11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1863–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Browngreen2 sentences1996(People v. Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746, 763-764 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 , 883 P.2d 949 ].) Christopher M., who evidenced a thorough understanding of the oath and the requirement to testify truthfully, testified that on October 9, 1994, he was at the beach with his family. 1996(People v. Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746, 763-764 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 , 883 P.2d 949 ].) Christopher M., who evidenced a thorough understanding of the oath and the requirement to testify truthfully, testified that on October 9, 1994, he was at the beach with his family. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bert Samuel Stefansongreen1 sentence1990(See United States v. Stefanson (9th Cir. 1981) 648 F.2d 1231, 1235 [rule applied where the magistrate issued a telephonic search warrant but failed to give the oath before the testimony and failed to record the oath as required by rule 41]; United States v. Johnson (9th Cir. 1981) 660 F.2d 749, 753 [federal agents obtained a telephonic warrant from a state magistrate rather than a federal magistrate as required for telephonic warrants under rule 41]; United States v. Loyd (11th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 331, 332-333 [federal magistrate failed to certify the accuracy of a transcription of an oral af | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Richard Gene Johnson, Patricia Stern Maggs, Allen Eugene Vanecek, Vickie Lynette Winter, Whose True Name Is, Dawn A. Goodheadgreen1 sentence1990(See United States v. Stefanson (9th Cir. 1981) 648 F.2d 1231, 1235 [rule applied where the magistrate issued a telephonic search warrant but failed to give the oath before the testimony and failed to record the oath as required by rule 41]; United States v. Johnson (9th Cir. 1981) 660 F.2d 749, 753 [federal agents obtained a telephonic warrant from a state magistrate rather than a federal magistrate as required for telephonic warrants under rule 41]; United States v. Loyd (11th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 331, 332-333 [federal magistrate failed to certify the accuracy of a transcription of an oral af | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David Loyd, William Harrison Hood, A/K/A Wayne Tabone, A/K/A Billie Wooten, Donald Lewis Canup, James Douglas Humegreen1 sentence1990(See United States v. Stefanson (9th Cir. 1981) 648 F.2d 1231, 1235 [rule applied where the magistrate issued a telephonic search warrant but failed to give the oath before the testimony and failed to record the oath as required by rule 41]; United States v. Johnson (9th Cir. 1981) 660 F.2d 749, 753 [federal agents obtained a telephonic warrant from a state magistrate rather than a federal magistrate as required for telephonic warrants under rule 41]; United States v. Loyd (11th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 331, 332-333 [federal magistrate failed to certify the accuracy of a transcription of an oral af | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alberto Rittergreen1 sentence1990(See United States v. Stefanson (9th Cir. 1981) 648 F.2d 1231, 1235 [rule applied where the magistrate issued a telephonic search warrant but failed to give the oath before the testimony and failed to record the oath as required by rule 41]; United States v. Johnson (9th Cir. 1981) 660 F.2d 749, 753 [federal agents obtained a telephonic warrant from a state magistrate rather than a federal magistrate as required for telephonic warrants under rule 41]; United States v. Loyd (11th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 331, 332-333 [federal magistrate failed to certify the accuracy of a transcription of an oral af | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William Rhys Comstockgreen1 sentence1990(See United States v. Stefanson (9th Cir. 1981) 648 F.2d 1231, 1235 [rule applied where the magistrate issued a telephonic search warrant but failed to give the oath before the testimony and failed to record the oath as required by rule 41]; United States v. Johnson (9th Cir. 1981) 660 F.2d 749, 753 [federal agents obtained a telephonic warrant from a state magistrate rather than a federal magistrate as required for telephonic warrants under rule 41]; United States v. Loyd (11th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 331, 332-333 [federal magistrate failed to certify the accuracy of a transcription of an oral af | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Louis Lukgreen1 sentence1990(See United States v. Stefanson (9th Cir. 1981) 648 F.2d 1231, 1235 [rule applied where the magistrate issued a telephonic search warrant but failed to give the oath before the testimony and failed to record the oath as required by rule 41]; United States v. Johnson (9th Cir. 1981) 660 F.2d 749, 753 [federal agents obtained a telephonic warrant from a state magistrate rather than a federal magistrate as required for telephonic warrants under rule 41]; United States v. Loyd (11th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 331, 332-333 [federal magistrate failed to certify the accuracy of a transcription of an oral af | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chavezgreen2 sentences1985(People v. Chavez (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 215, 226-227 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 306 ]; People v. Menchaca (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1025 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 691 ].) In Menchaca , the Second District Court of Appeal held the failure to administer such an oath to a defense interpreter is fatal to the constitutional effectiveness of an interpreter. 