Wainwright standard in Delaware

2024Defense counsel did not object to either of the statements during trial, and we 6 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 7 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82 . 5 therefore review for plain error.8 We first “examine the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.”9 “If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.”10 If we determine that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, “we move to the second step in the plain error analysis” and consider, under t

2024Defense counsel did not object to either of the statements during trial, and we 6 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 7 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82 . 5 therefore review for plain error.8 We first “examine the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.”9 “If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.”10 If we determine that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, “we move to the second step in the plain error analysis” and consider, under t

2025Dec. 9, 2003) (TABLE). 5 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 6 Trala, 244 A.3d at 998. 6 our analysis ends.7 If we find misconduct, then we apply the Wainwright standard to determine whether reversal is warranted.8 (12) We find no plain error as to the videos’ authentication.

2025Dec. 9, 2003) (TABLE). 5 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 6 Trala, 244 A.3d at 998. 6 our analysis ends.7 If we find misconduct, then we apply the Wainwright standard to determine whether reversal is warranted.8 (12) We find no plain error as to the videos’ authentication.

2023Accordingly, 40 Id. 41 Trial Tr., Nov. 2, 2022, at 130. 42 Spence II, 129 A.3d at 229 (quoting Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 ). 43 Morales v. State, 133 A.3d 527, 532 (Del. 2016) (quoting Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 959 (Del. 2006)). the improper statement does not satisfy the Wainwright standard and does not warrant granting a new trial. 26.

2023Accordingly, 40 Id. 41 Trial Tr., Nov. 2, 2022, at 130. 42 Spence II, 129 A.3d at 229 (quoting Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 ). 43 Morales v. State, 133 A.3d 527, 532 (Del. 2016) (quoting Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 959 (Del. 2006)). the improper statement does not satisfy the Wainwright standard and does not warrant granting a new trial. 26.

2023Accordingly, 40 Id. 41 Trial Tr., Nov. 2, 2022, at 130. 42 Spence II, 129 A.3d at 229 (quoting Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 ). 43 Morales v. State, 133 A.3d 527, 532 (Del. 2016) (quoting Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 959 (Del. 2006)). the improper statement does not satisfy the Wainwright standard and does not warrant granting a new trial. 26.

2023Accordingly, 40 Id. 41 Trial Tr., Nov. 2, 2022, at 130. 42 Spence II, 129 A.3d at 229 (quoting Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 ). 43 Morales v. State, 133 A.3d 527, 532 (Del. 2016) (quoting Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 959 (Del. 2006)). the improper statement does not satisfy the Wainwright standard and does not warrant granting a new trial. 26.

2022Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.20 If the Court finds plain error occurred under the Wainwright standard, the Court will reverse without reaching the third step of the analysis.21 If misconduct would not warrant reversal under Wainwright, the Court applies Hunter as “the third analytical step and consider whether the prosecutor's statements are rep

2022Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.20 If the Court finds plain error occurred under the Wainwright standard, the Court will reverse without reaching the third step of the analysis.21 If misconduct would not warrant reversal under Wainwright, the Court applies Hunter as “the third analytical step and consider whether the prosecutor's statements are rep

2020Moreover, we apply the test itself in a contextual, case-by- case, and fact sensitive manner. 33 If we conclude that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred but that reversal is not warranted because of the failure to meet the Wainwright standard under plain- error review or the Hughes standard under harmful-error analysis, we proceed to yet another analytical step in accordance with our decision in Hunter v. State.34 Under Hunter, even where we are unable to conclude that the prosecutor’s misconduct was so prejudicial as to compromise the fairness of the trial process, we may yet reverse where

2020Moreover, we apply the test itself in a contextual, case-by- case, and fact sensitive manner. 33 If we conclude that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred but that reversal is not warranted because of the failure to meet the Wainwright standard under plain- error review or the Hughes standard under harmful-error analysis, we proceed to yet another analytical step in accordance with our decision in Hunter v. State.34 Under Hunter, even where we are unable to conclude that the prosecutor’s misconduct was so prejudicial as to compromise the fairness of the trial process, we may yet reverse where

