oath requirement in Texas

2025“Normally, an attorney’s statements must be under oath to be considered evidence.” Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997). “[H]owever, the opponent of the testimony can waive the oath requirement by failing to object when the opponent knows or should know that an objection is necessary.” Id.

2025“Normally, an attorney’s statements must be under oath to be considered evidence.” Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997). “[H]owever, the opponent of the testimony can waive the oath requirement by failing to object when the opponent knows or should know that an objection is necessary.” Id.

2024Op. at 12. 7 Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005). 8 Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997) (noting the oath requirement may be waived by the failure to object when the opponent of the testimony knows or should know an objection is necessary). 9 Mathis, 166 S.W.3d at 745 (considering attorney’s statements as evidence in the context of explaining why the attorney failed to appear); Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 451 (Tex. 1997) (explaining why the attorney exercised preemptory strikes).

2024Op. at 12. 7 Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005). 8 Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997) (noting the oath requirement may be waived by the failure to object when the opponent of the testimony knows or should know an objection is necessary). 9 Mathis, 166 S.W.3d at 745 (considering attorney’s statements as evidence in the context of explaining why the attorney failed to appear); Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 451 (Tex. 1997) (explaining why the attorney exercised preemptory strikes).

2014Druery v. State, 412 S.W.3d 523, 532-33 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (citing Ex parte Golden, 991 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)). “[Njothing in Article 11.14 indicates it was intended to limit the jurisdiction of this Court to consider [a habeas] application not in compliance with the oath requirement or any of its other requisites....

2013See, e.g., Ex parte Golden, 991 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“[N]othing in Article 11.14 indicates it was intended to limit the jurisdiction of this Court to consider [a habeas] application not in compliance with the oath requirement or any of its other requisites....

2002According to appellant, the oath requirement is a mere Amagic words@ formality, and is irrelevant to whether his trial by the second jury violated his Fifth Amendment right. 3 This Court has emphasized that Athe critical question is not whether the defendant raised the double jeopardy issue in the trial court, but whether the record before the appellate court clearly reflects a double jeopardy violation.@ Duvall v. State, 59 S.W.3d 773, 777 (Tex. App.CAustin 2001, pet. ref=d).

2002This Court has emphasized that “the critical question is not whether the defendant raised the double jeopardy issue in the trial court, but whether the record before the appellate court clearly reflects a double jeopardy violation.” Duvall v. State, 59 S.W.3d 773, 777 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. refd).

2021Co. v. Davilla, 139 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (“Although an attorney’s statements must be under oath to be considered evidence, the opponent of the testimony can waive the oath requirement by failing to object when an objection is necessary.” (citing Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997))); see also Anderson v. Safeway Tom Thumb, No. 02-18- 00113-CV, 2019 WL 2223582 , at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 23, 2019, pet. denied) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (same). 18 they have a different opinion of what was reasonable.

2019Co. v. Davilla, 139 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (“Although an attorney’s statements must be under oath to be considered evidence, the opponent of the testimony can waive the oath requirement by failing to object when an objection is necessary.” (citing Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam))); see also Anderson v. Safeway Tom Thumb, No. 02-18-00113-CV, 2019 WL 2223582 , at *11–12 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth May 23, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (same). 6 And before us, Appellant’s only challenge to the noteholder’s claim that Appellan

2021See Smith, 207 S.W.3d at 792 (upholding validity of warrant where affiant failed to sign affidavit; “Although the affiant’s signature on an affidavit serves as an important memorialization of the officer’s act of swearing before the magistrate, it is that act of swearing, not the signature itself, that is essential.”); Clay, 391 S.W.3d at 97 (upholding warrant where affidavit was sworn out telephonically and the magistrate recognized the officer’s voice, but emphasizing that “an oath is both constitutionally and statutorily indispensable . . .”).