1985(People v. Chavez (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 215, 226-227 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 306 ]; People v. Menchaca (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1025 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 691 ].) In Menchaca , the Second District Court of Appeal held the failure to administer such an oath to a defense interpreter is fatal to the constitutional effectiveness of an interpreter. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Menchacagreen2 sentences1985(People v. Chavez (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 215, 226-227 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 306 ]; People v. Menchaca (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1025 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 691 ].) In Menchaca , the Second District Court of Appeal held the failure to administer such an oath to a defense interpreter is fatal to the constitutional effectiveness of an interpreter. 1985(People v. Chavez (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 215, 226-227 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 306 ]; People v. Menchaca (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1025 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 691 ].) In Menchaca , the Second District Court of Appeal held the failure to administer such an oath to a defense interpreter is fatal to the constitutional effectiveness of an interpreter. | 1 | 1 |
Richard M. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1984(Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 377 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 482 P.2d 664 ].) Section 751 provides that “[a]n interpreter shall take an oath . . . .” (Italics added.) The oath requirement is nondiscretionary. 1984(Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 377 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 482 P.2d 664 ].) Section 751 provides that “[a]n interpreter shall take an oath . . . .” (Italics added.) The oath requirement is nondiscretionary. | 1 | 1 |
Buck Wilcoxon v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1984Rules Evid., rule 604, where no objection was made to interpreter not being sworn; see also Wilcoxon v. United States (10th Cir. 1956) 231 F.2d 384, 386-387 , cert. den. (1956) 351 U.S. 943 [ 100 L.Ed. 1469 , 76 S.Ct. 834 ]; Beausoliel v. United States (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Fannin v. Jonesgreen1 sentence1984Rules Evid., rule 604, where no objection was made to interpreter not being sworn; see also Wilcoxon v. United States (10th Cir. 1956) 231 F.2d 384, 386-387 , cert. den. (1956) 351 U.S. 943 [ 100 L.Ed. 1469 , 76 S.Ct. 834 ]; Beausoliel v. United States (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Armstronggreen1 sentence1984Rules Evid., rule 604, where no objection was made to interpreter not being sworn; see also Wilcoxon v. United States (10th Cir. 1956) 231 F.2d 384, 386-387 , cert. den. (1956) 351 U.S. 943 [ 100 L.Ed. 1469 , 76 S.Ct. 834 ]; Beausoliel v. United States (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Wilcoxson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1984Rules Evid., rule 604, where no objection was made to interpreter not being sworn; see also Wilcoxon v. United States (10th Cir. 1956) 231 F.2d 384, 386-387 , cert. den. (1956) 351 U.S. 943 [ 100 L.Ed. 1469 , 76 S.Ct. 834 ]; Beausoliel v. United States (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Morrison v. State Board of Educationgreen2 sentences1978(Cf. Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 224-225 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 175 , 461 P.2d 375 ].) I would focus instead upon the relationship of the offense to the attorney’s fitness to practice law. 1978(Cf. Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 224-225 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 175 , 461 P.2d 375 ].) I would focus instead upon the relationship of the offense to the attorney’s fitness to practice law. | 1 | 1 |
Veterans' Welfare Board v. Rileygreen2 sentences1957(See Allied Architects’ Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [ 221 P. 209 , 30 A.L.R. 1029 ] ; Veterans’ Welfare Board v. Riley, 188 Cal. 607, 611 [ 206 P. 631 ].) In the case of First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, above referred to, it was held that the pursuit of such objectives by the state through the means employed in the constitutional amendment and implementing legislation does not in any way violate the right of free speech; that the classifications imposed are reasonable and proper; that they do not violate any constitutional provision, and that the oath requiremen 1957(See Allied Architects’ Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [ 221 P. 209 , 30 A.L.R. 1029 ] ; Veterans’ Welfare Board v. Riley, 188 Cal. 607, 611 [ 206 P. 631 ].) In the case of First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, above referred to, it was held that the pursuit of such objectives by the state through the means employed in the constitutional amendment and implementing legislation does not in any way violate the right of free speech; that the classifications imposed are reasonable and proper; that they do not violate any constitutional provision, and that the oath requiremen | 1 | 1 |
