pursuant rule in California

2025(See In re Eric H. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 955 , 968‒969 [“Section 350(c), the equivalent of a motion for nonsuit, allows a parent to test the sufficiency of the Agency’s evidence before presenting his or her case.”].) Moreover, it is unnecessary to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). 30.

2014Introduction The Orange County Superior Court, after a decision by the appellate division (Huntington Continental Town House Assn., Inc. v. Miner (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th Supp. 13 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 609 ] (Huntington Continental)), certified this case for transfer to this court pursuant to rule 8.1005(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court to address a single question.

2014Introduction The Orange County Superior Court, after a decision by the appellate division (Huntington Continental Town House Assn., Inc. v. Miner (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th Supp. 13 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 609 ] (Huntington Continental)), certified this case for transfer to this court pursuant to rule 8.1005(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court to address a single question.

1990The Supreme Court ordered that the opinion be published in the official reports and the opinion remains published at 192 Cal.App.3d 1630 .

1984(Stats. 1983, ch. 123, § 3, p. 203.) 8 Since the weekend afforded plaintiff an extra two days, even under defendants’ calculations, we need not quibble over whether plaintiff would have had until March 7 or March 8 to bring the matter to trial, absent the arbitration proceeding. 9 The trial court, however, could have taken judicial notice of the copy which was attached to Barnes’ earlier affidavit in opposition to plaintiff’s motion to vacate the original dismissal. 10 The affidavit of Deputy City Attorney McConnell, being totally conclusory and not containing an averment of personal knowledge

1984(Stats. 1983, ch. 123, § 3, p. 203.) 8 Since the weekend afforded plaintiff an extra two days, even under defendants’ calculations, we need not quibble over whether plaintiff would have had until March 7 or March 8 to bring the matter to trial, absent the arbitration proceeding. 9 The trial court, however, could have taken judicial notice of the copy which was attached to Barnes’ earlier affidavit in opposition to plaintiff’s motion to vacate the original dismissal. 10 The affidavit of Deputy City Attorney McConnell, being totally conclusory and not containing an averment of personal knowledge

1984(Stats. 1983, ch. 123, § 3, p. 203.) 8 Since the weekend afforded plaintiff an extra two days, even under defendants’ calculations, we need not quibble over whether plaintiff would have had until March 7 or March 8 to bring the matter to trial, absent the arbitration proceeding. 9 The trial court, however, could have taken judicial notice of the copy which was attached to Barnes’ earlier affidavit in opposition to plaintiff’s motion to vacate the original dismissal. 10 The affidavit of Deputy City Attorney McConnell, being totally conclusory and not containing an averment of personal knowledge

1984(Stats. 1983, ch. 123, § 3, p. 203.) 8 Since the weekend afforded plaintiff an extra two days, even under defendants’ calculations, we need not quibble over whether plaintiff would have had until March 7 or March 8 to bring the matter to trial, absent the arbitration proceeding. 9 The trial court, however, could have taken judicial notice of the copy which was attached to Barnes’ earlier affidavit in opposition to plaintiff’s motion to vacate the original dismissal. 10 The affidavit of Deputy City Attorney McConnell, being totally conclusory and not containing an averment of personal knowledge

1981Those consolidated appeals were transferred to this court pursuant to rule 62 and our published opinion is reported under the caption Babcock v. Antis (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 823 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 673 ].

1981Those consolidated appeals were transferred to this court pursuant to rule 62 and our published opinion is reported under the caption Babcock v. Antis (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 823 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 673 ].

1980For the reasons set forth below, we have concluded that although defendant’s confession was inadmissible, the error was not prejudicial per se under the rare exception of People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ] and People v. Cotter (1965) 63 Cal.2d 386 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 405 P.2d 862 ]; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

1980For the reasons set forth below, we have concluded that although defendant’s confession was inadmissible, the error was not prejudicial per se under the rare exception of People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ] and People v. Cotter (1965) 63 Cal.2d 386 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 405 P.2d 862 ]; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

1980For the reasons set forth below, we have concluded that although defendant’s confession was inadmissible, the error was not prejudicial per se under the rare exception of People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ] and People v. Cotter (1965) 63 Cal.2d 386 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 405 P.2d 862 ]; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

1980For the reasons set forth below, we have concluded that although defendant’s confession was inadmissible, the error was not prejudicial per se under the rare exception of People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ] and People v. Cotter (1965) 63 Cal.2d 386 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 405 P.2d 862 ]; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

1980The major *255 contentions on appeal are that: 1) his arrest was unlawful; 2) his confession was involuntary as made after threats, promises and psychological inducements and also was a product of continued interrogation; 3) it was error to permit the prosecutor to replay the tape-recorded confession to the jury during his closing argument; 4) there was insufficient substantial evidence to support the convictions without the confession; 5) the verdict did not reflect a unanimous jury under either of two alternative murder conviction theories; and 6) the trial court’s failure to instruct the ju

1980The major *255 contentions on appeal are that: 1) his arrest was unlawful; 2) his confession was involuntary as made after threats, promises and psychological inducements and also was a product of continued interrogation; 3) it was error to permit the prosecutor to replay the tape-recorded confession to the jury during his closing argument; 4) there was insufficient substantial evidence to support the convictions without the confession; 5) the verdict did not reflect a unanimous jury under either of two alternative murder conviction theories; and 6) the trial court’s failure to instruct the ju

1976We ordered transfer of the cause to this court pursuant to rule 62(a) of the California Rules of Court. *229 Lewd and Dissolute Conduct The trial court defined “lewd and dissolute conduct” as provided in the current version of CALJIC (Misdemeanor) No. 16.402, pertaining to Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a), as follows: “.. . the words ‘lewd’ and ‘dissolute’ are synonymous and mean lustful, lascivious, unchaste, wanton, or loose in morals and conduct.” The latter instruction has remained unchanged for many years and relies upon People v. Loignon, 160 Cal.App.2d 412, 420 [ 325 P.2d 541 ],

1976We ordered transfer of the cause to this court pursuant to rule 62(a) of the California Rules of Court. *229 Lewd and Dissolute Conduct The trial court defined “lewd and dissolute conduct” as provided in the current version of CALJIC (Misdemeanor) No. 16.402, pertaining to Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a), as follows: “.. . the words ‘lewd’ and ‘dissolute’ are synonymous and mean lustful, lascivious, unchaste, wanton, or loose in morals and conduct.” The latter instruction has remained unchanged for many years and relies upon People v. Loignon, 160 Cal.App.2d 412, 420 [ 325 P.2d 541 ],

1971The questions so presented are: (1) What constitutes indigency of a defendant under the ruling in In re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 255 , 473 P.2d 999 ] that an indigent defendant cannot constitutionally be imprisoned for nonpayment of a fine? (2) Where the fact of indigency has been decided by the trial judge, does the appellate court reexamine the question de novo, or do the usual rules for reviewing a trial court’s determination of fact apply?

1971The questions so presented are: (1) What constitutes indigency of a defendant under the ruling in In re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 255 , 473 P.2d 999 ] that an indigent defendant cannot constitutionally be imprisoned for nonpayment of a fine? (2) Where the fact of indigency has been decided by the trial judge, does the appellate court reexamine the question de novo, or do the usual rules for reviewing a trial court’s determination of fact apply?