2015PROC. article 18.01(b) to specifically and comprehensively regulate the process of obtaining search warrants by telephonic or other electronic means, “the question of whether the circumstances of an individual telephonic warrant application will suffice to satisfy the solemnizing function of the oath requirement under Article 18.01(b) will have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.” Clay v. State, 391 S.W.3d 94, 103-04 (Tex. Crim.

2019Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997) (holding attorney’s unsworn statements tendered as evidence were sufficient absent objection); see also Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (holding pro se litigants are governed by the same rules as attorneys). 166 S.W.3d 743 , 744–45 (Tex. 2005).

2005Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.1997) (holding attorney’s unsworn statements tendered as evidence were sufficient absent objection); see also Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex.2005) (holding pro se litigants are governed by the same rules as attorneys).

2013Id. at 804; Banda, 955 S.W.2d at 272 ; see also Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex.2005) (stating that, "while statements by neither [counsel] were under oath, the oath requirement was waived when neither raised any objection in circumstances that clearly indicated each was tendering evidence on the record based on personal knowledge on the sole contested issue,” i.e., whether the plaintiff's non-appearance was intentional or the result of conscious indifference); Molter v. State, 892 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla.Ct.App.2004) (prosecutor’s unsworn statements regarding claimed value of stole

2013Id. at 804; Banda , 955 S.W.2d at 272 ; see also Mathis v. Lockwood , 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005) (stating that, "while statements by neither [ counsel] were under oath, the oath requirement was waived when neither raised any objection in circumstances that clearly indicated each was tendering evidence on the record based on personal knowledge on the sole contested issue," i.e. , whether the plaintiff's non-appearance was intentional or the result of conscious indifference); Molter v. State , 892 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004) (prosecutor's unsworn statements regarding claimed value

2013It is worded as a pleading requirement and does not contain words of prohibition....”); Connor v. State, 877 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (when trial court treated a letter from the appellant as a pro se motion for new trial and held a hearing on it, court of appeals erred in finding that, because the letter was not verified or supported by affidavits, it was not a valid motion and the appellant was not entitled to counsel at the hearing); Rouse v. State, 300 S.W.3d 754, 758-59, 761-62 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (unsworn post-trial motion that had been overruled by operation of law was not sel

2013It is worded as a pleading requirement and does not contain words of prohibition . . . .”); Connor v. State, 877 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. Crim.

2013Id. at 804; Banda, 955 S.W.2d at 272 ; see also Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex.2005) (stating that, "while statements by neither [counsel] were under oath, the oath requirement was waived when neither raised any objection in circumstances that clearly indicated each was tendering evidence on the record based on personal knowledge on the sole contested issue,” i.e., whether the plaintiff's non-appearance was intentional or the result of conscious indifference); Molter v. State, 892 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla.Ct.App.2004) (prosecutor’s unsworn statements regarding claimed value of stole

2013Id. at 804; Banda , 955 S.W.2d at 272 ; see also Mathis v. Lockwood , 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005) (stating that, "while statements by neither [ counsel] were under oath, the oath requirement was waived when neither raised any objection in circumstances that clearly indicated each was tendering evidence on the record based on personal knowledge on the sole contested issue," i.e. , whether the plaintiff's non-appearance was intentional or the result of conscious indifference); Molter v. State , 892 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004) (prosecutor's unsworn statements regarding claimed value

1999Butler , 987 S.W.2d at 225 (emphasis in opinion).

1999Butler, 987 S.W.2d at 225 (emphasis in opinion).

2024See United States Gov’t v. Marks, 949 S.W.2d 320, 326 (Tex. 1997). “[T]he opponent of the testimony can waive the oath requirement by failing to object when the opponent knows or should know that an objection is necessary.” Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997).

2002Budding on its decision in United States Gov’t v. Marks, 949 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.1997) (holding that unsworn statements by counsel were not evidence, but could be relied on by the court), the Supreme Court in Banda v. Garcia by Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1997), recognized that an attorney must be under oath for statements to constitute evidence, but that the oath requirement can be waived by the opponent’s not objecting when the opponent knew or should have known that the attorney was providing testimony.