2024Defense counsel did not object to either of the statements during trial, and we 6 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 7 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82 . 5 therefore review for plain error.8 We first “examine the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.”9 “If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.”10 If we determine that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, “we move to the second step in the plain error analysis” and consider, under t

2024Defense counsel did not object to either of the statements during trial, and we 6 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 7 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82 . 5 therefore review for plain error.8 We first “examine the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.”9 “If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.”10 If we determine that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, “we move to the second step in the plain error analysis” and consider, under t

2024Defense counsel did not object to either of the statements during trial, and we 6 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 7 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82 . 5 therefore review for plain error.8 We first “examine the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.”9 “If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.”10 If we determine that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, “we move to the second step in the plain error analysis” and consider, under t

2024Defense counsel did not object to either of the statements during trial, and we 6 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 7 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82 . 5 therefore review for plain error.8 We first “examine the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.”9 “If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.”10 If we determine that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, “we move to the second step in the plain error analysis” and consider, under t

2024Defense counsel did not object to either of the statements during trial, and we 6 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 7 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82 . 5 therefore review for plain error.8 We first “examine the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.”9 “If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.”10 If we determine that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, “we move to the second step in the plain error analysis” and consider, under t

2024Defense counsel did not object to either of the statements during trial, and we 6 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 7 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82 . 5 therefore review for plain error.8 We first “examine the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.”9 “If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.”10 If we determine that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, “we move to the second step in the plain error analysis” and consider, under t

2022Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.20 If the Court finds plain error occurred under the Wainwright standard, the Court will reverse without reaching the third step of the analysis.21 If misconduct would not warrant reversal under Wainwright, the Court applies Hunter as “the third analytical step and consider whether the prosecutor's statements are rep

2022Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.20 If the Court finds plain error occurred under the Wainwright standard, the Court will reverse without reaching the third step of the analysis.21 If misconduct would not warrant reversal under Wainwright, the Court applies Hunter as “the third analytical step and consider whether the prosecutor's statements are rep

2021The Prosecutor Did Not Make Improper Remarks Warranting Reversal The second issue on appeal is whether the prosecutor made improper comments during his rebuttal summation by misstating the burden of proof, denigrating the role of defense counsel, and improperly vouching for evidence.69 We apply the plain error standard of review because defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s remarks during trial.70 The first step in our analysis, however, is to review the record de novo to determine whether the prosecutor made improper comments.71 “If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our a

2021The Prosecutor Did Not Make Improper Remarks Warranting Reversal The second issue on appeal is whether the prosecutor made improper comments during his rebuttal summation by misstating the burden of proof, denigrating the role of defense counsel, and improperly vouching for evidence.69 We apply the plain error standard of review because defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s remarks during trial.70 The first step in our analysis, however, is to review the record de novo to determine whether the prosecutor made improper comments.71 “If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our a

2020Moreover, we apply the test itself in a contextual, case-by- case, and fact sensitive manner. 33 If we conclude that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred but that reversal is not warranted because of the failure to meet the Wainwright standard under plain- error review or the Hughes standard under harmful-error analysis, we proceed to yet another analytical step in accordance with our decision in Hunter v. State.34 Under Hunter, even where we are unable to conclude that the prosecutor’s misconduct was so prejudicial as to compromise the fairness of the trial process, we may yet reverse where

2020Moreover, we apply the test itself in a contextual, case-by- case, and fact sensitive manner. 33 If we conclude that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred but that reversal is not warranted because of the failure to meet the Wainwright standard under plain- error review or the Hughes standard under harmful-error analysis, we proceed to yet another analytical step in accordance with our decision in Hunter v. State.34 Under Hunter, even where we are unable to conclude that the prosecutor’s misconduct was so prejudicial as to compromise the fairness of the trial process, we may yet reverse where

2013Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 967 (Del.2000). .

2013Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 967 (Del.2000). .

1994See Murphy v. State, Del.Supr., 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1993).

1994See Murphy v. State, Del.Supr., 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1993).