members bar in Illinois

1989This court stated as much 26 years ago in Pocius v. Halvorsen (1963), 30 Ill. 2d 73, 78 , when we stated that an attorney’s collection of a contingent fee “depend[s] upon the success or failure to enforce a supposed right.” In addition, Rule 2 — 106(c)(1) of the Code clearly states that a contingent fee agreement is an “agreement for the provision of legal services by a lawyer under which the amount of the lawyer’s compensation is contingent in whole or in part upon the successful accomplishment (by settlement or litigation) of the subject matter of the agreement.” (107 Ill. 2d R. 2 — 106(c)(1

1983(Application of Schatz.) Moreover, courts traditionally have employed the members of the bar for the purpose of ascertaining the qualifications of those applying for membership (Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee (1933), 116 Conn. 409 , 165 A. 211 ), and have recognized that the American Bar Association is a representative body upon whose accreditation decisions a State court or bar examining board properly may rely.

1983(Application of Schatz.) Moreover, courts traditionally have employed the members of the bar for the purpose of ascertaining the qualifications of those applying for membership (Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee (1933), 116 Conn. 409 , 165 A. 211 ), and have recognized that the American Bar Association is a representative body upon whose accreditation decisions a State court or bar examining board properly may rely.

1983Citing In re O’Hallaren (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 426 , the panel noted that “although conviction of wilful failure to file tax returns does not necessarily establish moral turpitude, it does establish misconduct constituting grounds for discipline in the absence of mitigating circumstance of an extraordinary nature.” The hearing panel reviewed a number of disciplinary cases involving tax convictions and concluded that “although mitigating circumstances did exist they were insufficient to warrant no discipline.” Despite the convictions for wilfully failing to file tax returns, the hearing panel concl

1978Likewise we note that our supreme court in People v. McCasle (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 552 , 221 N.E.2d 227 , pointed out that Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60 , 86 L.

1978Likewise we note that our supreme court in People v. McCasle (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 552 , 221 N.E.2d 227 , pointed out that Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60 , 86 L.

1978Likewise we note that our supreme court in People v. McCasle (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 552 , 221 N.E.2d 227 , pointed out that Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60 , 86 L.

1978Likewise we note that our supreme court in People v. McCasle (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 552 , 221 N.E.2d 227 , pointed out that Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60 , 86 L.

1978In United States v. Mandell (7th Cir.1975), 525 F.2d 671 , the court held the three co-defendants were not denied effective representation in being represented by one counsel despite the contention that they were not equally culpable; that the primary responsibility for the ascertainment and avoidance of conflict must lie with the members of the bar; that the sixth amendment rights of defendants are adequately safeguarded by imposing the duty of informing defendants of the potential dangers of multiclient representation, initially on the attorneys as officers of the court, and by admonishing t

1978In United States v. Mandell (7th Cir. 1975), 525 F.2d 671 , the court held the three co-defendants were not denied effective representation in being represented by one counsel despite the contention that they were not equally culpable; that the primary responsibility for the ascertainment and- avoidance of conflict must lie with the members of the bar; that the sixth amendment rights of defendants are adequately safeguarded by imposing the duty of informing defendants of the potential dangers of multiclient representation, initially on the attorneys as officers of the court, and by admonishing

1977It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that the legislature is presumed “not to have intended an absurdity or injustice.” (Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 121, 128 , 302 N.E.2d 64 .) It is manifest that any attempt to apply multifarious limits to the limitation period for filing legal proceedings would be impossible of practical application by the members of the bar.

1977It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that the legislature is presumed “not to have intended an absurdity or injustice.” (Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 121, 128 , 302 N.E.2d 64 .) It is manifest that any attempt to apply multifarious limits to the limitation period for filing legal proceedings would be impossible of practical application by the members of the bar.

1896Hawkins v. Hunt, 14 Ill. 42 .

1894Crane v. Nelson, 37 Ill.