Daeche v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1955(Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 [ 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. __ ].) Corroborative evidence is sufficient “if it touches the corpus delicti in the sense of the injury against whose occurrence the law is directed and is of a type which goes to fortify the truthfulness of the confession.” (Ibid. p. __ [99 L.Ed.], Daeche v. United States, *397 250 F. 566, 571 [ 162 C.C.A. 582 ].) The friendly relationship of appellant and Cuevas; the availability of appellant to participate in the social celebrations of his landlord; their inclinations to drink together at the same fountain and to inhale the inc 1955(Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 [ 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. __ ].) Corroborative evidence is sufficient “if it touches the corpus delicti in the sense of the injury against whose occurrence the law is directed and is of a type which goes to fortify the truthfulness of the confession.” (Ibid. p. __ [99 L.Ed.], Daeche v. United States, *397 250 F. 566, 571 [ 162 C.C.A. 582 ].) The friendly relationship of appellant and Cuevas; the availability of appellant to participate in the social celebrations of his landlord; their inclinations to drink together at the same fountain and to inhale the inc | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Levin v. Ligon
green
1 sentence2023“It is elementary that points raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered by the court.” (Levin v. Ligon, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486 .) Consequently, we will not address whether, 16. in the circumstances of this case, the trial court had a sua sponte9 obligation to hold a confirmation hearing to determine whether the receiver complied with section 567. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Mooc
green
2 sentences2011In Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1216 , the court concluded that the custodian of records who appears at the hearing is not required to produce the peace officer’s entire personnel file for the trial court’s review, but rather need only bring “those documents in [the officer’s] file that were potentially responsive to [the] defendant’s specific request.” (Id. at p. 1230.) The court added, however, that “if the custodian has any doubt whether a particular document is relevant, he or she should present it to the trial court.” (Id. at p. 1229.) Moreover, “[t]he custodian should be prepared to state in 2011In Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1216 , the court concluded that the custodian of records who appears at the hearing is not required to produce the peace officer’s entire personnel file for the trial court’s review, but rather need only bring “those documents in [the officer’s] file that were potentially responsive to [the] defendant’s specific request.” (Id. at p. 1230.) The court added, however, that “if the custodian has any doubt whether a particular document is relevant, he or she should present it to the trial court.” (Id. at p. 1229.) Moreover, “[t]he custodian should be prepared to state in | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Carreon
green
2 sentences1985(Ibid.) In People v. Carreon (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 559 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 843 ], this court disagreed, holding the failure to do so may be waived by lack of objection and that an oath is not required unless testimony is contemplated. 1985(Ibid.) In People v. Carreon (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 559 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 843 ], this court disagreed, holding the failure to do so may be waived by lack of objection and that an oath is not required unless testimony is contemplated. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Beausoliel v. United States
green
1 sentence1984Cir. 1939) 107 F.2d 292, 294 .) The Perez court made an additional perceptive observation as to why a waiver of the oath requirement may exist where interpreters are involved: “If this [waiver] be true of a witness, one who may and often does have an interest in the outcome of the trial and who may therefore require the admonition of an oath ‘in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind’ with his duty to tell the truth, how much more so of an interpreter. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
United States v. Salvador E. Perez
green
1 sentence1984(United States v. Perez (5th Cir. 1981) 651 F.2d 268, 272-273 , waiver of the oath requirement of Fed. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Allied Architects' Ass'n of Los Angeles v. Payne
green
