Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1950–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Susser Estategreen2 sentences2017As an agent of the principle, the entity acting under a power of attorney has “the duty not to compete with the principal on his own account or for another in matters relating to the subject matter of the agency, and the duty to deal fairly with the principal in all transactions between them.’ ” Id. at 235 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2017As an agent of the principle, the entity acting under a power of attorney has “the duty not to compete with the principal on his own account or for another in matters relating to the subject matter of the agency, and the duty to deal fairly with the principal in all transactions between them.’ ” Id. at 235 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Carole Tomka v. The Seiler Corporation, Daniel Lucey, David Polonsky and Timothy Conroygreen2 sentences2005Similarly, in Tomka v Seiler Corp, 66 F3d 1295, 1314 (CA 2, 1995), the Second Circuit ruled individual liability was not available under Title VII even though what it grudgingly referred to as “a narrow, literal reading of the agent clause” in Title VII “does imply that an employer’s agent is a statutory employer for purposes of [Title VII] liability....” As in Wathen, the Second Circuit went on to read Title VII not on the basis of its language, but on the basis of what it viewed as the real “intentions of the legislators.” Justice Weaver states in her dissent that our holding may be a “shall 2005Similarly, in Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (C.A.2, 1995), the Second Circuit ruled individual liability was not available under Title VII even though what it grudgingly referred to as "a narrow, literal reading of the agent clause" in Title VII "does imply that an employer's agent is a statutory employer for purposes of [Title VII] liability . . . ." As in Wathen, the Second Circuit went on to read Title VII not on the basis of its language, but on the basis of what it viewed as the real "intentions of the legislators." [20] Justice Weaver states in her dissent that our holding ma | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Cummin Estate
green
2 sentences2017“Common-law agency principles, which generally apply to powers of attorney, permit an agent to personally engage in a transaction with the principle with consent of the principal after a full disclosure of the details of the transaction.” In re Estate of Cummin, 258 Mich App 402, 407-408 ; 671 NW2d 165 (2003). 2017“Common-law agency principles, which generally apply to powers of attorney, permit an agent to personally engage in a transaction with the principle with consent of the principal after a full disclosure of the details of the transaction.” In re Estate of Cummin, 258 Mich App 402, 407-408 ; 671 NW2d 165 (2003). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Dodge v. Blood
green
2 sentences1984If he does not do this, it may well be presumed that he intended to make himself personally responsible.” In Dodge, supra, p 377 , the Court quoted the following: " 'The inference of an understanding that the agent is a party to the contract exists unless the agent gives such complete information concerning his principal’s identity that he can be readily distinguished. 1959If he does not do this, it may well be presumed that he intended to make himself personally responsible.’ ” Related Michigan cases of interest are Newberry v. Slafter, 98 Mich 468 ; Dodge v. Blood, 299 Mich 364 ( 138 ALR 322 ); and Storm v. Eldridge, 336 Mich 424 . | 2 | 1959–1984 |
Harts v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2023The majority’s error comes in its application of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Harts v Farmers Ins Exch, 461 Mich 1 ; 597 NW2d 47 (1999), to an independent agent despite the fact that the agent in Harts was a captive agent and a fiduciary of the insurer rather than the insured. 2023The majority’s error comes in its application of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Harts v Farmers Ins Exch, 461 Mich 1 ; 597 NW2d 47 (1999), to an independent agent despite the fact that the agent in Harts was a captive agent and a fiduciary of the insurer rather than the insured. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Alar v. Mercy Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences2001Alar v Mercy Memorial Hosp, 208 Mich App 518, 528 ; 529 NW2d 318 (1995). 2001Alar v Mercy Memorial Hosp, 208 Mich App 518, 528 ; 529 NW2d 318 (1995). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Newberry v. Slafter
green
1 sentence1959If he does not do this, it may well be presumed that he intended to make himself personally responsible.’ ” Related Michigan cases of interest are Newberry v. Slafter, 98 Mich 468 ; Dodge v. Blood, 299 Mich 364 ( 138 ALR 322 ); and Storm v. Eldridge, 336 Mich 424 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Storm v. Eldridge
green
1 sentence1959If he does not do this, it may well be presumed that he intended to make himself personally responsible.’ ” Related Michigan cases of interest are Newberry v. Slafter, 98 Mich 468 ; Dodge v. Blood, 299 Mich 364 ( 138 ALR 322 ); and Storm v. Eldridge, 336 Mich 424 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Young v. Masci
green
2 sentences1950Likewise, in Young v. Masci, 289 US 253 ( 53 S Ct 599 ; 77 L ed 1158, 88 ALR 170 ), the court, in upholding a similar New York statute regulating the use of highways by nonresident motorists, said: “The power of the State to protect itself and its inhabitants is not limited by the scope of the doctrine of principal and agent.” *665 Inasmuch, therefore, as the so-called agency brought into being under the statute rests not upon any common-law doctrine of contract or principal and agent, but, rather upon the inherent police power of the State, no sound reason appears for holding that such agency 1950Likewise, in Young v. Masci, 289 US 253 ( 53 S Ct 599 ; 77 L ed 1158, 88 ALR 170 ), the court, in upholding a similar New York statute regulating the use of highways by nonresident motorists, said: “The power of the State to protect itself and its inhabitants is not limited by the scope of the doctrine of principal and agent.” *665 Inasmuch, therefore, as the so-called agency brought into being under the statute rests not upon any common-law doctrine of contract or principal and agent, but, rather upon the inherent police power of the State, no sound reason appears for holding that such agency | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.