opening the door doctrine in Colorado

2026Opening the Door ¶ 54 The opening-the-door doctrine serves to “prevent one party in a criminal trial from gaining and maintaining an unfair advantage by the selective presentation of facts that, without being elaborated or placed in context, create an incorrect or misleading impression.” Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Colo. 2008).

2025Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Colo. 2008); Melillo, 25 P.3d at 775 ; People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191, 195 (Colo. 1996). ¶ 16 But the opening the door doctrine is not unlimited.

2026Because the case will turn on whether the jury finds the child credible, "courts must be particularly mindful of testimony that a child victim is telling the truth when that child's testimony is 'the focal issue in the case.'" Id. (quoting Snook , 745 P.2d at 649 ). 47 ¶80 The opening the door doctrine "'can be used only to prevent prejudice; it can't be used as an excuse to inject prejudice into the case.'" People v. Ray, 2025 CO 42M, ¶ 86 , 575 P.3d 400 , 427-28 (emphases added) (quoting People v. Cohen, 2019 COA 38, ¶ 23 , 440 P.3d 1256, 1262-63 ).

2026Because the case will turn on whether the jury finds the child credible, "courts must be particularly mindful of testimony that a child victim is telling the truth when that child's testimony is 'the focal issue in the case.'" Id. (quoting Snook , 745 P.2d at 649 ). 47 ¶80 The opening the door doctrine "'can be used only to prevent prejudice; it can't be used as an excuse to inject prejudice into the case.'" People v. Ray, 2025 CO 42M, ¶ 86 , 575 P.3d 400 , 427-28 (emphases added) (quoting People v. Cohen, 2019 COA 38, ¶ 23 , 440 P.3d 1256, 1262-63 ).

2026Id. (citing Murphy, 919 P.2d at 195-99 ). 1 There are additional exceptions to rape shield inadmissibility, but Webb does not assert that any such exception — other than the opening-the-door doctrine — applies here. 13 C.

2025Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Colo. 2008); Melillo, 25 P.3d at 775 ; People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191, 195 (Colo. 1996). ¶ 16 But the opening the door doctrine is not unlimited.

2026Pernell v. People, 2018 CO 13, ¶¶ 4, 24 , 411 P.3d 669, 670, 673 (declining to address whether an opening statement "opened the door" to inadmissible evidence); see also Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57 , ¶¶ 2, 12, 310 P.3d 58, 59, 61 . 49 ¶85 In Medina, we held that the prosecution could contradict the defendant's testimony with lay testimony on rebuttal. 291 P.2d at 1062 .

2026Pernell v. People, 2018 CO 13, ¶¶ 4, 24 , 411 P.3d 669, 670, 673 (declining to address whether an opening statement "opened the door" to inadmissible evidence); see also Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57 , ¶¶ 2, 12, 310 P.3d 58, 59, 61 . 49 ¶85 In Medina, we held that the prosecution could contradict the defendant's testimony with lay testimony on rebuttal. 291 P.2d at 1062 .

2026Pernell v. People, 2018 CO 13, ¶¶ 4, 24 , 411 P.3d 669, 670, 673 (declining to address whether an opening statement "opened the door" to inadmissible evidence); see also Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57 , ¶¶ 2, 12, 310 P.3d 58, 59, 61 . 49 ¶85 In Medina, we held that the prosecution could contradict the defendant's testimony with lay testimony on rebuttal. 291 P.2d at 1062 .

2026Pernell v. People, 2018 CO 13, ¶¶ 4, 24 , 411 P.3d 669, 670, 673 (declining to address whether an opening statement "opened the door" to inadmissible evidence); see also Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57 , ¶¶ 2, 12, 310 P.3d 58, 59, 61 . 49 ¶85 In Medina, we held that the prosecution could contradict the defendant's testimony with lay testimony on rebuttal. 291 P.2d at 1062 .

2026See People v. Johnson, 2021 CO 35, ¶ 15 , 486 P.3d 1154, 1158 .

2026See People v. Johnson, 2021 CO 35, ¶ 15 , 486 P.3d 1154, 1158 .

2026However, it does not give “unbridled license to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence.” People v. Cohen, 2019 COA 38, ¶ 23 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 988 F.2d 685, 702 (7th Cir. 1993)). ¶ 55 According to Li, even though Detective Andrews did not testify to Martinez’s exact statements, his testimony still opened the door because it revealed that Martinez provided information that allowed Detective Andrews to “track down the rest of the parties who were inside the vehicle.” Li argues that this left the impression that Martinez had described to the police the nature of the incident a

2026See People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 17-19 (Colo. 1999). ¶50 Equally importantly, the opening the door doctrine is inapplicable here.

2026Compare Golob, 180 P.3d at 1012 ("'[O]pening the door' represents an effort by courts to prevent one party in a criminal trial from gaining and maintaining an unfair advantage by the selective presentation of facts that, without being elaborated or placed in context, create an incorrect or misleading impression."), with Miller, 890 P.2d at 98-99 (same).

2026In Hemphill v. New York , 595 U.S. 140, 152 (2022), for example, the Supreme Court observed that New York's version of the principle requires state courts "to determine whether one party's evidence and arguments, in the context of the full record, have created a 'misleading impression' that requires correction with additional material from the other side." Colorado largely speaks the same language as New York when it comes to the opening the door doctrine.

2025See Murphy, 919 P.2d at 195 (“When a party opens the door to inadmissible evidence, [its] opponent may then 9 inquire into the previously barred matter.”); see also People v. Rollins, 892 P.2d 866, 873 (Colo. 1995) (“The trial court was not required to issue a limiting instruction or comply with the procedural requirements of . . .

2025See People v. Martinez, 2020 COA 141, ¶ 43 (holding the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless because it “constituted a minor portion of [the defendant’s] trial” and “the prosecutor did not refer to or repeat this testimony at any other point of the trial, including during her opening statement and closing argument.”).

2021But a “defendant cannot introduce evidence of a victim’s prior sexual history to attack the credibility of a victim as a witness.” People v. Wallen, 996 P.2d 182, 186 (Colo. App. 1999) (interpreting the rape shield statute).