2001Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 463 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2000, pet. denied) (citing Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.1997)). 3 .

2001Banda, 955 S.W.2d at 272 ; Knie, 23 S.W.3d at 463 .

2000In support of this argument, the State asks us to apply case law decided under Rule of Evidence 603 which requires an oath or affirmation of witnesses prior to their testimony. 5 The State relies on Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), a Rule 603 case, and says Beck stands for the principle that a subsequent oath or admonishment can relate back to previously given testimony that was not under oath.

1997See 935 S.W.2d at 793 (citing Fullenwider, 821 S.W.2d at 662 , and Bloom v. Bloom, 767 S.W.2d 463, 471 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, writ denied)); see also Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 213 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

2024Op. at 12. 7 Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005). 8 Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997) (noting the oath requirement may be waived by the failure to object when the opponent of the testimony knows or should know an objection is necessary). 9 Mathis, 166 S.W.3d at 745 (considering attorney’s statements as evidence in the context of explaining why the attorney failed to appear); Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 451 (Tex. 1997) (explaining why the attorney exercised preemptory strikes).

2022See Taylor v. Vela, No. 01-17-00370- CV, 2018 WL 828224 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 13, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that, because record established that counsel, who was not under oath, was attempting to show that his office did not receive facsimile transmission, opposing counsel should have known to object to counsel’s unsworn statements, and thus counsel’s statements constituted some evidence that he did not receive facsimile transmission); Darnell v. Broberg, 565 S.W.3d 450, 462 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (holding that attorney’s unsworn statement, refuting c

2022See Taylor v. Vela, No. 01-17-00370- CV, 2018 WL 828224 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 13, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that, because record established that counsel, who was not under oath, was attempting to show that his office did not receive facsimile transmission, opposing counsel should have known to object to counsel’s unsworn statements, and thus counsel’s statements constituted some evidence that he did not receive facsimile transmission); Darnell v. Broberg, 565 S.W.3d 450, 462 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (holding that attorney’s unsworn statement, refuting c

2021See Smith, 207 S.W.3d at 792 (upholding validity of warrant where affiant failed to sign affidavit; “Although the affiant’s signature on an affidavit serves as an important memorialization of the officer’s act of swearing before the magistrate, it is that act of swearing, not the signature itself, that is essential.”); Clay, 391 S.W.3d at 97 (upholding warrant where affidavit was sworn out telephonically and the magistrate recognized the officer’s voice, but emphasizing that “an oath is both constitutionally and statutorily indispensable . . .”).

2021Evid. 603; see also Glenn v. C & G Elec., Inc., 977 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied) (holding that the oath requirement applies not only to those who will testify in person in the courtroom, but also to those who testify by deposition).

2021See Wheeler, 573 S.W.3d at 446 .

2018Dist. v. Parker, 484 S.W.3d 182, 194 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (adopting the same approach with regard to intake questionnaires filed with the EEOC); but see Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. 2011) (holding that a statute requiring post-suit notice to a county was not jurisdictional pursuant to section 311.034 since the requirement could only be satisfied after suit was filed).

2015See Johnson v. Hawkins, 255 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. ref’d) (noting that while the appellate court did not endorse a trial judge’s decision to call and question a witness, because there was no objection, the testimony could be considered by the trial court); see also Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997) (holding that a party can waive the oath requirement by failing to object when the opponent knows or should have known that an objection was necessary).

2014See Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005) (citing Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997)). -7- 04-13-00363-CV Morales’s case is similar to the case of Cliff v. Huggins, 696 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985) (Cliff I), rev’d, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987) (Cliff II).

2014Druery v. State, 412 S.W.3d 523, 532-33 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (citing Ex parte Golden, 991 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)). “[Njothing in Article 11.14 indicates it was intended to limit the jurisdiction of this Court to consider [a habeas] application not in compliance with the oath requirement or any of its other requisites....