11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1970–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Colsongreen2 sentences1990Hence, “the need for the extensive hearing before the hearing committee and The Board was obviated_” Colson, supra, 412 A.2d at 1165 . 2 Moreover, although Congress has treated distribution and, impliedly, possession of a small amount of marijuana with intent to distribute, for no remuneration, different for purposes of sentencing, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (b)(4) and 844, respondent was not sentenced under these provisions, but under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D). 3 *1062 We express no opinion as to the effect sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(4) would have on the determination of mo 1990Hence, “the need for the extensive hearing before the hearing committee and The Board was obviated_” Colson, supra, 412 A.2d at 1165 . 2 Moreover, although Congress has treated distribution and, impliedly, possession of a small amount of marijuana with intent to distribute, for no remuneration, different for purposes of sentencing, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (b)(4) and 844, respondent was not sentenced under these provisions, but under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D). 3 *1062 We express no opinion as to the effect sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(4) would have on the determination of mo | 2 | 3 |
In Re Corizzigreen1 sentence2022We clarified, however, that a “lawyer need not actually be convicted of a crime of moral turpitude in order to be disbarred on the basis of the underlying conduct.” In re Corizzi, 803 A.2d at 442 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Spiridongreen2 sentences2018Code § 11-2503 (a) (2012 Repl.) provides that “[w]hen a member of the bar . . . is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, . . . [his] name . . . shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and such person shall thereafter cease to be a member.” “Whether [respondent’s] offense constitute[d] moral turpitude within the meaning of the statute is a question of law . . . committed to this court[’s judgment].” In re Spiridon, 755 A.2d 463, 468 (D.C. 2000). 2018Code § 11-2503 (a) (2012 Repl.) provides that "[w]hen a member of the bar ... is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, ... [his] name ... shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and such person shall thereafter cease to be a member." "Whether [respondent's] offense constitute[d] moral turpitude within the meaning of the statute is a question of law ... committed to this court['s judgment]." In re Spiridon , 755 A.2d 463 , 468 (D.C. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Edwardsgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., In re Edwards, 870 A.2d 90 , 94 & n. 4 (D.C.2005) (‘Edwards III”) (citing cases). 16 Here, the Board considered mitigating factors, such as respondent’s “reputation for honesty and integrity, the fact that his clients did not file a complaint, his cooperation with Bar counsel, and his taking ultimate responsibility for the overdraft,’ and ... the fact that he is one of the few members of the bar engaged in the practice of street crime defense,’ ” but concluded that they did not “carry the day when balanced against the misappropriation, the failure to supervise Mr. Kourtesis adequate | 1 | 1 |
Burton v. Mottolesegreen2 sentences2006Conn. Gen.Stat. § 51-84 (2003); Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1 , 835 A.2d 998, 1017 (2003) (The Supreme Court noted "that the [Connecticut] Superior Court possesses inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar. 2006Conn. Gen.Stat. § 51-84 (2003); Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1 , 835 A.2d 998, 1017 (2003) (The Supreme Court noted "that the [Connecticut] Superior Court possesses inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar. | 1 | 1 |
In Re McBridegreen2 sentences2002In re Hopmayer, 625 A.2d 290, 292 (D.C.1993); see also, e.g., In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. 1992) (en banc). [2] By contrast, the same section states that, "[u]pon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment" (emphasis added). 2002In re Hopmayer, 625 A.2d 290, 292 (D.C.1993); see also, e.g., In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C.1992) (en banc). 2 By contrast, the same section states that, “[u]pon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment” (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Meyersongreen2 sentences2002Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment. [2] In McBride , on the other hand, we recognized that the statutory language (specifically the word "thereafter") was ambiguous with respect to the length of disbarment, 602 A.2d at 637-38 , and applying by analogy the rule of lenity in criminal cases, we interpreted that ambiguity to mean that an attorney disbarred under the statute, "like all others who have been disbarred, [is] entitled to petition for reinstatement ... after five years of disbarment." Id. at 641 . [3] The court 2002Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment. [2] In McBride , on the other hand, we recognized that the statutory language (specifically the word "thereafter") was ambiguous with respect to the length of disbarment, 602 A.2d at 637-38 , and applying by analogy the rule of lenity in criminal cases, we interpreted that ambiguity to mean that an attorney disbarred under the statute, "like all others who have been disbarred, [is] entitled to petition for reinstatement ... after five years of disbarment." Id. at 641 . [3] The court | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hopmayergreen2 sentences2002In re Hopmayer, 625 A.2d 290, 292 (D.C.1993); see also, e.g., In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. 1992) (en banc). [2] By contrast, the same section states that, "[u]pon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment" (emphasis added). 2002In re Hopmayer, 625 A.2d 290, 292 (D.C.1993); see also, e.g., In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C.1992) (en banc). 2 By contrast, the same section states that, “[u]pon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment” (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
MacKinnon v. Ferbergreen2 sentences1980To repeat, § 11-2503(a) states in part: If a final judgment of conviction is certified to the court, the name of the member of the bar so convicted shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and he shall thereafter cease to be a member. [Emphasis added.] See, e. g., MacKinnon v. Ferber, 16 N.J.Super. 390, 395 , 84 A.2d 647, 649 (1951) (statute which compels forfeiture of right to drive thereafter upon second conviction of drunken driving means permanent forfeiture “for such is the force of the word ‘thereafter’ 16 A similar statute in New York has been so construed. 17 Judiciary L 1980To repeat, § 11-2503(a) states in part: If a final judgment of conviction is certified to the court, the name of the member of the bar so convicted shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and he shall thereafter cease to be a member. [Emphasis added.] See, e. g., MacKinnon v. Ferber, 16 N.J.Super. 390, 395 , 84 A.2d 647, 649 (1951) (statute which compels forfeiture of right to drive thereafter upon second conviction of drunken driving means permanent forfeiture “for such is the force of the word ‘thereafter’ 16 A similar statute in New York has been so construed. 17 Judiciary L | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Mance
green
2 sentences2017In determining to reinstate Mr. Manee subject to these conditions, we have also taken into consideration that, as we have observed before, he has a “ ‘lengthy and well-reputed history of providing an important service’ to 'the community by serving as one of the few members of the bar engaged in the practice of street crime defense.” In re Mance, 980 A.2d at 1208 (quoting In re Mance, 869 A.2d at 342 n.10). 2009In re Mance, 869 A.2d 339 , 342 n. 10 (D.C.2005). | 2 | 2009–2017 |
In Re Mance
green
1 sentence2017In determining to reinstate Mr. Manee subject to these conditions, we have also taken into consideration that, as we have observed before, he has a “ ‘lengthy and well-reputed history of providing an important service’ to 'the community by serving as one of the few members of the bar engaged in the practice of street crime defense.” In re Mance, 980 A.2d at 1208 (quoting In re Mance, 869 A.2d at 342 n.10). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1970A. It is evident that, at a minimum, Judge NEBEKER has grave doubts that there was probable cause for an arrest in this case at the time it was announced by the police officer, else there would be no need to apply Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 1970A. It is evident that, at a minimum, Judge NEBEKER has grave doubts that there was probable cause for an arrest in this case at the time it was announced by the police officer, else there would be no need to apply Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.