may not be sued in their individual capacity and have no personal liability, or (3) interpreted similar language in a state statute as not creating individual liability. ( Janken, supra, 46 Cal. App.4th at p. 67 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 .) The court discussed these circuit decisions individually. " Tomka v. Seiler Corp. (2d Cir.1995) 66 F.3d 129 | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Sayadoff v. Warda
green
2 sentences1963It is further claimed that plaintiffs thought Sayadoff v. Warda (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 626 [ 271 P.2d 140 ], to the effect that an “action for damages resulting from the acts of conspirators may be maintained against a single defendant,” (S ousa v. Capital Co., supra, 202 Cal.App.2d 221, 224 ) was inapplicable. 1963It is further claimed that plaintiffs thought Sayadoff v. Warda (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 626 [ 271 P.2d 140 ], to the effect that an “action for damages resulting from the acts of conspirators may be maintained against a single defendant,” (S ousa v. Capital Co., supra, 202 Cal.App.2d 221, 224 ) was inapplicable. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Sousa v. Capital Co.
green
1 sentence1963It is further claimed that plaintiffs thought Sayadoff v. Warda (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 626 [ 271 P.2d 140 ], to the effect that an “action for damages resulting from the acts of conspirators may be maintained against a single defendant,” (S ousa v. Capital Co., supra, 202 Cal.App.2d 221, 224 ) was inapplicable. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
French v. Rishell
green
2 sentences1957French v. Rishell (1953), 40 Cal.2d 477 [ 254 P.2d 26 ], where an action by an agent was held to bar subsequent action by the principals. 1957French v. Rishell (1953), 40 Cal.2d 477 [ 254 P.2d 26 ], where an action by an agent was held to bar subsequent action by the principals. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Von Arx v. City of Burlingame
green
2 sentences1956They are joint tort feasors in two respects: first, under the doctrine of respondeat superior the county is responsible for the torts of its officers in this regard occurring in the scope of their employment. 5 (See Von Arx v. City of Burlingame, 16 Cal.App.2d 29 [ 60 P.2d 305 ], holding that the liability of the sovereignty under the then section 171414, Civil Code (liability of owner of a public automobile) is that of a joint tort feasor with the agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior.) Secondly, the county had an independent duty through its other officers *451 to take care of dang 1956They are joint tort feasors in two respects: first, under the doctrine of respondeat superior the county is responsible for the torts of its officers in this regard occurring in the scope of their employment. 5 (See Von Arx v. City of Burlingame, 16 Cal.App.2d 29 [ 60 P.2d 305 ], holding that the liability of the sovereignty under the then section 171414, Civil Code (liability of owner of a public automobile) is that of a joint tort feasor with the agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior.) Secondly, the county had an independent duty through its other officers *451 to take care of dang | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.