2 sentences1957(See Allied Architects’ Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [ 221 P. 209 , 30 A.L.R. 1029 ] ; Veterans’ Welfare Board v. Riley, 188 Cal. 607, 611 [ 206 P. 631 ].) In the case of First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, above referred to, it was held that the pursuit of such objectives by the state through the means employed in the constitutional amendment and implementing legislation does not in any way violate the right of free speech; that the classifications imposed are reasonable and proper; that they do not violate any constitutional provision, and that the oath requiremen 1957(See Allied Architects’ Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [ 221 P. 209 , 30 A.L.R. 1029 ] ; Veterans’ Welfare Board v. Riley, 188 Cal. 607, 611 [ 206 P. 631 ].) In the case of First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, above referred to, it was held that the pursuit of such objectives by the state through the means employed in the constitutional amendment and implementing legislation does not in any way violate the right of free speech; that the classifications imposed are reasonable and proper; that they do not violate any constitutional provision, and that the oath requiremen | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opper v. United States
green
2 sentences1955(Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 [ 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. __ ].) Corroborative evidence is sufficient “if it touches the corpus delicti in the sense of the injury against whose occurrence the law is directed and is of a type which goes to fortify the truthfulness of the confession.” (Ibid. p. __ [99 L.Ed.], Daeche v. United States, *397 250 F. 566, 571 [ 162 C.C.A. 582 ].) The friendly relationship of appellant and Cuevas; the availability of appellant to participate in the social celebrations of his landlord; their inclinations to drink together at the same fountain and to inhale the inc 1955(Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 [ 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. __ ].) Corroborative evidence is sufficient “if it touches the corpus delicti in the sense of the injury against whose occurrence the law is directed and is of a type which goes to fortify the truthfulness of the confession.” (Ibid. p. __ [99 L.Ed.], Daeche v. United States, *397 250 F. 566, 571 [ 162 C.C.A. 582 ].) The friendly relationship of appellant and Cuevas; the availability of appellant to participate in the social celebrations of his landlord; their inclinations to drink together at the same fountain and to inhale the inc | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Marbury v. Madison
green
1 sentence1952"Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." ( Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 .) It is admitted by the majority that the two early cases of Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 and Bradley v. Clark, 133 Cal. 196 [ 65 P. 395 ], held that the question involved in litigation of this sort was whether the Legislature had, in prescribing an oath, gone "beyond the intent, objec | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Cohen v. Wright
green
1 sentence1952"Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." ( Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 .) It is admitted by the majority that the two early cases of Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 and Bradley v. Clark, 133 Cal. 196 [ 65 P. 395 ], held that the question involved in litigation of this sort was whether the Legislature had, in prescribing an oath, gone "beyond the intent, objec | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Bradley v. Clark
green
2 sentences1952"Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." ( Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 .) It is admitted by the majority that the two early cases of Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 and Bradley v. Clark, 133 Cal. 196 [ 65 P. 395 ], held that the question involved in litigation of this sort was whether the Legislature had, in prescribing an oath, gone "beyond the intent, objec 1952"Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." ( Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 .) It is admitted by the majority that the two early cases of Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 and Bradley v. Clark, 133 Cal. 196 [ 65 P. 395 ], held that the question involved in litigation of this sort was whether the Legislature had, in prescribing an oath, gone "beyond the intent, objec | 1 | 1952–1952 |
People ex rel. Smith v. Judge of the Twelfth District
green
1 sentence1863(People v. Judge of the Twelfth District, 17 Cal. 547 .) “ It has been repeatedly held that to warrant the Courts in setting aside a law as unconstitutional, the case must be so clear that no reasonable doubt can be said to exist.” (Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law, 592.) “ It is not on shght imphcation and vague conjecture that the Legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered void.” (Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128 .) The first point to determine is, whether this act does impose an oath or test substantiaEy differing from that prescribed by the | 1 | 1863–1863 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.